Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

345. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Karachi, December 20, 1963, Noon.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Mohammad Ayub Khan
• Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
• General Mohammad Musa, C-in-C of Pakistan Army
• Mr. Nazir Ahmed, Secretary of Defence
• General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy
• Major General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA

Taylor visited Pakistan December 19-20. A brief initial meeting between Taylor and Ayub at 8:15 a.m. on December 20 was reported in telegram 1188 from Karachi, December 21. (Ibid.)

After opening amenities, President Ayub in response to an invitation from General Taylor to give his general assessment of the security situation in the subcontinent, stated that he was bound to put forward the view that security interests of Pakistan had been seriously prejudiced by US military assistance to India. Vital interests of Pakistan had been placed in jeopardy. There was no telling what India would do with the added capability given her by the United States. He thought India would use the vast additional military strength to intimidate her smaller neighbors. The strength would not be used against the Chinese Communists. The Indians knew they could not challenge Communist China and they would in time seek an accommodation with the Chinese Communists. From the standpoint of India’s own selfish interests, the augmented military program was a mistake. Indian military expenses rose about 300 per cent in the years just before the attack in 1962, and had risen another 300 per cent since then. This was a very heavy burden on the Indian people.

The US policy toward India had placed Pakistan in a “terrible predicament.” Pakistan was torn between her sense of loyalty to the United States as an ally and the need to look after Pakistan’s security interests which had been hurt by US action.

In response to General Taylor’s observation that there should be no incompatibility between national security and loyalty to an ally, Ayub agreed that this should be so. But he felt that Pakistan’s security interests had been disregarded. The U.S. “held Pakistan’s interests too cheap.” It seemed that Pakistan’s security was considered an expendable commodity if it conflicted with other concerns of the United States. He thought that “wittingly or unwittingly,” the U.S. was building up the enemy of Pakistan. This was hard to reconcile with the status of uniquely close friendship which has happily prevailed between the United States and Pakistan. Ayub assured us that “we will fight for this land of ours.”

President Ayub indicated that he could not figure out why we had not required the Indians to come to a clear understanding with us on the nature of the commitments she would assume in return for the US aid she would receive. He thought India was assuming commitments against the Chinese which she could not and would not discharge, and was refusing to make collective security commitments to participate in the common defense which she could make and should be required to make. Ayub said it was self evident that the security objectives which presumably underlay our policy of assistance to India could not be achieved without a settlement between India and Pakistan, because the subcontinent was not defensible without the cooperation of India and Pakistan. Therefore, our Indian policy was self defeating unless we made an Indo-Pak settlement a condition precedent.

Ayub said it was the considered conclusion of the GOP that there would not be any Sino-Indian conflict. Tibet was not a feasible base for Chinese aggression across the Himalayas. He predicted that India would in time work out an accommodation with Communist China and then proceed to expel US influence from South Asia. He prophesied that the Indians would agree on “spheres of influence” with the Chinese. The Indians wanted only the “Indian Ocean littoral” and would leave Southeast Asia and the rest to Communist China.

The Indians would then be free to settle by force with Pakistan, using force in the same way that she has invoked force in the past. He recalled that India had already forced two mobilizations by Pakistan.

Ayub recognized that American assistance was not the only important contribution to the armament of India but he said that American aid was providing the decisive margin. And aid was the unsettling factor which was undermining the stability of the area. He said “only the Communists will benefit.” He said that all the peripheral small countries around India were disillusioned to see “US policy coinciding with India’s.” They would feel compelled to turn to Communist China to seek a counterweight against a stronger India which could not be trusted. He said that “sometimes in a bad situation it is necessary to lie down with the Devil.” Commenting on General Taylor’s remark that it was risky business to associate with the Devil, Ayub said sometimes it was necessary to decide which was the lesser of two Devils.

President Ayub insisted that the U.S. could not rely on Indian collaboration. He reiterated that India would eventually liquidate the US position in this area and accommodate with the Communists. The Pakistanis knew the Indians. Their positive prediction should be heeded. He recalled that Nehru has consistently sided with the USSR and the Communist Bloc against the U.S. and he will surely revert to this position. Ayub urged that the U.S. should support the smaller countries of South Asia. This was the natural course for the U.S. to follow in preserving a stable balance. All three of the big countries of the area (China, USSR, and India) were expansionist and it was disastrous for the U.S. to support any of them against the small countries. It forced the small countries to follow an unnatural course in trying to play one of the big Asian countries off against another as a means of self preservation. The Indians were not genuine allies of the U.S. and the U.S. is making a serious mistake to regard them as allies.

Ayub said that the people of Pakistan are completely baffled at the American policy of military aid to India. Everyone asks “Why?” and there is no good answer. The issue has made the life of every Pakistani miserable and the policy seems so clearly mistaken that Pakistanis keep looking for a deeper design not apparent to them. The President ended by saying, “We are in a fix. We have never had such a deep and close relationship as we have had with the U.S. and we want to continue to be your friends.” He implied that the creation of a deep sense of fear and insecurity in Pakistan was not consistent with friendship.

General Taylor expressed his appreciation for the opportunity of hearing firsthand a complete exposition of the President’s views. He mentioned that the U.S. and the GOP evaluations of Chinese Communist capabilities against the subcontinent were about the same. However, we differed on the strength of defense forces needed by India as a deterrent. The figures which the Pakistan Service Chiefs had given him in an earlier meeting were somewhat lower than ours. He mentioned the state of shock which prevailed in the Indian Defence establishment right after the Chinese attack in late 1962 and the process of adjustment to more realistic planning objectives that had occurred since that time. He stressed the need for economic stability in India and assured the President that we did not have in mind any Indian military program which would destroy economic stability.

The defense program that the Indians are shaping up does not seem entirely unreasonable although it is somewhat higher than our estimate of force requirements. The Indians seem to be talking frankly to us on their defense objectives. Possibly they are hoodwinking us, but, if so, we have good checks which will soon reveal to us just what they are doing. General Taylor mentioned the force goals of Indian Army and Air Force and the problem of funding. He thought that funding problems would be an automatic and effective brake on any unwarranted Indian military expansion. The Finance Minister did not intend to allow defense expenditures to exceed the current rate of 5 to 6% of the G.N.P. He also was planning to reduce the foreign exchange drain caused by military procurement by 50 per cent. It was recently $235 million a year and he expected to cut it to $125 million. The British were not expected to make any major arms contribution. And the amount of aid to be received from the Soviet Union was highly problematical. The Soviets were evasive in what they would do. Considering the heavy Soviet obligations in Indonesia and Cuba it was doubtful if they had any large stocks available for supply to India. A runaway program seemed definitely unlikely. The U.S. would not underwrite the Indian deficit. Thus the economic factor would be the ultimate brake on the armament program.

In answer to a question from Ayub about the magnitude of the US military assistance program for India, General Taylor thought it would run about $50 million this year. In answer to Ayub’s further question, he confirmed that this would be in addition to the Nassau Program of $60 million. In response to a further question from Ayub as to whether aid might be expected to continue at a figure more or less in this same range, General Taylor said no one could tell how much the US Congress would appropriate. Within the Executive Branch, the feeling was that a figure somewhere in this range was about right if Indian behavior should be right. We thought it would be worth that amount to help save a great nation from the Chinese Communist grip. The question had been carefully thought over for a long time and if India kept herself well detached from the Soviet Union and assumed some responsibility for the defense of the Free World countries facing China, the effort to help her would be worthwhile. The U.S. considered it essential to stop Chinese Communist expansionism in China’s southern flank as well as in the Far East. The holding action on the flank involved both India and Pakistan.

General Taylor referred to some possibilities mentioned by Under Secretary Ball on his visit last September and said we would like to inquire further into the possibility of the U.S. contributing something additional to Pakistan’s sense of security. We would like to demonstrate our determination and capability to assist Pakistan’s defense in case of necessity. He mentioned our efforts to capitalize on the principle of strategic mobility. He said we were prepared to talk with the Pakistanis about bringing in Army and Air Force elements for experimental exercises. He also mentioned the prospect of an Indian Ocean Task Force which would afford additional sea and air protection. He spelled out in general terms our preliminary concept for the presence of the task force from the Seventh Fleet consisting of a carrier, two or three destroyers, and a fleet oiler, in Indian Ocean waters.

President Ayub said that this type of assistance was of value only if it were utilized in accordance with a military plan. Pakistan knew the high physical capacity of the US forces but the question had to be answered, “what do they come for?” General Taylor said we did not know for sure what the time factors would be in actual practice. We could compute them on a slide rule but we wanted to verify the calculations with actual exercises.

President Ayub thought it would be “just a gimmick” unless it was for a definite purpose—in support of a certain plan.

General Taylor said that a certain type of operational planning could be engaged in—planning on how to join up US forces with the Paks and make the best use of them on any frontier—North, South, East or West—without concentrating attention exclusively on any one. Naturally, we would not want it known that any planning against India was contemplated. President Ayub agreed that it was not necessary to orient the planning to one direction. All contingencies should be considered. Details could be deferred but “some discussion would be necessary.” He said that Pakistan would be agreeable to keeping all planning highly classified.

General Taylor thought that various aspects of planning could be accommodated as an outgrowth of the basic exercise. If it was assumed that US forces were positioned initially in a central area, several alternative plans could be worked out for theoretical movement of the troops to different fronts.

President Ayub asked if we could proceed with planning on that basis. With some preplanning the presence of mobile forces could be made effective and decisive.

General Taylor said it would have to be understood there would be no overt assumption of use of forces against India.

President Ayub readily agreed. He observed that there also could be a Soviet threat—from Afghanistan or even from Iran. The various contingencies should be considered.

General Goodpaster mentioned the recent US exercise in Germany where troops were flown in, married up with prepositioned equipment, and exercised in accordance with a plan for an appropriate field operation.

Ayub agreed that previous planning and prepositioning were useful.

General Taylor said there was in progress a world-wide study of prepositioning requirements. The earlier prepositioning in Germany was on the ground, but in the Philippines there was experimentation with the positioning of materiel in ships.

President Ayub said, “we can think further of that.”

President Ayub then reverted to the Indian question and predicted that the US-Indian policy would create problems for the U.S. He understood U.S. reluctance to take measures which would seem aimed at India. It would not make any sense for us to take direct measures to curb Indian misuse of her arms capability, at the same time we were building up that capability. He regretted that our influence had not been used in India to force a solution of the disruptive issues. He said that “India would not sit still” after her military capacity was built up.

In response to a question from General Taylor about why Pakistan had strong reservations about US assurances to Pakistan covering the contingency of Indian aggression, Ayub said the U.S. might not be able to come to Pakistan’s assistance promptly. The good intention of the United States was not doubted. But the world situation and US global responsibilities might make it difficult even if the case were clear. The President observed that Pakistan could do the defense job for herself with proper modern equipment. Pakistan did not want to embarrass the United States or call on the U.S. to fight Pakistan’s battles. He said Pakistan could perform the defense task “more cheaply.”

General Taylor mentioned the unfavorable geographical position in which Pakistan had been placed by fate. He thought that with potential military threats on several fronts, some reliance on US help was unavoidable.

President Ayub said Pakistan must be able to take the first shock of an Indian attack. He stated, “the strategic defense of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan.” He thought that the GOP could hold in West Pakistan for a while. General Taylor affirmed that the United States wanted to keep Pakistan strong and its fighting forces tough so that they could have a considerable measure of reliance in themselves.

President Ayub said that the Pakistan forces needed something more in hand than they now have. He said if East Pakistan should be attacked “we go as hard as we can.”

General Taylor said in an ideal world there would be a unified defense of Pakistan and India.

President Ayub agreed, but said any such idea had to be dismissed. He had offered joint defense to Nehru four years ago and had got nowhere with that offer or any other attempt to cooperate. The Indians were completely negative and could not be brought to see the common interest.

President Ayub referred to the press reports of the proposal of an Indian Ocean Task Force and said he would tell us in all frankness that the political reaction to the reports was very adverse so far in African and Asian countries. It was interpreted as a reversion to “Gunboat Diplomacy.” It was thought of as a modern version of “teaching the natives and the heathen to behave.” He said the task force would be too far away to hurt or restrain Communist China. The task forces of the Seventh Fleet in Korean and Formosan waters were much closer to China. He had enough preliminary reaction from African and Asian countries to know the idea as it had leaked out in the press was not good. It had had a bad reception politically. He was “not in the know” but he had misgivings from this standpoint.

General Taylor asked if the reaction would be different if the task force were linked up with CENTO or SEATO responsibilities.

Ayub thought the “auspices” were important and that a collective security mantle would be an improvement.

General Taylor mentioned that the task force could operate in any context in fulfillment of CENTO, SEATO, or bilateral obligations.

Ayub thought that the defense problems in the Middle East and the subcontinent were essential land-air problems, not naval.

General Taylor noted that a carrier would provide a useful mobile airfield.

General Goodpaster observed that the task force would give us a better capability for backstopping our friends and carrying out our bilateral obligations.

President Ayub thought that with the remarkable jet air transport facilities the U.S. enjoyed, the Pacific was quite close and it would not take long for assistance to come from the Far East.

General Goodpaster mentioned the CASF groups in several sizes which are highly mobile and can close in on a given area within 48 to 72 hours.

President Ayub thought the task force was not the right sort of back-up for what we had in mind. He thought we needed staff talks on “what?” and “where?” If there was going to be a task force it needed the right sort of collective auspices. If the thing had been announced in a different way it could have been dovetailed with something acceptable. He thought it was unfortunate the way it had leaked.

General Taylor thought the question could be discussed in SEATO and CENTO councils.

President Ayub thought it would be a good thing to have discussions there.

Foreign Minister Bhutto said the Ceylonese leaders talked to President Ayub and him last week in the course of the official Ayub visit to Ceylon. Bhutto said the Ceylonese were quite concerned when the leak came out. The Ceylonese were worried about the nuclear weapons aspect, remarking that the Indian Ocean was free of the nuclear threat until this matter came up. They thought the task force would bring the confrontation of the great powers much closer to the Indian Ocean area.

Foreign Minister Bhutto then asked if we were consulting our allies first on the task force matters. He was assured that this was the case and that the reports to the effect that we had consulted the Indians closely on the matter over a long period of time were entirely without foundation in fact.

Ambassador McConaughy answered a question as to whether TTK and other Indian leaders had not been informed about the matter a long time ago, by stating categorically that no Indians had been consulted or informed about the matter until General Taylor did so earlier this week. He said he had already informed the Foreign Secretary to this effect earlier in the week.

President Ayub said he still thought the task force proposal as it now stands is “a gimmick.”

Minister Bhutto said that every country must be able to count on its own defense forces and have its own independent sense of security if it is to maintain its self-respect and its integrity.

General Taylor pointed out that no country in the present-day world could rely entirely on its own resources, not even the United States.

Ayub and Bhutto agreed that this was so and indicated that they had in mind more an initial holding capability so that the first shock could be absorbed. General Musa added that Pakistan badly needed equipment in order to prevent the heart of the country from being pierced during an initial attack.

President Ayub confirmed specifically in answer to a question from General Taylor that Pakistan did not want to enlarge its army or add greatly to the quantity of its equipment. The aim was to modernize. Ayub recognized that the United States would not want to negate its aid to India by automatically offsetting it in Pakistan. But he said that inevitably “you are involved on both sides under your present policy.” Ayub thought that if war should break out between India and Pakistan it would be bound to spread. It could not be kept localized.

General Taylor mentioned the U.S. conviction that the probability of Indian aggression was very low.

President Ayub thought that Indian intentions could change very rapidly when its capability changed. He thought that 1,000 years of history and antagonism could not be ignored.

Ambassador McConaughy recalled earlier statements of President Ayub that the Pakistanis could hold the Indians in case of an attack and administer them a lesson which the Indians would not forget.

President Ayub said the Pakistani resolve would remain the same but better quality of arms was needed to maintain the traditional ratio between the two countries. Pakistan would continue to rely on better skill, superior leadership, better fighting manpower and highly mobile equipment, “then India would not go off the deep end.”

General Taylor mentioned that we have got economic strings on India. The economic sanctions we could apply would in themselves be a strong deterrent to aggressive action.

President Ayub felt that various policy making elements in Washington “still bend over backwards to appease the Indians.” He said that Nehru consistently blackens the US reputation but seems to get more consideration from us the worse he acts. He said “it makes us sick to see how it goes.”

President Ayub mentioned with apparent approval a recent remark he attributed to an American caller to the effect that the U.S. seems to apply reverse order of priority in the consideration it shows to other countries. He said it seems that Communist countries get the most attention, then the neutralist countries, and finally the friends and allies—if anything is left.

General Taylor smiled at this but noted that we could not limit our help only to those who speak well of us. We would not do much helping if we confined ourselves to those who did not criticize us or follow policies divergent from ours. It was increasingly difficult to please all recipients of our aid.

Bhutto asked us to bear in mind that India had no interest in working with us in a security sense, once she is out of the China difficulty. “India will never be a security fortress.” General Taylor agreed that India would probably never be any great reinforcement to the Free World in a military sense, but he thought that politically and socially, India might become an asset. If it could be made into a good example of a going democratic nation, this would be a great development.

President Ayub noted that a year ago we had the Indians where we should have wanted them. We could have asked them to behave at that time, and they would have been bound to comply. They could not have turned their backs on the U.S. and turned to the Russians because the Russians would not pay. The opportunity passed quickly when we did not seize it and the present situation also is transitory. There is no solidarity in present US relationship with India.

(At this point the group adjourned for lunch with the President. General Taylor stayed on for a few words alone with the President.)

0. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Taylor, Gen., Trip to India and Pakistan, December 1963. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text, but telegram 1189 from Karachi, December 21, which transmitted the text of the memorandum of conversation as Enclosure F, indicated that it was drafted by McConaughy. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 JCS)