Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

347. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, December 19, 1963, 11:15 a.m.

1929. State for Ball; White House for Bundy; JCS for Adm Riley, PJS and Rogers, OCJCS. From General Maxwell Taylor.

1. In company with Ambassador Bowles and appropriate Embassy personnel, I have completed a very satisfactory round of talks with Indian officials including Prime Minister Nehru, Foreign Minister Desai, Finance Minister Krishnamachari, Defense Minister Chavan, Army Chief of Staff Chaudhuri, and Air Force Chief of Staff Engineer.¹ All requests for information have apparently been met within limits of availability of data. It is possible to ask many questions about the military program for which there are largely no answers.

2. In the conversations, the US side stressed the following points;

A. Continuing desire of USG to assist the GOI in dealing with its military and economic problems.

B. Need for GOI to develop a properly phased (preferably five-year) military program to permit USG to anticipate Indian needs and make a timely and effective contribution.

C. Importance of avoiding an excessive military program in over-reaction to the Chicom aggression of last year.

D. Need to work with Pakistan in defense of subcontinent.

E. Need to accept the long-term nature of the Chicom military threat accompanied by recognition that India has friends, notably the US and its Asian allies, to share in the task of neutralizing this threat.

3. Information elicited from the GOI representatives covered the following points:

A. As expounded by General Chaudhuri, Indian estimate of Chinese military threat does not differ significantly from US. However, Indians attach greater weight to a possible concentration of Chinese effort against Assam which is geographically isolated from the rest of India and exposed to invasion from three directions. Oil fields add to its attractions as a military prize.

B. Government approved force goals for the army are 16 divisions totalling 807,000 men. However, General Chaudhuri is seeking authority for five additional smaller territorial divisions which will increase manpower requirement to 866,000.

C. Air Marshal Engineer considers that his present program is 45 squadrons, although status of approval at governmental level is not clear. Several senior officials indicated that an approved program has not yet been established, but expect it to be soon. The 45 squadron force was stated by Engineer to consist of 25 fighter, 4 fighter/recon, 12 transport, 3 bomber and 1 bomber/recon squadrons, and to total about 50,000 men. These figures are apparently changing day by day. On his own, Engineer has developed a requirement, still unapproved for planning, which calls for 64 squadrons consisting of 12 all-weather interceptor, 6 fighter/recon, 22 fighter/bomber, 5 light bomber, 2 strategic/recon, 2 maritime recon and 15 transport squadrons.

D. There are vague hopes for naval modernization but no specific plans.

E. GOI is resolved to prevent the military program from affecting adversely the economic program. Military expenditures this year amount to between 5 and 6 per cent of GNP and are causing a loss of about 235,000,000 dollars in foreign exchange. Finance Minister TTK indicates intention to level off for the next year or two at about present percentage of GNP and reduce the drain of foreign exchange by half.

F. There is no approved mid-range plan for reaching the desired force goals with the available assets implicit in subparagraph E above.

G. US is main hope for external help to meet the uncovered portions of the military program. Indians expect little from UK because of limited resources and British fear of offending China. Statements on Soviet aid were evasive. There was no discussion of possible levels of US aid.

H. The GOI officials do not appear to fear Pakistan in a military sense, though they do not overlook possibility that situation could escape control of Ayub Khan. However, they justify the presence of several divisions facing the Paks on ground that populace there is uneasy without military presence. They also point to practical need of occupying the permanent cantonments and other facilities which have been used in the Punjab since British times.

I. The Indians are concerned over the situation in Burma because of governmental instability and the infiltration of thousands of Chinese farmers and ex-soldiers into north Burma. In this northern area, the Burmese government exerts only nominal control.

J. The Indian leaders evidence no particular concern over the prospect of a Chinese nuclear explosion. They recognize, however, that there may be some psychological effect, particularly in the small countries in Asia.

K. GOI intensely interested in assistance for defense production. They estimate need for $200 million capital investment and look to it for substantive help in this area.

4. The Indians never raised with me the question of the Indian Ocean Task Force although it had been the subject of several articles in the Delhi press. Taking the matter as a point of departure, during my meeting with Nehru which included attendance from foreign affairs and defense, I gave a short low-key explanation of the project. I described it as still incomplete in detail and without final approval. Nehru showed little interest and did not pursue the matter.

5. From these Indian contacts I have drawn the following impressions:

A. The Indians are aware of the dangers of a run-away military program but have not yet worked out a coordinated economic-military plan to reach goals in both areas following a line of phased priorities.

B. They are probably incapable of producing such a program without considerable US assistance in developing planning procedures. Only TTK seems to understand the problem.

C. The Indians are prepared to view themselves, implicitly at least, as part of a regional security community with the common objective of containing China. They seem to accept the fact that they should not try to handle China alone.

D. There is a justified requirement for continuing US military and economic aid to India. It should be conditioned, however, on adequate Indian mid-range (five-year planning) with military aid held within bounds proportioned to the limited nature of the military threat.

6. The foregoing represents a preliminary report which will be made in final form upon return with appropriate recommendations.

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Priority. Received in the Department of State on December 21 at 2:20 a.m. A note on the source text indicates that the telegram was delayed in transmission. Passed to the White House on December 21.
1. Taylor visited India December 16-19. A fuller summary of Taylor’s discussions with Nehru and other Indian officials was transmitted in telegram 1942 from New Delhi, December 19. (Ibid.)