Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, August 15, 1963, 9:17 p.m.

393. Eyes Only Ambassadors. Deptel 394.¹ There follows text of message from the President to Prime Minister Nehru which you are requested to deliver urgently.

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I must confess that your letter² and statement in the Lok Sabha³ took us by surprise. Though I can understand your irritation with Pakistani behavior, I still regret that you feel compelled to make such a negative statement on mediation at this time. It will certainly complicate our own efforts to help India.

You know that we are determined to assist India to the fullest in building a free society, a task now rendered more difficult by an obvious external threat. To this end, we have sought to provide India with far more assistance than any other single aid recipient. I might add that I personally intervened with the Germans, Japanese, Italians, and British to get this year’s consortium contributions up to the level finally achieved. But the setback to mediation will inevitably have an adverse impact on our efforts to obtain Congressional and popular support for economic and military aid to India and Pakistan. I must tell you quite frankly that it is hard to counter the mounting resistance in the Congress against aid programs which seem destined to aggravate disputes between two nations, both of which we regard as friends. This is not anti-Indian sentiment; it is a ‘plague on both your houses’ attitude.

The only way we see to counter this resistance, recognizing that Kashmir and other issues are not susceptible of easy and quick solutions, is to demonstrate that sincere and determined efforts are nevertheless underway to solve them. Here is where we had counted heavily on the mediation effort you proposed.

We entirely share your appreciation of Chinese aims vis-a-vis India. We too are also concerned at Pakistan’s developing relationship with Communist China, and intend to do what we can to arrest this trend. But we regard it as even more in India’s interest than in ours to forestall a Pakistan-China accommodation. However emotionally the Pakistani are behaving, and whatever the temptation to reply, surely a further heating up of the atmosphere between your two countries aggravates rather than diminishes this risk. We do not see a mediatory effort as weakening you against China, but as a move to lessen pressure on your flank, and hopefully to lead toward a reconciliation which will greatly strengthen India’s position.

In the last analysis, it must be primarily the task of Indian statesmanship, in seeking to strengthen India against Chinese Communist pressure, to forestall aggravation of this threat via closer Pakistani-Chinese ties. We want to help, but to do so effectively we must know more clearly what you propose to do. As I see it, you do not rule out mediation but suggest the necessary preparatory work be done by quiet diplomacy. An atmosphere must be created, but how is this to be done? We wonder what steps you plan to reestablish communications. Once we know what course you contemplate, we will do what we can to help bring Pakistan to the mediation table, which we still believe is the course best calculated to serve your larger interests and to permit us most effectively to help.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Schneider and Komer and cleared and approved by Grant. Repeated to Karachi and London.
1. Telegram 394 to New Delhi, August 15, instructed Bowles to deliver Kennedy’s letter to Nehru in person if possible. Bowles was instructed to discuss the letter with Nehru at the earliest opportunity and elaborate upon and emphasize the themes laid out in it. (Ibid.)
2. Document 317.
3. In telegram 644 from New Delhi, August 12, the Embassy transmitted the text of an advance copy of the speech Nehru intended to make on the following day to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament. In the speech, Nehru reviewed the history of the Ministerial talks with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. He attributed the failure of the talks to Pakistan’s determination to achieve a settlement entirely upon its own terms, or to continue the existing deadlock over the issue. Nehru then turned to the mediation proposal that followed upon the failure of the Ministerial talks. As with the talks, Nehru stated that India approached the mediation proposal with the hope that it would lead to a fair and equitable settlement to the dispute, but he concluded that the terms of reference proposed by Pakistan for the mediation exercise made success impossible. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)