239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
2871. Deptel 2775 to New Delhi,1 991 to Karachi.
Our reading from here of GOP and GOI views and likely negotiating positions in upcoming Delhi talks leads us to conclusion best US course is to continue refrain from making specific proposal at present time. Picture we have is that parties may show some flexibility in this next round; our tactics should be offer friendly off-stage encouragement that they out-vie each other in forthcomingness. We should clearly indicate on both sides that outcome this round will have genuine impact on US and particularly Congressional thinking. Hence, both parties have vested interest in demonstrating disposition to compromise in talks. They should know it remains our conviction most desirable and lasting solution Kashmir question will be that suggested and arrived at by parties themselves. We remain hopeful such solution possible and can be achieved soon.
It most important we make clear to both Indians and Pakistanis that we are not prepared see negotiations break down, certainly not at forthcoming talks. Hence, you should continue to urge respective Governments (1) explore any and all proposals; and (2) at minimum agree to continuation ministerial-level talks, and be prepared in advance with communique which will assure this.
In event there is clear indication talks foundering you, preferably in concert UKHiCom but if necessary alone, should inform both sides we will have concrete proposal to submit in nearest future following our assessment Delhi talks; therefore, both sides should agree to further round talks for purpose examining proposal. We believe it would not be advisable to present actual proposal at time talks collapsing as in atmosphere then existing it might be rejected out of hand.
We realize Indians prefer purely bilateral consideration this question and have always objected to third party intervention. As matter of tactics, it might be well to put them on notice that whereas we now also prefer bilateral approach, if it does not produce results, US likely make proposal for solution. We hope you can lead Indians to conclusion that in order to avoid problems which US proposal might cause them, they should make extra effort reach agreement in bilateral talks. We see no [Page 472] need tell Paks this now for fear they might drag feet in bilateral talks in order to stimulate our intervention.
FYI. We are presently considering specifics of possible US proposal which we plan finalize after upcoming talks. We will be consulting with UK on this and will be in touch with Embassies Delhi and Karachi. Our current thinking is to use this proposal only if bilateral talks on verge breaking down or, after period time, fail make progress. We believe proposal should be single balanced formula which is fair to both sides and would require equal sacrifice. While initial reaction by both parties to such formula might be cool, we believe later consideration would be more serious, particularly as they take into consideration implications rejection re US and Congressional reaction. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1-1563. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ludlow and Schneider and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.↩
- Document 235.↩