235. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
2775. Now that Kashmir discussions have gained some momentum, there is need for creating atmosphere in which more progress can be made in succeeding rounds of talks. Agreement both sides in joint communique to take steps this direction is necessary beginning and atmosphere both sides has already cleared somewhat. There have been some jarring notes, however, which indicate Paks, Indians and ourselves might profitably examine what steps necessary to create best conditions for Jan 15 talks.
On Pak side, philandering with Chicoms1 presents clear danger to talks. It took forbearance from Indians and some effort on our part to limit adverse effect Sino-Pak border agreement and further steps such as Pak-Chicom trade agreement and talk of Mohammad Ali’s visiting Communist China might prove intolerable. Pak statement on Indian invitation to Ayub similarly unhelpful. We would hope and expect Paks could control this sort of activity while concentrating on examination of range of possible solutions to dispute which could be considered during next round discussions.
On their side, Indians have shown bad judgment in issuing invitation to Ayub and then jumping gun on announcement acceptance. We [Page 464] hope Indians can keep from rocking boat and also settle down to serious consideration alternative solutions to dispute.
Our role in this process should continue to be one of exercising influence from sidelines. When either side makes faux pas, we should call attention to effect on atmosphere in other country. Embassy Karachi should take up Pak-Chicom dealings with GOP; prospects for talks would be improved if Paks could be persuaded make some showing of understanding of India’s defense requirements against China. This might be enunciation to Indians during next round of principle, which Ayub has mentioned to us (Murree’s 9),2 that Kashmir settlement must take into account India’s defense needs in Ladakh. Separate instruction being transmitted this subject. Similarly Embassies Karachi and Delhi should as need arises call to attention of local govts any excessive violations of agreement in communique re atmosphere such as overzealous statements by officials or resumption of press propaganda campaigns.
While playing this watchdog role we should not, however, become directly involved in preparations for Jan 15 talks. We should encourage both sides consider various alternatives, particularly in light of glimpses of principles for settlement afforded by first round. If the occasion presents itself, we might assist Indians and Paks at this stage by reviewing with them the entire range of various proposals which have been made for settlement dispute. We hope that two govts will be able to produce some concrete sign of progress by time Dacca Assembly meeting since Ayub’s capacity to continue talks might be limited thereafter if no progress shown. Organization of several technical working groups might be one device by which to make acceptable showing. It might be well to make sure Indians aware of this need. Also probably helpful remind both sides constructive communique would have useful effect. Finally, USG should keep its public comments to a minimum. USIA has agreed limit coverage Kashmir negotiations to official US statements and Indo-Pak communiques.
We should continue to conduct other aspects of our relations with both countries with an eye to their effect on the Kashmir negotiations. While there should be no question of linking between emergency phase military aid to India and progress on Kashmir, it should be made clear to Indians there definite relationship with longer run aid. In this connection it would be useful to know of effect Embassy’s efforts in accordance with Deptel 2599,3 particularly among military and political leaders below Nehru. It might be worthwhile to continue to point out to Indians that both foreign and domestic resources for strengthening their military establishment limited; relaxation Indo-Pak tensions would not only free [Page 465] resources for defense against Chicoms but would also mean less diversion from economic development.
In Pakistan efforts should continue be made reassure Ayub re US aid to India. We expect keep Ayub informed re arms commitments and deliveries to India. Further, we expect be forthcoming in meeting legitimate Pak request re such matters as MAP deliveries (DOD currently ascertaining, inter alia, possibility of expedited delivery; separate message to follow) and in releasing local currency expected to be made available shortly by AID/W to meet pressing GOP needs. At the same time we should assure Ayub of US determination to push for Kashmir settlement as part of effort strengthen security of subcontinent.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1-463. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by NEA, FE, and with USIS, AID, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.↩
- Reference is to the announcement by Pakistan on December 26 that agreement in principle had been reached with China on the demarcation of the Himalayan border between the two countries. Details of the agreement would be worked out by Foreign Minister Ali on a visit to Peking to be scheduled. On December 28, Swaran Singh stated to the press in Rawalpindi that Pakistan’s boundary agreement with India’s enemy on the eve of the Ministerial talks was not helpful in paving the way for a mutually satisfactory solution on Kashmir. (The New York Times, December 27 and 29, 1962)↩
- An apparent reference to telegram 8 from Murree, Document 234.↩
- Document 219.↩