238. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Attached is a brief recap of the current status of our Indian projects. Note particularly that we still confront the problem of getting Congress to lift the ceiling on total aid to India.

Also attached are some of Ken Galbraith’s reservations (Delhi’s 2696)1 about letting our air defense for Indian project get too closely tied to the Paks. Most of us share these concerns and will try to avoid the pitfalls.

Karachi’s 12582 (attached) is new letter from Ayub, which I for one regard as abominable. We simply must bring Ayub around to realizing the folly of letting his relations with us get out of hand before he gets himself so far out on a limb that he can’t draw back. Since you are the only one to whom he’ll listen, I propose to submit a vigorous reply.

Meanwhile, the second round of Kashmir talks begins 16 January in Delhi. The first round went off without undue bickering (indeed with glimmerings of hope) but each successive round will be more difficult. Each side is trying to get the other to make the first move. We may have to step in as honest brokers before too long, lest the talks break down in a contest of silence.

R.W. Komer

Attachment3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT

  • Status Report of NSC Subcommittee on Military Aid to India and Kashmir

The NSC Subcommittee on South Asia has the following report on the status of U.S. military assistance to India and the Kashmir question:

[Page 469]

1. Joint U.S.-U.K. Air Defense Team

We are moving ahead as rapidly as possible on sending, with the British, a team to India to determine air defense requirements. The JCS has approved terms of reference and our component of the team will be prepared to depart from the U.S. on January 15 to join its British counterpart in London. The British have handed us their version of the terms of reference for this joint team which seem generally in line with our thinking.

2. U.S. Defense Production Team

The Department of Defense is organizing a team, with Mr. Carroll Staley of the Army Materiel Command as head, to study how defense production facilities can be developed in India and what foreign assistance is necessary for their development. A similar British team is now in India. While its terms of reference are narrow—limited to ordinance and existing facilities—ours will be broad enough to cover such industries as communications and textiles and to include new facilities. We estimate that our team will leave the U.S. on about January 17.

3. Assistance from old Commonwealth and Western European Nations

The U.K. has informed the old Commonwealth countries of the Nassau decisions on military aid to India and is requesting their cooperation in providing aid within the agreed planning basis. We have no indication of their response or of their willingness to increase their contributions.

We are instructing our Embassy in London to request the British to increase pressures on their old Commonwealth partners.

We are also trying to bring the Governments of France, Germany and Italy more actively into the business of providing military aid to India. The British and ourselves are passing on to those governments the agreed U.S.-U.K. planning basis for such aid and seeking their cooperation in working within the planning basis. We also plan to brief the same Western European governments more fully on our views regarding the Sino-Indian conflict and, as they indicate their willingness to provide military assistance, bring them more fully into our coordination machinery.

4. U.S. Shipments to Date

Military aid to India to date approximates $22 million, and may be roughly divided into three categories: equipment sent by initial airlift ($7 million including transportation costs), that sent by sealift ($12.4 million) and other ($2.6 million). The material sent by initial airlift, comprising urgently needed Army ground equipment, was shipped between November 3rd and 14th. The sealift equipment, comprising the bulk of the aid, also consists of infantry equipment and ammunition. Of the three vessels transporting it, the first arrived in India on January 4th, and the remaining two are scheduled to arrive on the 13th. The “other” category includes: two Caribou (transport) aircraft now en route to India; [Page 470] C-119 (transport) aircraft spare parts (the majority as yet undelivered); 50,000 pairs of snow goggles (being transported via Air India International); 25,000 sets of winter clothing (10,000 via air, arrived January 3, 1963; balance by sea); and other miscellaneous administration and training type support. Another form of assistance, not included above since the operating costs to MAP are as yet unresolved, is airlift support, i.e., the twelve C-130s currently in India.

5. Congressional Ceiling on Aid to India

If we meet our commitment of $60 million to provide aid under the agreed planning basis, we will have a leeway of about $15 million under the informal ceiling on aid to India as agreed with Senator Humphrey at the time of the Senate-House Conference on the foreign aid authorization bill. Likely air defense commitments and a continued increase in PL-480 aid will push us over the top. We are, therefore, initiating consultations with the Congressional leaders regarding the ceiling.

6. Policy Studies and Intelligence

We are looking into the need for policy studies on a variety of subjects such as the U.S.-U.K. relationship regarding military aid to India, our approach to long run military aid, long run Indian requirements for economic assistance, and the implications of the Pakistan-Chinese Communist relationship.

We are also taking steps to improve our intelligence regarding Communist China as it relates to the Sino-Indian conflict.

7. Kashmir Negotiations

We believe the opening round of the India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir went as well as could have been expected. We believe for the present we should continue to concentrate on building an atmosphere in which progress can be made, leaving the substance of the negotiations to the two parties. We have instructed our Embassies in New Delhi and Karachi to take certain steps along these lines.

At the same time we are urgently studying other ways by which the U.S. and U.K. can encourage forward movement, including offering good offices when and if they are required.

We are particularly concerned over the effect on the talks of increased Pakistani flirtation with the Chinese Communists, and have instructed Ambassador McConaughy to speak firmly to Ayub on this.

Phillips Talbot
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 1/11/63-1/15/63. Secret.
  2. Dated January 10; not printed.
  3. Document 237.
  4. Secret.