Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, December 8, 1962, 1:41 p.m.

2599. Most pressing immediate needs on Kashmir are to maintain momentum generated as result Sandys-Harriman initiative, and to keep responsibility firmly fixed on India and Pakistan for working out solution. Because of Commonwealth ties, and less close British identification with previous efforts to move this problem towards solution, we believe British should be kept in forefront of this effort. Contents of this message have been discussed with British Embassy here and we envisage close cooperation this subject between our Embassies New Delhi and Karachi with respective UK High Commissions. Embassy London should discuss contents this message with appropriate British officials.

Our general approach is that British and ourselves should identify in both India and Pakistan those points at which effective pressure can be brought to impress both governments that it is in interest both countries strive for agreement despite possible political costs. Prospects for settlement will be improved if each side enters talks with eyes open; if each side realizes from outset that it must make substantial concessions which will be unpopular with many in both countries.

In various approaches to GOI and GOP we hope we can get over idea that neither party should tie itself to any particular plan for settlement. To do so would limit possibility compromise which will be essential. Also restriction scope discussions would lessen chances for agreement. For time being we believe thrust of your approaches should be to encourage parties come up with ideas about possible solution. If they want to discuss them with us and British so much the better. In any case we would expect both parties to be candid with us about progress of discussions.

For New Delhi: In India both we and British should make it clear that it untenable for us to continue for long give extensive military assistance to India while it expending efforts on quarrel with Pakistan. Further, we have extended aid to India so far at considerable cost our relations with Pakistan. Both these factors constitute major obstacle in way our obtaining approval for future aid of magnitude desired by GOI. Both U.S. and India benefit from U.S. having both countries on subcontinent as friends rather than just one.

As US contribution this effort Embassy Delhi is authorized at its discretion to bring these and other arguments for early constructive negotiations on Kashmir to attention of GOI in following ways after appropriate consultation UK High Commission:

1) Direct to Prime Minister. Sandys and Harriman have already covered ground well, and President’s letter¹ has added emphasis and authority. You should continue remind Nehru at suitable occasions.

2) To political leaders below Nehru. We have in mind greater diffusion of power demonstrated by forced dismissal of Menon. Embassy at its discretion should ensure that relationship between US capacity to aid India and resolution Kashmir dispute is widely understood among key political leaders both at center (e.g. Morarji Desai, Lal Bahadur Shastri, S.K. Patil, Y.B. Chavan, A.K. Sen) and in states (e.g. Kamaraj Nadar, P.C. Sen, Sanjiva Reddy, C.B. Gupta). Embassy might point out that since GOI cannot make necessary compromise without assurance political support, responsibility for giving that support rests with political leaders who may not feel directly concerned. It is for this reason that US has made effort make known its views among wide circle leaders in hope India will be able reach conclusion which we believe much in its interest.

We of course leave to Embassy determination to whom to make approach and in what manner. While we believe maintenance momentum Kashmir initiative requires early efforts in Delhi, more delicate approaches to out-of-Delhi leaders might be deferred until trips by Ambassador, other Embassy officers, and Congens offer suitable opportunities.

3) At its discretion Embassy might encourage President Radhakrishnan urge Nehru be prepared make concessions necessary for agreement. As Embassy suggested during Harriman visit, Radhakrishnan might make pitch this Nehru’s last great opportunity make major contribution Indian foreign policy.

4) Similar missionary work should be carried out among senior officers of Indian military establishment where direct relationship between US capacity extend military aid and Kashmir settlement should be easy to explain.

For Karachi: While need in Delhi is for GOI willingness make concession greater than it has previously been willing consider, need in Karachi is for GOP receptiveness to solution which likely fall considerably short of achieving Pak objectives. Ayub’s statement that settlement likely unpopular both sides indicates he is aware of this. In Pakistan we should point out this is probably most opportune time since independence for Pakistan obtain settlement from India. In future India may become less disposed to compromise. Paks should take advantage of opportunity of the moment; to ask too high a price might dissipate chance. By pressing Delhi to come to negotiating table on Kashmir, US is fulfilling promise to make new effort bring solution. This is most opportune moment and we may not again be able to help.

As you believe it necessary and helpful, Embassy Karachi is authorized to discuss Kashmir negotiations along these lines with Ayub and other GOP civilian and military officials. You should coordinate as appropriate with UK High Commission. We do not believe approach in depth suggested for India would be appropriate in Pakistan both because authority to make decisions is limited to much smaller circle and because first and most important requirement for coming negotiations is Indian willingness make concessions.

Since we believe present circumstances offer best prospect for Kashmir solution in recent years, we are prepared to undergo some risk to bring it about. It is not our desire seriously to weaken either Nehru or Ayub and we count on both Embassies to warn us if this likely happen. By way of contingency planning, we are suggesting to British desirability of having high-level representative, preferably a Britisher, available to go to subcontinent for discussions on Kashmir for purpose providing informal link between two capitals if this should become necessary to save talks. As ministerial talks develop we shall keep you closely informed of our thinking and would welcome your ideas.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12-862. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Schneider and Cameron; cleared with BNA, IO, and FE, and by Ludlow in NEA in substance; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi, London, and USUN.
1. See Document 218.