Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

234. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Murree, December 27, 1962, 2 a.m.

8. Department telegrams 936¹ and 938.²

Late today I met for almost one hour with President Ayub to deliver President Kennedy’s letter (Department telegram 938) and to discuss decisions reached in Washington and Nassau on Western military assistance to India and Indo-Pak discussion of Kashmir. Dehlavi present and Sneider accompanied me. I reviewed for Ayub fully deliberations on United States policy to subcontinent and presented justification for our action decisions stressing our concern for GOP interests, and provisions to safeguard those interests. I will follow with full report. Key points which emerged during our conversation were:

(1) Throughout our meeting Ayub remained relaxed, cordial and very friendly. He was very grateful for President Kennedy’s letter and for comprehensive briefing I gave him on Washington and Nassau proceedings. Most important he took news of your decision to provide 100 to 120 million dollars emergency arms aid to India without expressing any disagreement. Even when I pressed him for specific reaction, he avoided any expression disapproval. While he did not give specific approbation, he avoided argument against rationale for emergency arms aid and in fact by implication accepted it when he acknowledged that our initial shipment of military aid to India and over all United States involvement in support of India had proved one of two major deterrents, in his judgment, to further Chinese attacks. (Other deterrent was over-extended Chinese Communist supply lines in NEFA.)

(2) On other hand throughout conversation Ayub made clear that he still felt Nehru would not be moved to negotiate Kashmir settlement except under pressure from United States and United Kingdom. While he did not contest our view that emergency arms aid could not be withheld as condition for progress in Kashmir negotiations, he pointedly asked whether we felt failure to make this aid conditional would harden Indian position in forthcoming ministerial talks. I told him that we did not believe this to be true and were emphasizing importance we attached to progress towards Kashmir solution regarding longer range aid to Indian Army and fact that rate progress towards Kashmir solution would be important factor taken into account in considering any second phase program.

(3) On Kashmir negotiations Ayub remained open minded and flexible. He indicated recognition that first round of talks at best would be reiteration past positions³ and that at some crucial point compromise would have to be proposed by third party. I gathered that he remains willing to accept compromise solution not wholly satisfactory to either party which would be based on recognition interests of all parties concerned, including assured provision for unfettered Indian line of communications to Ladakh.

(4) At close of our conversation, Ayub intimated that his reaction to our emergency arms aid program would ultimately depend on Indian attitude at ministerial talks and that his current tolerant and non-committal reaction could harden if it appeared Indians were taking unwarranted comfort from our continued unconditional provision of emergency aid and adopting as result completely negative attitude in talks. On other hand if Indians show any inclination to explore avenues to resolution of Kashmir issue, I believe Ayub will continue tacit acquiescence in emergency arms program. In my view this makes it all the more important that Indians here indicate they have come to Rawalpindi for more than courtesy call which is all most Pakistanis now expect.

(5) Ayub reacted well to indication that General Adams or other top United States general visiting India and possibly air defense survey team also could endeavor stop off in Rawalpindi, if desired, for military exchanges of information and views. Any gesture along line of high-level consultation or early conveyance of important information or conclusions is psychologically invaluable here.

Comment: The interview went better than I had dared hope. Evident he had made decision to rely heavily on our assumed influence with Indians, which will make it difficult to keep British “half step in front” of us, as we had planned. British HICOM has not yet been given requested appointment with President, but hopes to see him before President’s departure for Karachi tomorrow. Tonight I went over my meeting with President analytically and in detail with British HICOM James, and he can take full advantage of this knowledge in his meeting, which can be useful follow up and consolidation. President particularly asked me to stay here throughout meeting, and to maintain contact with both delegations. I agreed to do this.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/12-2762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi and London. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy to the President in Palm Beach, Florida, on December 28. (White House telegram CAP 5665-62; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 12/62)
1. Not found.
2. Document 232.
3. The first round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir took place in Rawalpindi December 26-29. India was represented in the talks by Swaran Singh, Minister for Railways. Pakistan was represented by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister for Industries, National Resources and Works. In five meetings, the two Ministers restated well-established positions on the Kashmir issue. Bhutto pressed for a solution based on a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite. Singh countered that India was a secular state and could not countenance a plebiscite based on religious principles. (Telegram 19 from Murree, December 28; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12-2862) The talks adjourned on December 29 and the Ministers agreed to meet again in New Delhi in mid-January. (Telegram 1165 from Karachi, December 29; ibid., 690D.91/12-2962) Documentation on the first round of talks is ibid., 690D.91.