Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

212. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Rawalpindi, November 28, 1962.

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan
• H.E. Duncan Sandys, U.K. Minister for Commonwealth Relations
• W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

On arrival in Rawalpindi (November 28, 5:00 p.m.) I was informed by Ambassador McConaughy that President Ayub wanted me to dine with him and Duncan Sandys alone and that Sandys wanted to see me half an hour before dinner in order to bring me up to date on what transpired. Ambassador McConaughy told me that Sandys had informed President Ayub of Nehru’s willingness to start discussions regarding Kashmir without preconditions on any level; Sandys was proposing that first a preliminary meeting be held between Ayub and Nehru at New Delhi, since it was Ayub’s turn to go to the Indian capital. President Ayub wanted to talk to me before making up his mind.

In my discussion with Sandys before dinner, he argued for a President-Prime Minister meeting, and I told him that I would think it wise to hold such a meeting only if the communique to be issued at the end of the meeting be agreed to in advance. Without such an agreement it would be dangerous since Ayub and Nehru found it difficult to negotiate due to the difference in the personalities of the two men. Sandys bought this idea. Sandys and I then drove to President Ayub’s house and had a long talk with him before going into dinner. Sandys produced a draft communique announcing a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in New Delhi, including a sentence to the effect that the objective of the meeting would be to decide on methods and procedure to settle the differences between their two countries. I then outlined my thought of an agreement in advance on the final communique to be issued at the close of the meeting. After some discussion, Ayub said if we are to agree upon a communique at the end of the discussions, why have a meeting at all—why not agree now on that communique by correspondence between himself and Nehru? I readily accepted this and so did Sandys. Taking the first sentence of Sandys’ paper, Ayub dictated, with some discussion of each sentence, the following communique to be issued:

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that renewed effort should be made without delay to resolve the Kashmir problem so as to enable their two countries to live side by side free from anxiety.

In consequence, they have decided to open negotiations at an early date with the object of reaching an honorable and equitable settlement.

The negotiations will be conducted initially at the ministerial level. At the appropriate stage direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub.

Sandys agreed to take this draft to Nehru, attempt to get his approval and signature, and bring it back to Rawalpindi for President Ayub’s signature. We all hoped that it might be possible to issue the communique on Friday morning.¹

While the draft communique was being retyped, we had a discussion ranging over a wide area. In answer to Ayub’s questions, Sandys and I expressed our views of the climate of opinion in India on the possibility of reaching a settlement on Kashmir. Sandys expressed himself somewhat more optimistically than I did. I explained that I had been struck by the unity of purpose which had developed in India in recognizing the long-range danger of Chinese Communist aggression. Domestic difficulties were being put aside by the people all over the country. In the villages people were enlisting, contributing funds, and asking what they could do to help in this national emergency. I explained I had found that everyone with whom I had talked, unanimously spoke of the emergency in long-range terms. It was therefore natural that the minds of many were turned towards the importance of settling differences with Pakistan so that their entire energy could be directed towards the Communist menace. I told President Ayub that I thought some further time would be needed to get all the Ministers, as well as public opinion, in a mood to make a reasonable settlement but that I felt the time was running in the right direction and that it was essential to start negotiations which in themselves would focus public opinion on the issue.

Ayub insisted that Kashmir be named as the problem. He rejected the idea of a vaguer reference to “differences between the two countries.” Both Sandys and I made it plain that it would be impossible to have a plebiscite, that the Vale as such could not be transferred to Pakistan, but that there was an understanding in India that they had to make certain concessions beyond the present cease-fire line. We both told him we had not discussed details and did not know how far the India Government was ready to go at the present time. Ayub accepted this situation and recognized that the negotiations on Kashmir might last a considerable time, but under the formula it was proposed in the communique there was considerable flexibility of continuing discussions even though the first talks might not reach a satisfactory conclusion.

We discussed Chinese intentions. Ayub said he believed that their intentions were only to insure control of the Sinkiang road and a certain part of Ladakh. I pointed out that this might be their immediate objective but that they did not have to attack in the NEFA area in order to achieve this objective. I underlined the opinion of all the Indians I had talked to that Red China was determined to destroy India’s independence and way of life. Ayub did not contradict this and talked as if he recognized the long-range menace of Red China to the subcontinent. There was no suggestion of a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and Red China.

We discussed Khrushchev’s motives in Cuba. President Ayub expressed great admiration for the manner in which President Kennedy handled the Cuban question.

President Ayub said he believed the differences between Moscow and Peiping were real but that if Red China got into military difficulties, the Soviet Union would come to her assistance. There seemed to be no intimation that President Ayub thought that Pakistan could make a special deal and thus avoid the dangers of either Soviet or Chinese Communist aggressive intentions.

We discussed at some length the relationship between Nehru and Krishna Menon with general agreement that Krishna Menon had spoken for Nehru. I believe that Sandys and I convinced Ayub that Krishna Menon was out for good, that Nehru did not have, any longer, the unchallenged authority to bring him back.

Sandys and I touched on the military situation in India but did not go into details as I explained that General Adams was here to brief President Ayub the next morning, although we did give some indication of the size of British and American assistance so far. At dinner President Ayub reverted to the subject of our military assistance, turning to me and saying, “Now tell me about this assistance you are giving to India.” I gave him the general order of dimensions emphasizing that the loss of the equipment by the Fourth Division alone was far in excess in anything we had delivered or had agreed to deliver so far. I pointed out, however, that India had plans for long-range military build-up which the Government was now determined to undertake in order that they would not be helpless against Communist attack in the future. We left it that we would discuss this subject in more detail the next day. In answer to my question Ayub told me of the commencement of the de-salinization program. He expressed hopes that it would be successful, although it would take a long time. He talked about his visit to the Hunza area and he expressed the hope that he could come to an agreement with Peiping over the boundary but would insist on retaining the Hunza grazing areas.

At one point, touching on Khrushchev’s desire to avoid nuclear war, he said, “Yes, I know your views. I read your book which you had sent to me.” He did not, however, take issue with this statement and agreed that at the present time Red China was more reckless. Cuba had been proof of Khrushchev’s brinkmanship methods, leaving open always an opportunity to withdraw.

He spoke warmly of President Kennedy and with satisfaction of his visit to Washington. He pointed to a framed photograph on the wall.

Dehlavi was present throughout the evening but rarely injected himself in the discussion except at one point he mentioned that they had received an offer from Turkey to undertake mediation on Kashmir. Sandys pointed out that a Turkish offer would not go very well in New Delhi. President Ayub discussed at some length his difficulties with Nehru. He mentioned that when a subject came up which Nehru did not wish to discuss, he simply sat silent, which President Ayub said was most disconcerting. President Ayub asked about the Soviet MIGS. Sandys said that the Soviet Union had declined to furnish them. I said that my information maintained that they had postponed delivery, attempting to straddle the relationship (their “friend” India and their “ally” China).

President Ayub was cordial throughout the evening, relaxed, showed no strain or scars from the debate in the Assembly in the statements of the opposition.

I did not raise any of the other subjects I have in mind discussing, as I felt it was desirable to concentrate on the commencement of negotiations over Kashmir. He may well become more perturbed when we get into some of the questions about which he has been critical of U.S. policy and actions.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11-2862. Secret. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held at President Ayub’s residence.
1. Sandys returned to New Delhi on November 29 to discuss the text of the proposed joint statement with Nehru. Nehru accepted the statement, conditional upon one substantive change. He requested that the first paragraph be amended: change “to resolve the Kashmir problem” to read “to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other matters.” (Telegram 2158 from New Delhi, November 29; ibid., 690D.91/11-2962) With the alteration of “other matters” to read “other related matters,” Ayub accepted the proposed change and the joint communique was released on Friday, November 30. (Telegram 964 from Karachi, November 29; ibid.)