213. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- H.E. Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan
- The Honorable Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
I called on President Ayub alone Thursday afternoon, November 29, at 6:00 p.m. at his Residence. He asked if I objected to his bringing in his secretary (namely Dehlavi, the Foreign Secretary).
I replied that I did since I wanted to talk personally.
I started in by asking him whether he was concerned over his political position now that he had instituted the constitutional procedures. He replied that he was not. He could count on over 80 votes out of 156 membership in the Assembly. He could not act as freely as before, and it would take him longer to get things done. He commented that this was in the direction of democratic processes that we believe in. We must not expect too rapid development of democracy as in the East people didn’t understand it. In reply to my question he said the opposition was largely self-serving politicians. I told him that the President and Secretary of State wanted to do all we could to help strengthen his position and asked what we might do.
He replied three things:
- (1)
- Use our influence to get a Kashmir settlement.
- (2)
- Don’t press him for disengagement with India in the meantime.
- (3)
- Go slow on urging joint defense of subcontinent. This would come automatically with the Kashmir settlement.
In answer to my question on what I might say helpfully to the press, he suggested I say “Circumstances force us to give military aid to India but emphasize that Pakistan is our close friend and ally. We realize Kashmir is Pakistan’s major problem.” I suggested that I might add that since the attack of Red China more and more people in India were beginning to realize the necessity of a Kashmir settlement. It was interesting that he suggested that I use the words “under the changed circumstances more and more people,” etc. He obviously did not want me to refer to Red Chinese aggression.
I underlined the damage that the talk about non-aggression pact was to Pakistan’s good will in the U.S. He said to pay no attention to such [Page 414] talk, it was unthinkable for him to do such a thing. (Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali confirmed this when I saw him on Friday.)
I still maintained it was dangerous to permit such speculation. Such talk could irreparably damage confidence in Pakistan’s responsibility as an ally. He and his country were now considered one of staunchest and steadfast friends. This was an asset not lightly to be thrown away. I also referred to the anti-American press and Assembly speeches. He belittled these, said he had to allow free discussion, and referred to our freedom of press. I urged him not to let it get out of hand as he might become a prisoner of the public opinion that was being developed.
At that moment (6:35 p.m.) a message was brought in from the British High Commissioner, Sir Morrice James, that Nehru had accepted the word “related” between “other … matters.” I said that I thought President Ayub had been wise in holding out for “related” matters. This was a first test of Nehru’s sincerity in starting discussions.
James came in and there were mutual congratulations. I commented that this was a good start but only a start. Ayub replied that he understood that but was counting on our help in getting a fair settlement. He said he understood that any fair settlement would be unpopular in both countries.
After James left, I asked Ayub if there was any particular subject in connection with U.S. aid that he wanted me to look into when I got back to Washington. He thought for a minute and said he couldn’t think of anything, although some of our people were unnecessarily suspicious and slow in taking action. He said he wanted me to see his Planning Commissioner, Said Hassan, when I got to Karachi. In taking my leave he asked me to give the President his warmest regards. He expressed the highest admiration for the manner in which the President had handled the Cuban crisis.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11-2962. Secret. Drafted by Harriman on January 8, 1963.↩