Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, November 25, 1962, 10:40 p.m.

2329. Eyes Only for the Ambassador and Harriman. For Harriman from the President. While the ostensible purpose of your stopover in Pakistan is to inform Ayub generally on your Delhi talks, I also regard it as a major opportunity to show Ayub how radically the Sino-Indian confrontation has altered the situation in the subcontinent from our point of view. We have had to look at this situation in terms of Free World security and we regard it as a major test of our alliance ties as well as Ayub’s statesmanship whether he does so too.

Up to this time we have been prepared to disregard as much as possible a basic difference in viewpoint between us and the Pakistani as to what our alliance meant. They have always regarded it primarily as a basis for soliciting support of their aims vis-a-vis India. We have regarded it as part of the total free world defense against Bloc aggression, a contingency that Ayub seems to have regarded as remote. Now that it has actually occurred, however, it must take precedence in our thinking. It ought to do so in Pak and Indian thinking too. As and when this sinks in, our task of promoting Pak-Indian reconciliation will grow easier.

Regrettably, Ayub has elected instead to pursue at least initially a tough line toward India and, for obvious reasons, toward us. Though I recognize that he is under some domestic pressure, at a moment like this there are limits on how far we can live with this attitude. Whether the present Sino-Indian crisis ends in a negotiated settlement or continues to boil, the Indians will almost certainly wish to undertake a major modernization of their forces. We shall be pressed to become the chief underwriter and cannot sustain the additional costs implicit in continued Pak-Indian quarrels. These costs have already been great enough.

I also believe that the Sino-Indian confrontation has given us what may be a one-time opportunity to bring about a Pak-Indian reconciliation. Though this opportunity may be fleeting, we still ought to seize it if we can. Success will require movement in both the Pakistani and Indian positions. Yet unless both Pakistan and India look clearly at their fundamental interest in partnership this opportunity may be lost. We cannot expect quick results, but can hope to set in motion a trend which will bring about, with a lot of nursing along from us, a resolution of such issues as Kashmir.

I do not want to push Ayub so hard as to get his back up, yet I think it imperative that he be under no illusion as to where we stand. Frank talk carries risks, but these seem to me less than those entailed in failing to make our position clear. I count on you to do so. Therefore, while you and McConaughy will of course choose the manner of your presentation, please tell Ayub that I have specifically asked you to make the following points to him:

(1) Whatever India’s past follies, the Chicom attack and India’s response to it create a basically new situation. We regard this as far more than a mere border squabble, even if it ends in a temporary settlement. By the Chinese action, the subcontinent has become a new area of major confrontation between the Free World and the Communists. We must take this fact into account in our global policy.

(2) The Indians themselves are at long last fully aware of the Chinese Communist threat and appear to be determined to meet it. This creates a recognized community of interest between India and Pakistan, which India is beginning to acknowledge. It provides a basis for the resolution of Pak-Indian differences which did not previously exist.

(3) We for our part have made clear time and again that our alliance ties with Pakistan were for the express purpose of meeting the Communist threat. Now that India too recognizes this threat and is seeking to cope with it, we intend to provide help to meet that threat.

(4) We regard such aid to India as fully consistent with our ties to Pakistan because there is no blinking the fact that the threat to the subcontinent is a threat to the security and independence of both.

(5) Were Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at a time when we were assisting India to confront Communist China, it would cut across the deep commitments of the entire free world. We know Ayub has no illusions about the Chicoms, but we would regard such gestures as wholly incompatible with Pakistan’s own interests, traditions, and commitments. Pakistan must realize that there are certain limits which should not be overstepped if a fruitful Pak-US relationship can continue. The American people have a million men in uniform outside the United States in defense of the freedom and independence of nations and are taking casualties every week. The esteem and friendship of the American people for Pakistan would melt away if Pakistan elects to draw close to those who are the sworn enemies of freedom.

(6) Indeed we think the opposite course from that which Ayub pursuing publicly is far better calculated to lead to the resolution of Pak-Indian differences which we and Ayub seek. The more forthcoming Pakistan is toward India, the harder it will be for India to avoid movement in its direction. By the same token, the tougher the Pak attitude, the less likely India can risk the humiliation of appearing to knuckle under. Thus the current Pak attitude risks diverting India from primary focus on the Chicom threat, a focus which can only benefit Pakistan in the long run.

(7) The US too will continue to do all it can to bring the two countries together. We have not been pressing Pakistan alone. But we cannot command we can only persuade. This means Ayub as well as Nehru. Nevertheless, we see the current situation as moving both parties toward the point where we can assist in a reasonable compromise involving some give by both parties. Indeed, should Ayub himself be prepared to be forthcoming, we are prepared to tell Nehru that if we give him major military aid he should agree to negotiate at a suitable point on Kashmir. Ayub cannot ask more of us, and we are unable to provide more.

(8) Meanwhile, though we recognize Ayub’s public opinion problem, he should bear in mind: (a) that if he lets it get out of hand he may end up losing his room to maneuver; (b) current Pak outbursts make it that much more difficult for India to be forthcoming; (c) the US public and Congress will be adversely affected by what they tend increasingly to regard as irrational Pak outbursts. In fact you might cite the 23 Nov. Washington Post interview in which Eisenhower, whom the Paks regard as a friend, is reported as favoring all-out military aid to India, but warns that any US commitment must be carried through until the Chinese are decisively beaten back.

(9) As to military aid, we are fulfilling our commitments to Pakistan and we intend to help India if it wants our help. Both steps are essential to the security of the subcontinent. We have conveyed adequate security reassurances to both India and Pakistan. We’ve never committed ourselves to any particular military balance between the two, nor can we do so.

(10) In sum, we intend to stand by our commitments to Pakistan and to protect its integrity. I regard this as more than justifying Pakistan’s reciprocal alliance obligations to us. In return we ask Ayub to examine dispassionately the great opportunity he and Nehru have to resolve Pak-Indian difference in the cause of solidarity against the Chicom threat. We will press this case on both powers and be guided largely by their responses.

In requesting you to press Ayub along the above lines, I am proceeding on the assumption that in the last analysis he will go along with us. This is foreshadowed by Mohammed Ali’s statement (Karachi 913)¹ that Pakistan would not sacrifice its alliance with us because it had no sound alternative course. So I am convinced that with the right combination of patience and firmness we can bring Ayub to take a reasonable course in his own interest.

Your mission will be an unqualified success if we can get the following from Ayub: (1) recognition that he must start re-educating his public before things drift too far; (2) indications of his willingness to respond to Indian overtures, so that we can encourage Nehru to make them; (3) minimizing of attacks on the US, which only redound to Pak disadvantage; and (4) cutting off his flirtation with Peiping on matters other than their own border problem. In return we can assure Ayub that we will take full account of Pak interests in our dealings with India.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11-2562. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated to Karachi and London eyes only for the Ambassadors. A note on the source text indicates that the approved text of the telegram was supplied to the Department of State for transmission by the White House. Komer, Talbot, Rusk, and the President are listed as having cleared it. White House telegram CAP 5551-62, November 25, from Komer to the President at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, transmitted the text to the President for approval. Komer noted that the telegram was drafted on instructions from Bundy, who had cleared an earlier draft. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/24/62-11/25/62)
1. Document 207.