Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, November 18, 1962, 8:46 p.m.

782. It clear that Paks have whipped themselves into near hysterical state and that next few weeks will be very difficult for all of us. In view legacy Indo-Pak relations strong reactions to our aid to India were to be expected. We can tolerate and are prepared for considerable buffeting but obviously wish avoid dramatic reversals of policy. We are presently very concerned by leaderless appearance of GOP. We have impression that GOP at this moment is desperately floundering around, is striking out blindly, and has no idea where it will be next week. The Hindu baiters such as Dehlavi seem to be having field day in absence firm political leadership. We recognize that unstable domestic situation places Ayub in doubly difficult position, even if he were of mind attempt moderate opinion. From Pak domestic viewpoint Chinese attacks and our response could not have come at worse time. At same time it also likely GOP statements and our intelligence “take” to some extent intended by GOP frighten U.S. and force us into certain actions vis-a-vis India. We must, therefore, avoid appearance of over concern and avoid being whiplashed. For example, we must give no encouragement to GOP that we will provide additional military assistance to Pakistan to “balance” aid to India. Full gamut of relations between U.S. and western world and nations of subcontinent is under change. One of our main objectives in next few months will be to do what we can to encourage resolution Indo-Pak differences and we must be careful take no actions with Pakistan which make this task more difficult.

In present situation, we must attempt guide leadership to see through temper tantrums and to recognize Pakistan’s basic long-range interests and continuing value of close relations with U.S. and improved relations with India.

We do not underestimate difficulty of your task, but believe our past policies and current actions do give you great deal work with. In discussions with GOP leaders you may wish at your discretion draw on following points:

1. On question of prior consultation we do not believe we need be apologetic. On October 26 you informed Ayub of all actions taken by U.S. to assist India up to that time.¹ Ayub’s response was at minimum tacit approval of those steps. Secondly, Talbot discussed matter with Ambassador Ahmed October 29 and President sent letter to Ayub October 28.² Since then we have kept GOP fully informed of details arms aid. As you have informed GOP our assistance is so far relatively small and certainly poses no threat to Pakistan. Impact of our aid to date is clearly of greater psychological impact in Pakistan than of concern militarily. (At same time you will not want to mislead Paks that more substantial aid is not coming. You will receive instructions shortly on this subject.)

2. U.S. understands Pakistan’s concern. We have, therefore, specifically taken this concern into account in our agreement with India and have made our assurances public in the November 14 Press Statement. In the Secretary’s letter to FonMin³ this assurance is repeated and the Secretary has referred to previous private assurances. (Embassy has copy of Chayes to McGhee memorandum of February 16, 1962,⁴ summing up our private, treaty, and public assurances and you may wish draw on this paper.)

In our view GOP has been given every assurance for its security. For them to believe otherwise is simply either questioning U.S. integrity or attempting pressure us into inadvisable actions against India. We do not intend play latter game beyond what we have done in Press Statement and Secretary’s letter and you may wish firmly and coldly inform argumentative types we do not appreciate former.

3. U.S. policy over years has been assist to extent possible settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan, Kashmir in particular. Alliance relationship per se has not demanded actions but we have, anyways, worked diligently for solutions problems out of conviction peace and stability subcontinent so demanded. Offer of Black mission is one example and GOP is fully aware that its recent efforts in UN would not have gotten off ground without our help and President’s personal intercession.

In letter Secretary has affirmed again that we will continue search for ways to be of assistance. As opportunities arise to take new steps we will not hesitate to do so and will be alert for them.

4. In addition diplomatic support we have given, Pakistan alliance with us has been of great value. Our economic assistance very substantial and Paks should realize that this large amount, in view many demands on us, is directly related to our alliance relationship. Our military aid has been substantial and during Ayub’s recent visit we made firm commitments respecting this aid. (Aide-Memoire of McNamara-Ayub talks.)⁵ We intend, despite added demands of Indo-China conflict, meet this commitment to letter. In talking about withdrawing from CENTO and SEATO, Pakistan appears to overlook intricate relation between our bilateral military aid and Pakistan’s commitments made under these arrangements. Perhaps they should get the word now that withdrawal from pacts would cause us re-examine basis our military assistance.

Each of the above points can be elaborated at some length and you undoubtedly can think of many others to help Pakistanis see own best self interests.

Finally, it is difficult assess with confidence many Pakistan hints of much closer relations with Chicoms. Likely that in part these reflect Pakistani frustration and in part crude and obvious efforts to cause us concern. You have full range of argumentation re nature Chicoms etc. and there little we can add to your knowledge this subject. In discussions with GOP you might wish point out that Chicoms made careful preparations for confrontation with India by May border agreement with GOP. Chicoms are cleverly playing one against the other and Paks have fallen for gambit. We have instructed Hong Kong keep you fully informed on current developments. Our policy continues to be not to object to legitimate GOP efforts make boundary settlement. However, to help GOP avoid errors, you will wish make clear that U.S. would not understand entente between two and such action would be viewed most seriously here. At time when Chicoms attacking subcontinent we do not expect nation which allied with us against communist expansionism give aid and comfort to Chinese. This would be a way of beginning to establish the dimensions of our tolerance of Pakistan flirtations with the Chinese Communists.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11-1862. Secret. Drafted by Naas and approved by Talbot and Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
1. See Document 183.
2. See Document 186.
3. The reference is to a letter from Rusk to Ali transmitted to Karachi in telegram 779, November 18. In the letter, Rusk emphasized that the United States viewed the military assistance provided to India in response to the threat posed by China as essential to the security of the entire subcontinent. The notes exchanged between the United States and India on November 14 had explicitly established that the purpose of the assistance was to meet the challenge of “Chinese aggression.” (See Document 197.)Rusk wrote that he was certain that the military assistance provided to India would not be used in any conflict with Pakistan. But with Pakistani concerns in mind, he reiterated the assurance made when the texts of the November 14 notes were released to the press: “if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.” (Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11-1862) The full text of the press statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 3, 1962, pp. 837-838.
4. Not found.
5. See footnote 2, Document 170.