Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, October 28, 1962, 2:42 p.m.

681. Deptel to Karachi 680,¹ rpt info Delhi 1682, London 2337 and Deptel to New Delhi 1681,² rpt info Karachi 679, London 2336.

There follows text of letter from the President to Ayub which you are instructed to deliver in accordance with Deptel 680.

“Dear Mr. President:

I was heartened by your response to my message on the Cuban crisis that was delivered to you by Ambassador McConaughy.³ In times like these, the support of friends and allies has a personal, as well as a political, significance.

We see another instance of Communist aggression almost as close to your borders as Cuba is to ours—the Chinese Communist attack on India. It also concerns me greatly. The Chinese have moved quickly, with large forces to take territory beyond that immediately in dispute; it is no longer a border wrangle. In my judgment, the long-run significance of this move cannot be exaggerated. The Chinese Communists, having established themselves on the near slopes of the Himalayas, will have secured a favorable position for further aggression. Thus they will put themselves in a politically dominant posture vis-a-vis India. But I think that this will be more than counter-balanced if their aggression has the effect of awakening India to the dangerous intentions of the Peiping regime, and turning the attention of the Indian Government and people to their true long-run security interests. These are interests which we all share. Certainly the United States as a leader of the free world must take alarm at any aggressive expansion of Communist power, and you as the leader of the other great nation in the subcontinent will share this alarm.

Unfortunately, press comment in Pakistan has already produced a negative reaction in India. This is particularly distressing at a time when a unique opportunity exists for laying the basis for future solidarity.

We now intend to give the Indians such help as we can for their immediate needs. We will ensure, of course, that whatever help we give will be used only against the Chinese. You, on your part, are in a position to make a move of the greatest importance which only you can make. This is to signal to the Indians in a quiet but effective way that the concerns—which you know I think totally unjustified—that have led them to maintain the greater part of their military power on their borders with you, should be put aside in the present crisis. Perhaps an effective way would be a private message from you to Nehru. You could tell him that he can count on Pakistan’s taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India. No possible outside aid can increase the ability of the Indians to withstand the Chinese offensive as much as a shift in their own dispositions.

Knowing the history of Kashmir, I do not make this suggestion lightly, but in the hope and belief that the painful moments which India is now experiencing will teach them how much more important the threat from the North is to the whole of the subcontinent than any regional quarrels within it. Our own recent experience with the response of our Latin American neighbors when they were confronted with the Soviet threat in Cuba gives me ground for this belief. Action taken by you now in the larger interests of the subcontinent will do more in the long run to bring about a sensible resolution of Pakistan-Indian differences than anything else I can think of.

Further, I am sure that the lesson of such a change in Indian dispositions would not be lost on the Peiping regime. Communism has always advanced in the face of disunity in the free world. This crisis is a test of the vision of all of us, our sense of proportion and our sense of the historic destiny of the free nations.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”

Signed original being pouched.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10-2862. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
1. Document 184.
2. Telegram 1681, October 27, summarizes the letter transmitted to Ayub in telegram 681 to Karachi. The Department noted that McConaughy’s effort to press Ayub for the assurances sought in the letter would be reinforced by an indication from Nehru that such assurances would be welcome. The Embassy was instructed to seek such an indication from Nehru. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10-2762)
3. See footnote 1, Document 183.