Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, September 27, 1962, 5:46 p.m.

560. 1. Ayub discussed US military assistance with Secretary McNamara September 25¹ in frank and cordial atmosphere. Ayub said he did not wish alter scope US military aid nor seek enlargement agreed force base, but hoped US performance on delivery agreed items could be improved.

2. McNamara said he would see to it that any serious deficiencies in delivery would be corrected expeditiously. FYI: McNamara undertook that delivery level in FY 1963 would be at least twice, perhaps 2-1/2 times that achieved in FY 1962.² However, FY 1962 deliveries were abnormally low because of SEA and Berlin priorities, so that net performance for the two years is not above prior delivery schedule. End FYI.

3. No increase in MAP was requested or committed. Under agreed MAP ceiling a submarine for Pak Navy was committed for delivery not earlier than FY 1964. 1961 commitment of 4 C-130’s reaffirmed and UASF survey team will be sent to study how meet remainder Pakistan’s air transport needs, and a further increment of transport aircraft will follow, although not necessarily C-130’s.

4. FYI: Current MAP includes delivery to Pakistan of 130 tanks, chiefly M-48’s during FY 1963. 72 tanks are programmed for later delivery. As noted above this does not represent any increase over previous MAP level. There is no increase in fighter aircraft inventory. Attrition aircraft both F-86 and F-104 will be provided in kind as required. End FYI.

For New Delhi

Dept considers it possible Ayub may try through press to create impression, as he did in 1961, that his trip has resulted in increased or at least more glamorous US military assistance. If Karachi perceives no objection Ambassador Galbraith may wish forestall effect of such an effort by informing GOI immediately of results Ayub’s talks with McNamara. Ambassador authorized pass to GOI information in paragraph 3 only. If submarine is questioned, he could say that it will be used to train Pak Navy in ASW. If it later develops Ayub publicizes commitment to increase delivery, Ambassador also may draw on all of paragraph 2.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/9-2762. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Gatch; cleared by Kettelhut, Cameron, and William Bundy; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi and USUN for the Secretary.
1. Ayub met with McNamara in Washington on September 25 and then visited New York before returning to Pakistan on September 27. A memorandum of this conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, SA #47, Pakistan, 200.6-333, 1962.
2. This undertaking was confirmed in an aide-mémoire signed on October 13 by Talbot, and delivered to Foreign Minister Ali on that date. A copy of the aide-mémoire was transmitted under cover of a January 18, 1963, memorandum from McNamara to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force expressing his concern that the terms of his commitments to Ayub were not being met. (Ibid.: FRC 67 A 4564, Pakistan, 1963, 000.1-091.4)