Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

168. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Newport, Rhode Island, September 24, 1962, 12:30-2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Kennedy-Ayub Talks at Newport, Rhode Island

PARTICIPANTS

• President Ayub
• Ambassador Aziz Ahmed
• President Kennedy
• Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
• Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy

The following subjects were discussed:¹

I. Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in London: Common Market Problem;

II. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations;

III. Pakistan-India Relations;

IV. Presentation of President’s Science Advisory Committee Report on Waterlogging and Salinity in West Pakistan.

II. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

President Kennedy asked President Ayub what he thought the prospects were for some sort of solution of the Afghan problem. President Ayub indicated that he was not optimistic about the outlook for an improvement in relations. He gave a summary of the history and present status of the mediation effort of the Shah of Iran, substantially along lines already reported by our Embassies in Tehran, Karachi, and Kabul. Although the chances for a settlement did not seem promising owing to Afghan unwillingness to show any flexibility, he thought that a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, or other representatives of the three governments, could still be arranged, to take place shortly after they returned from the General Assembly. The meeting would have taken place in Tehran before the General Assembly, if Afghan Foreign Minister Naim had not had to cancel because he wanted to take his son to Europe for medical treatment.

President Ayub said he felt there was little hope for Afghanistan so long as the present Royal Family remained in power. He characterized the Royal Family as being entirely indifferent to the needs and interests of the mass of the Afghan people. He termed the regime as cruel and motivated by expediency. He said the ruling family had formed its opinion that the Soviet Union was going to take over South Asia and was shaping its policy accordingly. He felt that the Afghan Government was influenced by this estimate when it broke relations with Pakistan and terminated trade and transit arrangements with Pakistan. The Afghan rulers had always played one side against another and their assessment of the present situation caused them to lean toward the Soviet Union. He thought they would have given the Soviets an opening, regardless of the policy followed by Pakistan.

President Kennedy expressed the deep concern of the U.S. Government at the adverse trend of events in Afghanistan. It was clear that the extension of Soviet influence was proceeding at a rapid rate. It seemed to the U.S. that the break with Pakistan had accelerated the adverse trend. It had made the Afghans far more dependent on Soviet trade than on the trade route through the Soviet Union. It had tended to isolate Afghanistan from the free world countries and had made it extremely difficult and expensive for the Afghans to receive any free world economic assist-ance. We do not feel that Afghanistan is irretrievably lost, but a major effort must be made to save the situation. Restoration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan seems essential to the success of the effort to counter the expansion of Soviet influence. President Kennedythen outlined, in general terms, our thinking as to how Pakistan-Afghanistan relations might be restored. He indicated the U.S. would be prepared to assist the financing and construction of short rail extensions into Afghanistan from Quetta-Chaman to Spin Baldak and from the Khyber Pass to a connecting point in Afghan territory. With the completion of this rail extension, which would require some months for consruction, it would be possible to send Afghan goods across Pakistani territory to Afghanistan in sealed cars in bond, with no transshipment or handling of the merchandise in Pakistan required. This would mean Afghan Trade Agencies would not be required. Our proposal was that the Pakistan Government allow the stationing of Trade Agencies in Peshawar and Quetta temporarily, such Trade Agencies to be closed as soon as the rail extensions are in operation. Diplomatic relations and trade and transit arrangements under this plan would be re-established immediately, along with the temporary reopening of the Trade Agencies. Consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would not be established now under the proposal, but small consulates would be reopened as soon as the Trade Agencies were closed. Since the number of Afghan representatives would be small, they could be kept under surveillance. The President said that, if desired, we would be willing to assist the Pakistani authorities in satisfying themselves that the Afghan representatives were not engaging in improper activities.

The President observed that this formula would achieve the objective of restoring Afghanistan’s access to the free world and would improve the prospects of keeping Afghanistan out of the Soviet camp. It would save the face of both Afghanistan and Pakistan and would give Pakistan reasonable protection against objectionable activities of Afghan representatives among the tribesmen.

President Ayub indicated that he had considerable reservations to this proposal. He was agreeable to the rail extension, Chaman to Spin Baldak, which was already contemplated, but he seriously doubted the financial and engineering feasibility of a rail extension from the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. Nor did he think this was necessary. A trucking service from Peshawar over the existing highway was far more economical and practical. This trucking service had always worked well and could continue to do so. The Afghans could pick up the goods in Peshawar and handle the traffic arrangements in any way they pleased. Every facility would be granted by the Pakistani authorities even to the extent of some sacrifice of Pakistani traffic requirements. He thought the cost of extending the line through the very difficult mountainous terrain of the Khyber area would be enormous and long delayed and impossible to justify. The existing short line west of Peshawar was a difficult engineering accomplishment which was very expensive when it was built some decades ago. Even then the British could justify it only on military grounds.

President Ayub thought that if the Afghan ruling authorities were really interested in restoring trade, they would have accepted the U.S. compromise proposal of last March which Pakistan had accepted and which would have enabled the Afghans to supervise and document the transit traffic in Pakistan (although this was not really necessary), by means of Afghan Trade Agents stationed in Karachi, who would have had the right to travel periodically to the border points in connection with the transit traffic. The fact that the Afghans had rejected this, and had terminated the limited sixty-day resumption of transit traffic which continued through February and March of this year and which had worked very satisfactorily, showed that the Afghans did not really put a high priority on resumption of trade and transit.

President Ayub said that he did not see how Pakistan could safely permit the return of Afghan government representatives to the sensitive tribal area. They were all trouble-makers and they had orders to stir up the tribesmen. There has been great improvement in the peace and stability of the tribal area since the departure of the Afghan representatives last year. Before that, there had been numerous bombing and shooting incidents, some of them rather serious. In one clash, 700 had been killed. Furthermore, President Ayub thought that public opinion in Pakistan was a factor which had to be taken into account, especially since the return of constitutional government last June. The public understood the Afghan problem, and would regard President Ayub and his government as “fools,” if the return of Afghan local representatives was allowed on practically the same basis as before. President Ayub felt there would be no legitimate consular work for Afghan consuls in the Northwest Frontier area anyway. They would only be there for subversive purposes. He was willing to permit the Afghans to have all the consulates they wanted in Rawalpindi and beyond, but no closer to the border than Rawalpindi. It seemed to President Ayub that the logical first step would be for the Afghans to agree to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. After this was accomplished, efforts could be made to restore other relations, step by step.

President Kennedy pointed out that the Afghan sensibilities had to be considered. The Afghans had been offended by the Pakistan action of last year in closing the Afghan offices. The Afghans would certainly need to give assurance as to proper conduct of their representatives and they could not expect an exact return to the former situation. With only a small Afghan consulate eventually situated in Peshawar and with the various safeguards, it seemed unlikely that the Afghan representatives could create serious difficulties, or threaten Pakistan security. The U.S. had been able to control Communist consuls in New York without any great difficulty. Mr. McConaughy noted that it was customary for a neighboring country to have a consulate in a nearby friendly city as important as Peshawar. There would be some visa work and other traditional work for an Afghan representative to perform in Peshawar.

President Kennedy urged President Ayub to view the problem from a broad standpoint, bearing in mind the very large stakes involved. He hoped that President Ayub could overlook some of the local factors in view of the much wider implications of the problem. It was our view that the prospects for saving Afghanistan from satellite status were greatly reduced by the continuation of the impasse between Pakistan and Afghanistan and that the security of Pakistan itself would be threatened in a major way by the entry of Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit.

President Ayub said he agreed on the great danger to Pakistan inherent in the present situation and outlook. He said he expected to be confronted with Soviet or Soviet-controlled forces on his border with Afghanistan at some time. He felt that Pakistan’s policy was not responsible for the mistaken policy of the Afghan rulers. He felt that a change in the government of Afghanistan and some sort of confederation between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan was the only hopeful way of dealing with the security problem. Under present circumstances, the Soviets were very confident and did not feel it necessary to show their hand openly in Afghanistan. Their technicians and advisors were being very correct and were staying in the background. The Soviets were able to use central Asian nationals to do their work when necessary. These people could hardly be distinguished from the natives of Afghanistan. He thought the Soviets were playing their game very cleverly in Afghanistan and possibly would not have to make a show of aggressive force, which would have a damaging international effect.

President Ayub then said rather reluctantly that, in view of President Kennedy’s views, he would be willing to consider permitting the establishment of Afghan “tentacles” in the Quetta-Chaman area, and in the Khyber area, but not in Peshawar itself. He might consider allowing an Afghan representative in say Landikotal, between Peshawar and the border, but Peshawar was too sensitive and he could not consider authorizing the reopening of an Afghan government office there. The Afghans still had permission to station representatives of the Afghan banks there, but official representatives could not be permitted in Peshawar.

President Kennedy noted that there was a basis for discussion in this offer of President Ayub’s even though it did not go so far as we had suggested. We thought it was important for representatives of the two countries to get together in the presence of Iranians as soon as possible to try to work out an agreement. He hoped that President Ayub could authorize his people to start the discussions.

President Ayub said that this would be acceptable. He thought the Foreign Ministers might initiate the discussions in Tehran, after an initial preliminary meeting in New York while they are all present at the General Assembly. He expressed his distrust of Afghan Foreign Minister Naim, whom he described as devious and shifty. He said he preferred to deal with Daud, whom he described as tough and difficult, but blunt and forthright.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 10/62. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy on October 1 and approved by the White House on October 15. Kennedy’s meeting with Ayub at Hammersmith Farm in Newport, Rhode Island, grew out of a request by Ayub for an informal visit to the United States following a State visit to Canada. (Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, August 15; ibid., 7/62-8/62)
1. Memoranda of conversation dealing with items I, III, and IV are ibid.