169. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Your meeting with Naim1 will be the first (and perhaps last) real chance we’ll have to influence the basic outlook of the Afghan regime.
All in town are convinced that Moscow is slowly but surely binding Afghanistan to it in a way the Afghans sooner or later won’t be able to escape. The latest is a sensitive report2 that USSR is insisting on a three-year export monopoly on karakul and rugs, major Afghan exports. Our Embassy claims this would signify the “virtual end of RGA economic independence.” Whether or not Kabul is in fact past the point of no return, the trend is certainly clear.
Dominant Soviet influence in Afghanistan would so increase the pressures on Iran and Pakistan as to justify a major forestalling effort on our part. Such an effort would involve largely US economic aid. But here we run afoul of the Pushtunistan issue and its derivative, the transit dispute, which prevents us from even getting much aid in.
We’ve just tried moving Ayub on this issue without much success. He’s probably willing to compromise but won’t restore status quo ante as Kabul insists.
So we’ve got to get the Afghans to come halfway too. The only means I see is to drive home to Naim and his brother Daud how dangerous a spot we think [Page 332] they’re in and how little we can do to help so long as our entry through Pakistan is blocked.
To me, this requires lifting the discussion above the level of Pushtunistan and transit. There is no purchase in letting Naim give you his usual long harangue on these; he is letter perfect and passionately convinced he’s right.
Instead I’d urge stressing our concern over the skillful game Moscow is playing—half a billion in loans and grants, 3-4000 Soviet technicians, and reorientation of most Afghan trade toward the Bloc. The Soviets have been very cautious to date, but Naim should ask himself what they might do once they have Afghans in their grasp.
Naim’s comeback will surely be to appeal for greater US aid and support. Here I think we should frankly ask him whether he thinks we can desert our ally Pakistan on Pushtun issue, when we fully recognize Durand Line. We can’t even continue present aid program effectively till the border is opened anyway.
If Naim shows any give, you could tell him: (1) you personally told Ayub that both he and Afghans must recognize that their common security interest far transcends their lesser disputes—Afghanistan must have a friendly Pakistan in its rear and vice versa; (2) we are convinced that straight restoration of the status quo ante is unacceptable to Ayub, but; (3) he seems willing to compromise and agreed to foreign ministers talks under Iranian auspices in New York; (4) we urge Afghans to pick up this gauge before something sours the prospects again; and (5) there can be a reasonable settlement if both sides will keep their larger mutual interests clearly in mind (pp. 4-5 of State’s Talking Paper3 have more details).
The Afghans, who are horribly isolated, may just feel that the USSR is coming out on top, and that they have to bend with the wind. So you may want to weave in a few remarks about the Bloc’s current troubles and our confidence we’re ahead, though pointing out as a fact of life that we would have a hard time helping Afghans if they got too enmeshed by Soviets before they woke up and called for help.
My sense is that you might just be able to break this logjam. As was the case with Sukarno, these proud, sensitive Afghan leaders might take from you what no one else can really get across.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Security, 1961-1963. Secret.↩
- Kennedy was scheduled to meet with Afghan Foreign Minister Naim on September 27.↩
- Not found.↩
- Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, 9/14/62-9/26/62)↩