138. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

SUBJECT

  • U.S.-Pakistan Relations

There is enclosed a memorandum prepared at the request of Mr. McGhee for the President, outlining the current status of U.S.-Pakistan relations. This memorandum has been approved by Ambassador McConaughy, who is presently in Washington.

Further consideration is being given to moves on our part which can improve U.S.-Pakistan relations, in particular to overcome problems arising from U.S. involvement in the India MIG-21 issue. The President may wish to have a review of the results of this investigation prior to Ambassador McConaughy’s departure.

A.E. Breisky1

Enclosure2

U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

We have maintained a close and for the most part friendly alliance with Pakistan since 1954. We and Pakistan have mutually benefited by this alliance, although they and we view it from a different perspective. Recent strains on both partners have caused both to re-examine the value of the alliance. Despite indications that the various causes of strains will not be easy to eliminate, it seems clear that it is in the best national interest of both the U.S. and Pakistan to continue the alliance.

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I. The Nature of the Alliance

There exists between the U.S. and Pakistan an extensive range of scientific, cultural, educational, military and political common interests.

The basic objective of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is to insure to the best of our ability its continued existence as an independent nation with a healthy economic development firmly integrated in the non-communist world. We have assisted Pakistan on a massive basis economically and militarily, and to a lesser extent politically. We have guaranteed Pakistan’s security against aggression from any quarter. In return we have asked Pakistan to allow us to maintain in the country military communications and intelligence facilities which we consider vital to our national interests. We expect Pakistan to stand with us politically on the major issues dividing the free world from the communist bloc; and stand with us militarily to the extent that it can contribute to regional collective security within the framework of CENTO and SEATO.

The basic objectives of Pakistan policy toward the U.S. are to insure that it can maintain a military capability sufficient to prevent its neighbors, most particularly India, from attempting solutions of outstanding disputes by force; and that it can undertake its much needed economic development under the general protection of the U.S. against the long-range communist threat to its existence.

Pakistan has granted us facilities, the existence of which have brought regional pressure and specific threats of war-like action to bear against it. Pakistan has stood up firmly, after the U-2 incident for example, to this pressure. Pakistan has stood with us on every major political issue except the question of admission of Communist China to the UN.

In return Pakistan has asked us for economic and military assistance, and strong political and moral support on those issues which it considers vital to its existence as an independent nation, principally Kashmir and to a lesser degree the Pakistan-Afghanistan border problem.

II. Background

The course of U.S.-Pakistan relations has been irregular over the last several years. At times when interests seemed to coincide, or when one of the partners in the alliance had a particular need, relations have been excellent. At other times when doubt and frustration on the part of Pakistan as to the validity and utility of its commitment has caused it to question the alliance, or when our irritation at some particular action of Pakistan’s made us do likewise, relations have worsened appreciably. We are currently in a low period similar to the one existing before President Ayub’s visit to the U.S. in 1961. At that time Pakistan considered the new Administration to be so biased in favor of India as to be detrimental to Pakistan’s interests.

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However, U.S.-Pakistan relations improved markedly as a result of President Ayub’s visit during which both countries were reassured as to the good intentions of the other. President Ayub left the U.S. with these understandings on the subjects of his main interests:

Kashmir

a.
The President would make a major effort in November 1961 to get Nehru to negotiate reasonably on Kashmir.
b.
If this effort were unsuccessful, the U.S. would then support Pakistan when it again took the issue to the Security Council.

U.S. Military Assistance to India

The U.S. had no current intention of changing its policy on providing military assistance to India and would not unless circumstances in the area altered—for example, if an increased military threat to India from Communist China became apparent. In any case, the U.S. would not change its policy without prior consultation with Pakistan.

Afghanistan

There was a fundamental disagreement between the U.S. and Pakistan on how Pakistan should deal with Afghanistan, but the U.S. would not stand in the way of a Pakistan attempt to deal firmly with the Afghans.

Communist China

The U.S. knew that Pakistan was planning to demarcate its northern border with Communist China in order to prevent a situation similar to the one in Ladakh from arising in Pakistan.

Economic and Military Assistance

The U.S. intended to undertake a thorough look at Pakistan’s waterlogging and salinity problem with a view to seeing whether we could not start a practical program to solve it. The U.S. planned to be similarly forthcoming with regard to its other assistance programs, including our part in the Indus Waters scheme and the Second Five Year Plan. Concerning military assistance, the U.S. planned to maintain its current policy and, in addition, supply a squadron of C-130 transport aircraft.

On our side we had substantially the same understandings except for the one in Afghanistan. President Ayub left the impression that, when he spoke of dealing firmly with the Afghans, he was referring to military reprisals by Pakistan against Afghan incursions into Pakistan territory rather than any political actions.

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III. Pakistan’s Policies Since Ayub Visit

Afghanistan

Our relations with Pakistan took a turn for the worse about a month after Ayub’s visit when Pakistan unilaterally and brusquely ordered Afghanistan to close its consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan. Afghanistan thereupon broke off relations with Pakistan and sealed the common border, which has remained closed, except for eight weeks, ever since September 6, 1961. Despite our good offices, including Ambassador Merchant’s mission, the situation remains unresolved. We continue to consider that, despite Afghanistan’s illogical and stubborn policy, Pakistan has played into the hands of the Soviet Union by its pre-emptory action.

Kashmir

The President attempted without success in November to get Nehru to negotiate on Kashmir. Because of this, and spurred on by what appeared to be a genuine fear of Indian aggressive intent after the Indian seizure of Goa, Pakistan carried through on its plan to take the Kashmir issue to the Security Council, although delaying this move several times at our request while we tried various ways of getting Pakistan and India together—including the President’s proposal to send Eugene Black on a good offices mission. There is a definite feeling among Pakistanis—officials and private citizens alike—that we have not lived up fully to the President’s commitment to support Pakistan in the UN. Recent efforts by USUN may have changed this opinion to some extent among Pakistan officials, but the general belief remains among the people that the U.S. has let Pakistan down.

U.S. Military Assistance to India

Pakistan’s distrust of U.S. intentions was heightened in May by reports that Ambassador Galbraith had attempted to counter an Indian plan to acquire MIG-21’s from the Soviet Union by offering to provide F-104’s. The fact that India was attempting to build a supersonic capability revived the fear that had been aroused by the Goa take-over. The U.S. has attempted to allay this fear in several ways after Goa, including a confidential renewal of U.S. security guarantees for Pakistan which were contained in a letter from the President to Ayub last January.3 Despite these assurances, Pakistanis at all levels continue to distrust India—particularly Krishna Menon—and appear to be genuinely apprehensive at the possibility of an attack from India.

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Communist China

When Pakistan and Communist China announced jointly in May that they intended to negotiate the border between Pakistan-held Kashmir and Singhiang Province, India reacted sharply in the belief that both Pakistan and Communist China were attempting to put pressure on India. Although the U.S. has maintained official silence on the subject, early press reports gave Pakistan officials the idea that the U.S. was displeased at Pakistan action. The Pakistan Ambassador here and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary in Karachi have gone to great lengths to justify Pakistan’s policy on this matter.

U.S. Economic and Military Assistance

Pakistan was greatly reassured by U.S. support which resulted in the IBRD Consortium’s pledging the full amount requested for the first two years of the Second Five Year Plan. However, the delay in issuance of the report from Dr. Wiesner’s office on salinity, and the revisions that have had to be made on the Indus Waters scheme have aroused doubts in Pakistan as to the validity of our commitments. On the military side Pakistan defense officials desire to maintain close association with the U.S. but are worried that we do not reciprocate. Washington rumors and delays in MAAG programming and deliveries have accentuated these fears. Pakistan defense officials have also been putting pressure on us in CENTO, SEATO and within the framework of our bilateral understanding to engage in contingency planning against possible attack from India or Afghanistan.

The accumulation of doubt and frustration in Pakistan as a result of the foregoing has led politically aware Pakistanis to question the value of Pakistan’s alliance just at a time when a measure of political freedom returned to the country after over three and a half years of martial law. The newly convened National Assembly will have some restraint on the power of the Executive and Ayub will thus have to be responsive or at least alert to its wishes. He will not be able to make decisions affecting Pakistan’s foreign policy posture without being more responsive to the pressure of public opinion than he has in the past. There have been some recent indications of a possible reappraisal by Pakistan of its alignment with the West. Logically, however, it would seem that Pakistan has really no practical alternative to its alliance with the U.S. Despite increasingly bold opposition, Ayub can be expected to follow substantially the same course as he has in the past.

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IV. Recent U.S. Attitudes

Beginning with Pakistan’s abrupt action against Afghanistan in August 1961, our view of Pakistan’s course of action has become more and more critical. It has seemed that Pakistan is asking for more from us than we are prepared to give in order to maintain our special relationship. Furthermore, Pakistan’s actions have at times seemed to have been taken without sufficient consultation with us and there has been an increasing breakdown of communication.

Some of the major irritants have been listed above—i.e., Pakistan-Afghanistan impasse, Kashmir, Pakistan-Chinese Communist relations, differing views on CENTO and SEATO. In connection with the latter organization, Ayub recently failed to respond to the U.S. suggestion to send token forces to Thailand.

We too have been taking stock of the alliance in the light of the unsatisfactory relations of the past year. Pakistan seems determined to try to limit U.S. freedom of action with respect to India and to a lesser extent, with respect to Afghanistan. The present judgment is that the value of our special relationship with Pakistan, particularly in the military field, is such that we cannot contemplate withdrawal from the alliance. We cannot, furthermore, yet accept the dissolution of CENTO and SEATO, which might follow if Pakistan on its side withdrew.

Conclusion

We recognize the difficulties which we face ahead in trying simultaneously to maintain our relationship with Pakistan and to develop an increasingly effective relationship with India. Nevertheless, continuation of the alliance is in our interest. Not only is a free and cooperative Pakistan essential to the stability and security of South Asia and to our presence there, but there is no satisfactory alternative site for our facilities which are vital to our national interest.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/6-1562. Secret. Drafted by Gatch and McGhee and cleared by Grant, Cameron, McGhee, and McConaughy.
  2. Breisky signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.
  3. Secret.
  4. See Document 100.