Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

139. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, June 19, 1962, 4 p.m.

Meeting with the President on India-Pakistan Problems

PRESENT

• The President
• Mr. G. McGhee
• Mr. J. Grant
• Ambassador McConaughy
• Mr. McG. Bundy
• Mr. R. Komer

1. The President approved a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan’s messages of 18¹ and 19 June² on a counter-offer to forestall Indian purchase of MIG-21s. He accepted Mr. McGhee’s arguments as to why we couldn’t sell F-104s to India for rupees, even though it was technically feasible to do so. These were chiefly the likely strong Pakistani reaction, which might even lead to restrictions on our key intelligence facilities, and secondarily the likely Congressional reaction. The President agreed to tell Macmillan that we would pay more than half the hard currency costs of a Lightning squadron if necessary, especially if we could find some way to minimize the dollar drain involved.

2. Ambassador McConaughy explained how he would propose to explain our maneuvers to Ayub, depending upon the possible outcome in Delhi. The President instructed Ambassador McConaughy to tell Ayub in the event our counter-offer seemed likely to be accepted that we were serving Pakistani interests as well as ours, and that a Western-controlled supply of jets to India was infinitely preferable to uncontrolled reliance on Soviet sources. On the other hand, if the MIG deal went through we should tell them that it didn’t change the military balance much (as a hedge against new Pakistani requests for jets), and explain that counter offers to India had been in an attempt to spoil this deal. The President was dubious about giving more jets to the Pakistani regardless of what happened.

3. The desirability of meeting the Pakistani request for bilateral joint planning vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan was discussed. Although Ambassador McConaughy pointed out how the Pakistani argued that this was purely contingency planning of the sort any two allied general staffs would normally carry out, the President was opposed to our engaging in any joint planning which might leak to the Indians and suggest that we were planning with the Paks against them.

4. Mr. McGhee noted the Pakistani desire for a public US guarantee of Pakistan’s security against Indian aggression. He felt that reiteration of the Pak guarantee in some form might be essential to mollify Ayub if we and the UK supplied planes to India. The President said he was extremely reluctant to give any new commitments to the Pakistani; he queried why we got into such commitments in the first place. Mr. McGhee briefly explained the history of our past “guarantees” to Pakistan and India.

Mr. McGhee suggested that if we could get the two countries, perhaps in the UN discussion on Kashmir, to make public statements disavowing any intention of attacking each other, the US could then come out with a public statement noting these declarations and “guaranteeing” the security of each in event of aggression by the other. Mr. Grant noted that our main objective in supplying such security reassurances to Pakistan was to forestall their “doing something” to our Peshawar facilities in retaliation for what they regarded as pro-Indian US actions. The President reserved judgment on any such idea, and asked that it be studied further when the occasion arose.

The President said that perhaps he ought to have one more meeting with McConaughy before the latter returned to Pakistan; he also thought that he might write a letter to Ayub.

R.W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 6/20/62-6/24/62. Secret. Drafted by Komer on June 20. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
1. Macmillan’s message of June 18 to Kennedy reported on two “difficult” conversations that British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys had with Nehru concerning the Indian desire to purchase supersonic aircraft. Nehru stated that the F-104 fighters supplied to Pakistan by the United States had created a strong public demand in India for comparable aircraft. Of the Western aircraft being considered, the Indian military viewed the British Lightning fighter as least suited to their needs. Only the Soviet MIG, in Nehru’s view, could be produced and offered at a price India could afford. An offer of Western aircraft at a comparable price would amount to military assistance and compromise India’s neutrality. (Telegram 6781 to London, June 18; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6-1862)
2. On June 19, Macmillan informed Kennedy that he had received a further report from Sandys which was more optimistic. Sandys had learned from Indian President Radhakrishnan that Nehru was concerned about the strong U.S. and British reactions to the projected purchase of MIGs, and would be glad to find a way to resolve the issue that did not involve too much loss of face. Radhakrishnan and Desai had urged Nehru to put the question into “cold storage” for several months. (Telegram 6792 to London, June 19; ibid., 791.5622/6-1962)