137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 0
6679. Please transmit urgently following message from President to Prime Minister:
We are most appreciative of your willingness to come up with a Lightning Mark II offer, despite the real sacrifice involved. I am concerned, however, lest Nehru’s press conference remarks mean that he has all but made up his mind to buy MIGs. The unfortunate leak to The New York Times from Delhi also suggests that it will be difficult to keep the US role in any counter-offer from being too transparent and exposing us to a strong Pakistani as well as domestic US reaction which may jeopardize other programs.
Nonetheless, I still believe that it is in our mutual interest to forestall if possible a crucial step toward Indian acceptance of the USSR as a main source of arms supply. Even if we fail in this endeavor, we want to deprive hostile elements in India of the argument that India had no reasonable alternative.
Therefore, we emphatically support the Orpheus engine offer, and will finance 75 per cent of the three million pounds additional you estimate is required to develop it.
As you know, we believe that it is equally important to offer some aircraft in order to provide an alternative comparable to the MIG offer. We share your view that reasonably comparable soft currency terms will also carry great weight with the Indians, and that we should allow payment in rupees to the extent necessary.
In reflecting we have looked again at the possibility of offering to provide Nehru transport aircraft, on which his need vis-a-vis the Communist Chinese is much more valid than for the fighters, and where the Pakistani reaction would be minimized. Accordingly, I conclude that the farthest we should now go is to offer to sell India a single squadron (12 aircraft) of the Lightning Mark II, for rupees at a stated price of perhaps 300,000 pounds, plus accessories which we suppose would be about 3 million pounds or a little more than half of the 5 million estimate for the two squadrons. In addition, we on the US side would offer to provide nine C-130 transports as a sale for rupees. This latter would of course be [Page 271] left to Galbraith, but Sandys could refer to indications from us in this direction.
If you were prepared to do this, we would hope that you could bear one-half of the real cost of the fighters, which would total about 10.2 million pounds. We would make up the rest through some means involving greater participation in military research projects, or through some economic aid sharing, or a combination of the two. Our joint interests are such, as I am sure you will agree, that we should not hesitate to reallocate financial responsibilities in order to advance our common interests or minimize our common difficulties. I trust that these assurances are sufficient so that you can go ahead with an offer of twelve Lightnings as well as the Orpheus.
We are of course anxious to forestall a violent Pakistani reaction, for reasons I have mentioned. In our approach to the Pakistanis, we should both tell them frankly that it is to save them and us from something worse, i.e., a major Soviet re-equipment of the Indians of a nature we cannot control.
Let me also assure you that we are bending every effort to bring home to Nehru how a MIG purchase might gravely prejudice Congressional approval of continued massive US aid. I had already sent a brief message to Nehru, and am instructing Galbraith to make a full-scale assault as soon as he returns. Sandys too could certainly mention the great concern in Washington lest a MIG deal undermine our whole aid program.
The French reaction is negative so far. But I think you will agree that we should give India the impression, if possible, that there is more than one Western alternative to MIGs. Hence we will continue explorations with the French.
With warm regards.
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy Correspondence with Macmillan, 1962-1963, Vol. II. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant, William Bundy, and Komer; cleared by McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Grant. Repeated to Karachi and New Delhi.↩