242. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Cuban Revolutionary Council

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. Antonio de Varona, Revolutionary Council Member
  • Dr. Carlos Piad, Washington Representative, Revolutionary Council
  • Dr. Morales-Carrion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
  • Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

Dr. Varona expressed his discouragement over the Councilʼs future, the future of Cuba, and said he felt that the U.S. was abandoning Cuba to its fate under Castro.

He continued that Mr. Goodwin had informed Dr. Aragon (Miro Cardonaʼs secretary) that no decision would be reached regarding support for the Council until the Council had broadened its base and achieved greater unity among the exile groups. He said that it would be [Page 618] difficult to include groups such as those led by Sanchez Arango or Marquez Sterling in the Council. Sincere attempts had been made to reach an understanding with the Manolo Ray group; these had failed. He suggested that the U.S. name new Council members.

Varona then turned to the necessity of organizing a new invasionary force. He said that Nicaraguan President Somoza had offered to assist to that end. He urged that all Cuban young men in exile of military age undergo compulsory military training as a first step toward training such a force. When informed that U.S. compulsory military training was for eighteen months, he replied that for his purposes two months were sufficient and that in view of Cubansʼ special refugee status, special arrangements should be made for them under U.S. law. He stated that once trained the force he envisaged would also require sufficient equipment to overcome Castroʼs military power. When asked what basis he had for thinking in these terms, Varona replied that he understood that Cubans were to be recruited in the U.S. armed forces on an individual basis and also that Cuban pilots would be given training. Of what purpose were these steps by the U.S. if not to train a new invasionary force, Varona asked.

When Varona received no encouragement for this line of reasoning, he said that he would insist upon clarification of this point in a meeting that might take place soon between Miro Cardona and the President. As far as he, Varona , was concerned, the struggle against Castro to be successful involved three basic aspects, all inter-related and inter-depend-ent: a massive propaganda campaign, sabotage, and a frontal military attack on Cuba.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-761. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 10.