Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara ⁰

Washington, June 16, 1961.

JCSM-414-61

SUBJECT

• Contingency Outline Plan (Cuba) (S)

1. On 1 May 1961, in a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,¹ you requested that the Joint Staff and CINCLANT be assigned the responsibility for preparing instructions necessary to implement a Cuban Contingency Plan which would minimize the lead time required and maximize security during the period between the decision and invasion.

2. CINCLANT has developed an outline plan² with a 5 day lead time. This plan has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following major considerations are involved:

a. Cost—Requirement for shipping and repositioning of units results in an estimated initial cost of $52.4 million and a cost of maintenance on a 30 day basis of $8.2 million.

b. Redeployment—The redeployment of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade from PACOM will reduce the capability of CINCPAC to react to contingencies in his area as long as those forces and related shipping are deployed in Atlantic or Gulf Coast waters.

c. Training and Morale—A short reaction time requires that units be on a continuing alert status over a long period of time. This adversely affects a unitʼs ability to maintain training efficiency and may affect morale. This could offset the advantages gained by a short reaction time.

d. Repositioning—The plan requires the repositioning of two major Army combat units to a presently inactive Army post (Fort Polk, Louisiana) and the possible closing of another (Fort Devens, Massachusetts). This may have serious domestic political implications.

e. Security—The required movement to pre-position forces as envisioned in the plan would be impossible to conceal. Accordingly, it is unlikely that any cover plan would hide the intent and purpose of proposed actions. However, deception plans could be designed for the purpose of misleading the Cuban forces as to the specific areas and timing of the assault.

3. CINCLANT has stated that a more economical use of forces can be achieved if more time is allowed between the order to execute and the initial assault. He estimates that he could implement a modification of his current operations plan for Cuba in 18 days from “Execute” to “Assault” and this plan would bring Cuba under control in a relatively short period of time.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude, therefore, that more leeway must be provided in the reaction time; and that with activation of some additional amphibious shipping CINCLANT will be able to achieve a reaction time within 18 days from “Execute” to “Assault”. This is the course of action recommended.

5. In the event emergency conditions, such as an immediate requirement to succor US citizens whose welfare has been placed in serious and immediate jeopardy, an airborne assault of approximately two divisions could be initiated against the Havana area with a lead time of five to six days. The combat elements of the force could close in 81-1/2 hours. All combat elements and scheduled support units could close in 114 hours. Marine augmentation forces could be air landed at Guantanamo for defense and expansion of control in that area, a Marine BLT could seize a beachhead in the Havana area as a diversionary support of the airborne assault, and follow-on forces would be phased in as rapidly as possible. It is recognized that this course of action is less desirable and is intended to be used if the situation so warrants.

6. As a result of our review, a memorandum has been prepared for dispatch to CINCLANT ³ giving him additional guidance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. The source text bears a stamped indication that it was seen by the Secretary of Defense.
1. Document 190.
2. Not found.
3. Not found.