Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

25. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

CM-190-61

Washington, April 18, 1961

SUBJECT

• “Doctrine” on Thermonuclear Attack

1. By JCSM-252-61, attached hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward to you their divergent views on Project #2 of Assignment of Projects within the Department of Defense, dated March 8, 1961,¹ in which you asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff present a “doctrine” which if accepted would permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack.

2. You will note, from the attached memorandum, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I among them, are in agreement that we do not now have the requisite capabilities for carrying out a doctrine of controlled responses and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack. We also agree that attempts at the present time to implement such a doctrine, or to declare such an intent, would be premature and could gravely weaken our deterrent posture.

3. The basic split in this report relates to the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff should make a judgment now that implementing a doctrine of controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear war is a desirable and feasible course of action in the future.

4. My personal judgment is that we do not now have adequate defenses, nor are our nuclear retaliatory forces sufficiently invulnerable, to permit us to risk withholding a substantial part of our effort, once a major thermonuclear attack has been initiated. Furthermore, the advantages to be achieved by limiting our responses, under such conditions, could only be realized by the enforcement upon the Soviets of a degree of tacit “cooperation” which does not now appear realistic. Nevertheless, I believe that further specification of such a doctrine, insofar as it applies to conditions of less than large-scale deliberate attack, would be a desirable undertaking. It would submit the complex problems of controlled responses, negotiating pauses, and their interrelationship with enemy reactions to rigorous analysis. However, except for these lower levels of attack, I believe that an attempt to spell out specific controlled response options would be undesirable until we have more knowledge of the technological possibility of creating the essential building blocks on which safe implementation of the doctrine could be based.

5. It is my judgment, therefore, that it is not now possible to set forth a more definitive doctrine, which if accepted in the proximate future would permit, with safety, controlled response and negotiating pauses covering the full range of the conceivable thermonuclear threat. Nevertheless, I believe the matter to be of such importance that it can, with profit, be examined further, with regard to its application under conditions of less than large-scale deliberate attack and particularly with respect to the conditions and the time-frame under which such a doctrine might realistically be made increasingly applicable over a wider range. Accordingly, I have directed the Joint Strategic Survey Council, as a matter of priority, to examine the problem further from this point of view and to submit their findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. I recommend, therefore, that the answer to Project 2 provided herewith be considered as a first reply, to be followed by further study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

L. L. Lemnitzer

²

Attachment³
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-252-61

Washington, April 18, 1961.

SUBJECT

• “Doctrine” on Thermonuclear Attack (U)

1. Reference is made to Item 2 of your memorandum, dated 8 March 1961, requesting preparation of a “doctrine” which, if accepted, would permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack.

2. Appendix A hereto is a study which considers the problem of a “doctrine” as it would relate to the current situation; i.e., 1 April 1961, and to a future situation; i.e., mid-1960’s. A possible doctrine is contained in paragraphs 17 through 25 of Appendix A.⁴

3. United States and Allied response to a thermonuclear war emergency in the current time period is implemented through the Single Integrated Operational Plan and other US and Allied operational war plans. These implementing plans are in consonance with current policies and doctrines and are based upon guidance contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy,⁵ the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,⁶ and other directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These provide certain controls relating to objectives and constraints and allow some flexibility in timing and the selection of the major geographical areas against which the response is to be directed. They do not, however, address directly the type and degree of controlled response which are postulated in recent studies and analyses conducted within and outside of the Department of Defense.

4. In the context of your request referred to in paragraph 1, the attached doctrine, if accepted, would not permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack in the current time period. The reasons for this judgment are discussed in paragraphs 9-12 of Appendix A. As further discussed in paragraphs 16 and 23 a of Appendix A, attempts to implement a strategy including such options, or declarations of such intent, would at the present time be premature and could gravely weaken the current deterrent posture.

5. In light of the relative capabilities, limitations and objectives of the United States and its Allies and of the USSR and its satellites, there is no significant likelihood of thermonuclear attack against the former which would be so executed that it would be to the advantage of the United States and/or its Allies in the current period to respond under a degree of control beyond that provided in current policy, doctrines and strategic plans.

⁷ 6. It is possible, although not certain, that the future relative power positions of the United States and the USSR may result in feasible options for controlled attack and response, which could lead to opportunities for negotiating pauses and war termination under conditions advantageous to the United States and its Allies. Accordingly, US and Allied planning for the mid-1960’s and beyond should take such possibilities into consideration.

⁷ 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will consider the doctrine in paragraphs 17-25 of Appendix A hereto and the range of foreseeable possibilities attendant thereto in preparation of joint policies and plans for the mid-1960’s and subsequent time period, and will reflect, as appropriate, in such plans and policies, provision for controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack upon the United States and/or its Allies.

8. Attached as Appendix B⁸ is an amplifying statement by the Chief of Staff, US Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and, as Appendix C, the views of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer

⁹
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3020 (3 Apr 61) Sec 2. Top Secret.
1. This memorandum was addressed to the JCS and other recipients within the Department of Defense, and contained 96 questions (informally known as “the 96 trombones”) on all aspects of the national defense. (Ibid.,JCS 2101/413, JMF 5000 (8 Mar 61) Sec. 1)
2. Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
3. Top Secret.
4. Not printed. This tentative doctrine emphasized that the various elements of a controlled reponse strategy should be phased in only as the United States attained capability to implement them.
5. Concerning the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, see footnote 2 to the memorandum of conference with President Eisenhower held August 11, 1960, in Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. III, Document 113.
6. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), revised annually, was the shortest-range of the JCS group of comprehensive plans. Its major purpose was to translate national defense policy into military tasks consonant with actual capabilities.
7. For views of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, see statement following paragraph 7 of Appendix C. [Footnote in the source text. Appendix C is not printed. The view there expressed was that U.S. war plans should reflect, as controlled response capabilities became feasible, “provision for increased latitude in options for controlled response to thermonuclear war emergency, preserving military advantage to the United States and its Allies as the basis for negotiating pauses and war termination under conditions advantageous to the United States and its Allies.”]
7. For views of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, see statement following paragraph 7 of Appendix C. [Footnote in the source text. Appendix C is not printed. The view there expressed was that U.S. war plans should reflect, as controlled response capabilities became feasible, “provision for increased latitude in options for controlled response to thermonuclear war emergency, preserving military advantage to the United States and its Allies as the basis for negotiating pauses and war termination under conditions advantageous to the United States and its Allies.”]
8. Not printed. Appendix B recommended “the desirability of moving as rapidly as possible towards a posture which will permit increased flexibility of response” and stated that a doctrine that would rely on counterforce alone would negate controlled response because “any doctrine which specifies in advance the nature of the response would invalidate the entire concept of controlled, deliberate application of force, the achievement of which is the basic objective of the doctrine itself.”
9. Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.