24. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of
State Rusk1
Washington, April 15,
1961.
Dear Dean:
The enclosed memorandum reflects the current views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the use of nuclear weapons in limited war. I think you will find
them of interest.
While the references by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to basic national security
policy (NSC 5906/1)2 are historically accurate important revisions in the
military portion of this document are now being prepared within the
Department of Defense. While it is too early for us to indicate in specific
terms what policy we will recommend on the use of nuclear weapons in limited
war, the trend of our thinking has been made evident in the recommendations
we have made on revisions to the 1962 budget and in the accompanying
explanatory statement.3 It is very much in accordance with the
views you expressed in your February 4th memorandum on defense posture.4
It is our conviction that greater emphasis be placed on the use of
non-nuclear weapons in the defense of third areas. However, as you
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know, we believe that the United
States must retain the ability to use nuclear weapons tactically in local
wars under carefully controlled conditions.
When our review of basic policy is further along I would like to discuss our
findings with you. I expect that this will be possible within the next few
weeks.
Sincerely,
Enclosure4
Memorandum
From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara
JCSM-170-61
Washington, March 17,
1961
SUBJECT
- Assumptions Regarding the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited War
(U)
- 1.
- In recent discussions relating to the review of defense posture
currently underway, two questions have been frequently asked
concerning:
- a.
- The assumptions regarding the use or non-use of nuclear
weapons in limited wars that are currently used in the
formulation of force levels and equipment levels.
- b.
- The validity of those assumptions in the future.
- 2.
- With respect to subparagraph 1 a above:
- a.
- Force and equipment levels are based on Basic National
Security Policy (NCS 5906/1), which provides in substance
that:
- (1)
- Main, but not sole, reliance will be placed on
nuclear weapons and that these weapons will be used
in conjunction with other weapons when required to
meet the nation’s war objectives.
- (2)
- The nuclear stockpile should include a variety of
weapons to provide flexible and selective
capabilities for general or limited war.
- (3)
- In the accomplishment of national objectives in
certain limited war situations, nuclear weapons may
not be necessary or appropriate.
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However, conflicts
involving sizeable forces of the United States and
the USSR should not
be construed as limited war.
- (4)
- In carrying out the central aim of deterring
general war, the United States must develop and
maintain as a part of its military forces, its
effective nuclear retaliatory power.
- (5)
- In dealing with limited aggression, the United
States must be prepared to defeat such aggression in
a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent
hostilities from broadening into general war.
- b.
- These provisions have combined to give the highest
priority to the development of forces primarily designed for
general war. Requirements for limited war forces and
equipment types are contained within the larger requirements
for general war. Additional equipment levels for limited war
are also provided for in military planning. However,
budgetary and manpower limitations have necessitated lesser
priorities for equipping and manning of forces to provide
non-nuclear capabilities.
- 3.
- In substance, our national strategy requires that limited war
operations be conducted with whatever weapons and forces are
required by the military and political exigencies involved in each
particular situation and by the national objectives to be attained.
In terms of nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, the requirements of each
of these contingencies are impossible to determine with precision in
advance. They can be determined only in the light of the particular
military and political context in which each has developed.
Situations may occur in which authorization for use of nuclear
weapons will be delayed, and there may be other contingencies which
do not warrant the use of nuclear weapons. An appropriate mix of
nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for those of our forces which
might be involved will provide the United States with greater
political and diplomatic flexibility as well as greater battlefield
flexibility and capability for survival than if only one of these
capabilities is developed to the exclusion or neglect of the other.
Forces and delivery vehicles which might be used in limited war
should continue to have the capability of delivering either nuclear
or conventional weapons.
- 4.
- With respect to subparagraph 1 b above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are of the opinion that while expected changes in the world
situation during the next 10 years certainly justify continuing
review of national strategy, there is nothing foreseen that will
justify abrogation of the principle that US forces must maintain a
dual nuclear and non-nuclear capability. It can be reasonably
anticipated that the trend in the future will be toward expansion
rather than contraction of the weaponry available for these actions,
as innovations in agents, weapon systems and techniques develop. For
example, a US capability to utilize advanced nonlethal
incapacitating agents in a limited conflict in the future might well
offer substantial military advantages within the limitations imposed
by delicate political considerations.
- 5.
- It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in planning
for limited war, a flexible capability for diverse levels of
operations, employing the appropriate weapons, will continue to be
of paramount importance.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L.
Lemnitzer
5Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
