We would like to draw your attention particularly to the following broad
conclusions of the study:
Attachment4
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
IMPLICATIONS OF NIE 11-8-62 AND RELATED
INTELLIGENCE
I—Implications Clarifying Soviet
Policy
1. The evolution of Soviet strategic forces described in NIE 11-8-62, “Soviet Capabilities for Long
Range Attack,” dated 6 July 1962,5 reflects in the first instance the
USSR’s desire to overcome the
advantage which the US had enjoyed in this vital ingredient of the power
equation. The Soviet weapons programs are obviously aimed at obtaining
greater security for the Bloc and greater freedom for Soviet policy in
the face of the immense threat posed by US strategic power. Within the
last year, with the availability of a more suitable second-generation
missile, a rapidly unfolding deployment program has carried the Soviets
farther toward these aims.
Soviet View of the Risks of
War
2. It is clear, from the trends in Soviet strategic capabilities
estimated in NIE 11-8-62, that the
Soviet leaders have considered that they can continue to pursue their
present political policy, while simultaneously avoiding courses of
action involving high risk of general war. If they had not, they would
surely have provided themselves with much stronger forces than they now
have and would be embarked on a much steeper buildup. Instead, they are
building strategic forces at a pace which, while a substantial burden on
an already strained economy, is well below their maximum potential. This
in turn implies that they intend to pursue courses of action which, in
their view, will keep the risks of war under control. It does not
assure, however, that they will always estimate these risks
correctly.
Effect on the Soviet Outlook
3. While intending to avoid war, the Soviets expect their strategic
strength to lend increasing weight to their foreign policies. On a
general [Page 360] level, growing
strategic capabilities will strengthen the Soviet leaders’ belief in
their ability to influence the course of events in all areas of the
world. Their sense of the USSR’s
political weight, its “right” to a voice in all international questions,
is closely linked to their appraisal of relative military power. As the
gap has grown between their own military strength and that of all other
countries save the US, they have increasingly insisted upon their
great-power prerogatives and have injected their demands into all sorts
of world issues. This attitude has encouraged them to pursue more
forward courses of action in remote areas, for example, Southeast Asia.
The growing capabilities estimated in NIE 11-8-62 will nourish this tendency.
4. In particular issues involving a direct clash of Soviet-American
interests, however, more acute considerations of military risk figure in
Soviet calculations. The Soviets know the magnitude of Western military
strength. We believe that their appraisals of the implications of that
strength are realistic. We also think it certain that the USSR has come to appreciate US
intelligence capabilities and now credits the US with a fairly accurate
estimate of Soviet long-range striking power. At present, the Soviets
estimate that each side could inflict great damage on the other, despite
their respective defense capabilities, and they believe that the US
makes the same estimate. They realize, however, that the US still has a
greater capability to damage Soviet territory than they do to damage US
territory. Unless some highly effective antimissile system alters the
strategic balance, or some unforeseen break-through in offensive weapons
occurs, we believe that they will continue to hold this judgment.6
Uses of the Soviet Deterrent
5. The Soviets hope—indeed they think it all but inevitable—that their
growing intercontinental striking power, together with their air defense
posture, will so inhibit US policy as to widen the scope of actions
which they can undertake without substantial risk of war. During most of
the 1950’s, the Soviet deterrent consisted mainly of the threat of
ground and air attack, and more recently MRBMs, against Western Europe. The Soviets evidently
regarded this form of deterrence as insufficient because it could not be
applied directly against the US, and their foreign policies reflected a
cautious approach to the calculation of risks of war.
6. During the same period, however, they were vigorously pursuing the
development of new and more effective systems for attacking the [Page 361] US and for protecting
themselves against US attack. They evidently believed that the ICBM, by posing a direct threat to the US
homeland, would radically increase the force of their deterrent and thus
permit them to undertake bolder advances with no increase of risk. By
late 1958, they concluded that their ICBM claims, borrowing credibility from their sputnik
demonstrations, had begun to achieve this result. At this point, a
decade after the Berlin blockade, they felt themselves able to resume
the exploitation of the West’s geographic vulnerability in Berlin.
7. Nearly four years have elapsed, and during this time the Soviet
leaders’ expectations have sobered. They have acquired a keener
appreciation of the difficulties of translating gains in military power
into tangible political advances. During much of the period, they had
reason to believe that the US was overestimating their ICBM force. Even so, they evidently did
not consider that the West was so deterred that they could safely
undertake unilateral moves against its vital interests in Berlin.
Future Uses of the Deterrent
8. NIE 11-8-62 makes it clear, however,
that during 1958 and 1959 the USSR in
fact had no ICBM capability, and that
even in 1960 and 1961 this capability was quite small. But in 1962 the
second generation ICBM is being
deployed at operational sites, and the USSR almost certainly knows that the US knows, not only of
the deployment, but also the actual location of the sites. The Soviets
previously were willing to act only with caution on the basis of a
capability which they knew existed mainly in their opponents’ minds, but
their appraisal of risks may change now that their capability has become
real and is growing.
9. We recognize this possibility and its hazards for the period ahead. We
nevertheless regard it as likely that the Soviets will not abandon
caution in Soviet-American confrontations, including Berlin. We believe
they recognize that there are severe limits to the challenges which can
be posed with weapons which the challenger is as concerned as the
opponent to avoid using. As before, when their inflated ICBM claims had won considerable
acceptance, they will again seek to persuade the West of their
determination to advance. They will believe that the US ought to draw
the conclusion that, under these circumstances, it can no longer
maintain its exposed positions. They will almost certainly test Western,
and particularly American, reactions in order to judge whether their
gains in strength have had this effect. But the depth and vigor of their
probing will depend more upon their estimate of US reactions than on
their calculations of relative military strength. Accordingly they will
not, in our view, automatically conclude that actions which were
heretofore too risky have now become tolerably safe.
10. It is also important to note that the calculations of relative
military strength and Western reactions to probes are only part of a
host of factors which will affect Soviet decisions. The movement of
politics [Page 362] within the USSR, the course of intra-Bloc relations,
and the nature of opportunities for expansion which arise in the Free
World will be fully as important in determining the shape of Soviet
foreign policy.
The Question of Timing
11. It is clear that the Soviet successes with sputniks and ICBM tests in 1957-1958 had much to do
with inspiring the confidence which led the USSR to open its challenge on the Berlin question in
November 1958. Beyond this general observation, we find no precise
relationship in timing between the USSR’s Berlin tactics and the progress of its buildup in
strategic forces. In particular, the quickening of the tempo of the
ICBM program in 1961 seems unlikely
to have resulted from any new decisions regarding Berlin. It reflects
development and deployment decisions taken several years previously. The
fairly regular buildup of intercontinental forces projected in the
estimate for the next year or so does not suggest that Soviet efforts
are concentrated toward reaching some particular force level at any
particular time or in relation to any particular situation, e.g.
Berlin.
Secrecy
12. One additional implication deserves attention. The Soviet long-range
forces estimated in NIE 11- 8-62 for the
next few years are neither as large nor as well protected as
corresponding US forces. In these circumstances, we believe that the
Soviet leaders will continue to think it highly important to make it as
difficult as possible for the US to acquire targeting information. This
in turn implies that they are unlikely to ease their basic attitude
toward inspection of arms control agreements. It also indicates that
they will continue to attach a very high priority to the countering of
Western reconnaissance.
II—Implications for US Defense
Policy
Specific Implications
1. We have examined the implications for our defense policy of changes in
the Soviet military posture over the next five years, as pro-jected in
NIE 11-8-62 and other pertinent
national estimates. Among the changes forecast are several potentially
significant developments on which some new light has been shed since
earlier estimates, such as:
- a.
- A growing sub-launched missile threat.
- b.
- A large-yield weapon threat.
- c.
- Hardening of ICBM
sites.
- d.
- Missile readiness and re-load capability.
- e.
- Anti-ballistic missile capability.
- f.
- Larger MRBM/IRBM forces than previously
estimated.
2. These developments represent problem areas which require close
attention and review of certain US programs. We can, however,
tentatively [Page 363] conclude from our
examination of estimated changes in the Soviet military posture that
these changes, in themselves, presently call for no major alterations in
the US strategic retaliatory force structure which was recommended to
you by the Department of Defense on 23 September 1961.7 A
fuller basis for judging the validity of this conclusion will be
provided by an intensive study of strategic force requirements now being
conducted by the JCS, and scheduled for
completion on 1 October 1962.8 The most immediate effect of
Soviet developments is likely to be on our research and development
programs in areas associated with such matters as large yield weapons
effects, penetration aids, and satellite survivability. Our present
examination also reaffirms the continuing need to press ahead with
programs we have laid out in other fields, including civil defense, air
defense, and general purpose forces.
3. The Soviet forces now estimated for the period 1962-1967 are of a size
and character which remain within the parameters used last fall in
developing our own recommended strategic force mix (force levels and
weapons systems) for this period. Soviet ICBM forces in particular, are estimated for the period to
be approximately of the size previously forecast in our intelligence
estimates, and they remain substantially less than in the assumed high
and median Soviet postures used by DOD
in developing our recommended forces last fall.9 The new estimates indicate that a hardening
program may be proceeding somewhat sooner than previously anticipated,
but again the total number of hardened sites forecast for the period is
still well below our planning assumption figures for 1965 and 1967.
Perhaps the principal unknown presented for our planning is the
influence which introduction of large yield weapons—and their number—may
have on future Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities. While such
weapons were taken into account in our force planning last fall, there
are still uncertainties as to some of their physical effects which must
be resolved before their full military implications can be
determined.
4. Our present re-examination of the situation in light of the latest
estimates of Soviet posture indicates that the objectives we have been
seeking through our recommended strategic forces mix and other programs
are still essentially valid. In brief, these objectives have been:
first, to provide the United States with the capability, even under
unfavorable [Page 364] circumstances of
war outbreak, to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of military victory
or of knocking out the US retaliatory force, while at the same time
assuring prompt destruction of a high proportion of Soviet nuclear bases
and remaining nuclear forces; second, to retain a large protected
reserve force for (a) follow-on attacks against Soviet military forces,
(b) attacks if necessary against Soviet urban society, and (c)
attempting to bring the war to a negotiated end without attacks on
cities.
5. Our present and previous analyses recognize that even in the most
favorable case with restraints in targeting on both sides, civil
casualties in the United States and Western Europe could be on the order
of ten million each, while without restraints during the 1962-1967
period, under many circumstances of war outbreak, they could be on the
order of 100 million or more each. As time passes the Soviet potential
for doing civil damage to the West will grow; the incentive to actually
carry out such attack may, however, diminish.
6. The new estimates of Soviet posture do not lead us to alter our basic
assessment that during this time period we retain a relatively strong
military posture in the event of nuclear war, but that the potential
civil damage implications are progressively more unfavorable with the
passage of time. The latter, of course, applies to both sides, so that
the prospect of real victors emerging from any major nuclear war
diminishes further.
7. In addition to the problem areas given prominence by our latest
estimates of Soviet long-range striking forces for the 1962-1967 period,
there are several areas of potential significance which merit
attention.10 The
most important of these are:
- a.
- The prospect of Soviet anti-satellite activity.
- b.
- The possibility of Soviet weapons in space.
- c.
- The problem of making clear to Soviets advantages of non-civil
targeting.
- d.
- The problem of civil defense.
8. The rapid Soviet development and initiation of deployment of
anti-ballistic missile systems require the US to counter Soviet
political and propaganda exploitation of their anti-missile program.
Preparation for this contingency should include active informational
programs on our own progress and on military limitations on Soviet
progress. Decisions [Page 365] on our own
anti-missile program should be urgently reconsidered with due weight
given to the political considerations.11
General Implications
9. It is our view, after examination of the Soviet military posture in
light of our most recent intelligence estimates, that the Soviets are
pursuing an essentially deterrent military strategy in which their
military forces are designed to:
- a.
- Support an aggressive political-subversive strategy;
- b.
- Deter the West from military action, particularly from
initiation of a first strike with nuclear forces;
- c.
- Afford the option of conducting partially blunting pre-emptive
strikes and retaliatory operations against us in the event
mutual strategic deterrence breaks down and a major war should
occur.
10. Our intelligence estimates indicate an increase in the number of
Soviet forces capable of hitting directly at the United States in the
1962-67 period, as well as a general trend of larger warhead yields
deliverable by these forces. However, the relative US-USSR military postures during the period
do not significantly improve Soviet chances of launching a disarming
nuclear strike against us. During this period, the Soviet military
posture shows some improvement in surviving nuclear military forces
following an initial nuclear exchange, but the Soviet Union would still
be left in a militarily inferior position relative to the US under
almost all circumstances of war outbreak.12 The Soviet
military posture also increases the Soviet ability to inflict civil
damage, already great for most war outbreak situations.
11. The general implication of the Soviet military posture and the
strategy which it supports would appear to be that the Soviets hope to
confront us with continuing political pressure, subversion and various
forms of unconventional warfare under the umbrella of their growing
strategic power. At the same time, they would hope to capitalize on
their conventional military power by the implicit threat of bringing it
to bear in situations where they have a local conventional superiority.
Thus—barring successful effort on our part to create additional
options—such a strategy could, at worst, leave open to us the
unpalatable choice of a first strike or swallowing our losses in a
series of confrontations at local pressure points around the periphery
of the Soviet Bloc. Increased Soviet [Page 366] ability to put direct pressure on the United
States (through the threat of larger forces capable of hitting the US)
would also open us to added Soviet efforts to separate us from our
Allies, and to create divisions among them.
12. The broad conclusion to be drawn for our own defense policy is to
reaffirm the importance of shaping our military posture so as to provide
credible military options over a wide spectrum of contingencies from
nuclear war at one end to local wars and minor aggressions at the other.
The developments we have considered here, while not of a kind to dictate
basic change in our strategy and military posture, do reduce even
further the desirability of resort to the high end of the spectrum of
nuclear means and consequently increase the importance of developing
alternative means of bringing military power to bear around the
world.
III—Implications for US Foreign
Policy
- 1.
- The estimates contained in NIE
11-8-62 of Soviet capabilities for long-range attack do not require
basic revisions or changes in our foreign policy as a whole. This
view is predicated on the expectation that the defense policies
outlined in Section II of this study are vigorously and effectively
carried out. If these policies are effectively implemented, there is
no reason to believe, in the period under review, that the
correlation of forces in any significant extent will favor the
Soviet Union. We can anticipate the continuance of the tensions,
strains, and dangers of the cold war. As Soviet strategic
capabilities grow the USSR may well
judge that it can press more aggressively toward limited objectives
without running serious risks of general war. A more aggressive
political action by the Soviet Union is, however, not at all
certain, and cannot be predicted at this time. Any such development
would depend upon a number of factors which, at present cannot be
foreseen—in particular, their estimate of relative military
strength, and of the Western reactions which they encounter when
they try to test the political potency of their strategic
strength.
- 2.
- We judge the greatest hazard to be in the Soviet calculation (or
miscalculation) of the risks of particular courses of action as
Soviet military capabilities grow. A dangerous change in the
calculus of risks would of course be most likely if the Soviets
thought they had obtained a temporary military superiority,
especially in the field of AICBMs, whether or not we shared that
estimate. In such circumstances, the Soviets might seek to exploit a
temporary military advantage before the United States could redress
the balance. The current estimates of future Soviet military
strength, and current US defense programs, do not lead us to expect
such a situation. Nonetheless, it should be a basic task of the
United States, if possible, to see to it that this military
advantage does not occur and to this end to give the highest
priority to the established defense programs [Page 367] of the United States and to continue and, if
possible, to increase the effectiveness of our intelligence
collection systems, and to conduct effective informational programs
to blunt Soviet efforts to exploit politically real or alleged
Soviet military advances, such as an anti-missile capability.
- 3.
- In general, however, there is nothing in the estimate contained in
NIE 11-8-62 which would require
any substantive change in our foreign policy.
Annex A13
SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS FOR US DEFENSE POLICY
1. Soviet Sub-launched Missile
Threat
- a.
- It has long appeared likely that the Soviet Union would follow the
United States’ lead and develop a submarine missile force of some
strength. These forces now appear likely to be larger than was
previously estimated. Reasonable figures consistent with the
estimates in NIE 11-8-62 are about
90 submarines with some 350 missiles by 1967. This is almost double
the numbers forecast a year ago for 1966. (See comparison of
estimates and explanatory note in Table 2.)14 It should
be noted that the bulk of the increase is accounted for by cruise
missiles (30 submarines with 156 missiles by 1967, compared with
none in last year’s forecast). There is uncertainty both as to the
eventual number of these cruise missile subs (which as estimated
will include many more nuclear than diesel-powered types), and their
intended use—whether they are intended for attack against land
targets as well as surface shipping. The latter presently appears to
be their more likely major role.
- b.
- Other aspects of the changing composition of the Soviet missile
sub force also present difficulties in assessing the potential
threat this force poses. On the one hand, there is an increase in
the ballistic missile threat (about 60 submarines in 1967 compared
with 48 submarines previously forecast for 1966), and a greater
number of nuclear-powered submarines (about 50, compared with 24
submarines previously), which will increase the potential for
protracted stationing of these forces at sea. [Page 368] Also, there are strong indications
that the Soviets are developing a submerged ballistic missile launch
capability. With missiles of ranges estimated at 650 to 2,000 miles,
these submarines could increase the difficulties of our ASW task when the Soviets have
developed them on an operational scale. On the other hand, while the
Soviets are actively pursuing a submerged launch program, these
developments at their present stage indicate that a Polaris-type
threat has not yet materialized. Furthermore, the component of the
Soviet force which combines nuclear-powered submarines with
ballistic missiles shows no appreciable change from what was
previously estimated (25-30 submarines in 1967 compared with 24
submarines previously forecast for 1966).
- c.
- Despite the many uncertainties which exist with respect to the
potential threat of the Soviet sub-launched missile force, both in
terms of weapons and methods of operation, it is apparent that we
shall have our work cut out for us in finding ways to deal with this
problem. In the future, as the number of nuclear-powered submarines
increases, the Soviets may adopt operational practices that would
make it very difficult to counter the sub-launched missile threat.
In the mid-60’s, a portion of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine
missile force will probably be conducting routine patrols within
missile range of US targets.
- d.
- There are asymmetries, to be sure, in the ASW prospects of the United States as compared with the
Soviets. We have certain advantages in terms of access to the seas,
transit distances, the use of advanced bases, the SOSUS detection system, and a
superior naval technology. So far, it has been possible for the
United States to operate submarines on station close to Soviet
territory while the Soviets have not done likewise. Nevertheless, if
the Soviets continue their technical progress, build the numbers of
ships estimated, and keep a substantial portion of their force on
station with long-range missiles (although probably a much smaller
proportion than we will be able to keep on station), we will be
presented with problems of great difficulty.
- e.
- Two contrasting cases are of interest in illustrating some of the
problems we face. In the first, favorable to us, the Soviet
submarine fleet—following current practice—for the most part would
not be deployed at war outbreak and virtually some would be in
position to launch immediately against the United States. In this
case, we could expect our attacks on Soviet naval and submarine
bases (some 50 aiming points in the mid 1960’s) to kill a large
proportion of the missile sub force. The remainder would face
further attrition in seeking to reach launch areas. The surviving
sub-launched missile threat to the United States in this optimistic
case would be minimal in comparison with other Soviet nuclear forces
that are likely to survive.
- f.
- In a second and more likely case, much less favorable to us, the
Soviet submarine fleet would be largely deployed either on a
steady-state [Page 369] basis or
during a crisis. The survival to time of launch of the Soviet force
would depend, in addition to circumstances of war outbreak, on the
effectiveness of our sea surveillance, tracking and sub-killing
systems. If the Soviets operate their nuclear submarines very
carefully, and especially avoid making much noise, a portion of
their force will probably be able to avoid detection while on
station within missile range of targets in the United States. On the
other hand, with presently planned improvements in SOSUS, and if the number of
submarines on station is small, we may be able to count and to track
them with fair precision. If ordered to fire in a coordinated
attack, the Soviet missiles could undoubtedly be launched before the
submarines could be destroyed. However, it might be possible through
prompt attack to destroy many of the submarines and at least deny
the Soviets the prospect of retaining a highly protected reserve
force on station.
- g.
- The Soviets might be able on occasion to put enough submarine
missiles on station by the mid-1960’s to present a threat with
virtually no tactical warning to our soft bomber and missile bases
(submarine missiles are unlikely to have a combination of yield and
accuracy to present a major threat to hardened dispersed sites).
However, during such periods of tension, extra ground and airborne
alert and dispersal measures can be adopted. Other possibilities are
the development of a warning system against sub-launched missiles
and a shift of bomber operations from coastal to inland
bases.
- h.
- In terms of future effort, it appears that we should continue to
exploit our relative advantage in sea-surveillance capabilities. We
cannot count with much confidence on being able to blunt a submarine
missile attack; we do have the prospect, however, of being able to
keep a fairly close watch over the deployment and movements of enemy
submarines.
2. Soviet Large Yield Weapon
Threat
- a.
- Within the next few years, the Soviets will probably have limited
numbers of large yield weapons (25-100 MT) deliverable by bombers and probably ICBMs. A few bombs of these yields
could already be available. These prospects point to a potentially
dangerous problem area. Some of the physical effects of large yield
weapons—such as electromagnetic pulse, secondary thermal radiation,
communications blackout, large-scale general damage from
high-altitude bursts—are not yet fully understood; consequently, the
full military implications for our command and control systems, air
defenses, soft bomber and missile forces, and other elements of our
defense posture remain to be ascertained.
- b.
- In connection with our current nuclear test series we are
acquiring data which will help reduce some of the present unknowns.
To get some needed effects data, larger yield effects tests than are
possible in the current series might be necessary to provide a basis
for extrapolation to very high yield devices. While it would appear
that design fixes can be [Page 370]
found to deal with most of the presently identified problems that
very large yield weapons may pose for our military systems, such as
possible vulnerability of our Minuteman LCC’s to electromagnetic
pulse effects, it would be unwise at this time to dismiss the
potentially serious military implications that Soviet employment of
these weapons might have. For example, some recent preliminary
investigation suggests that the thermal effects from a 100 MT weapon burst at very high altitude
over a bomber base might greatly reduce the number of bombers that
would survive to undertake their assigned missions, even with 15
minutes of BMEWS warning.
Likewise, the multiple effects of large yield bursts against
hardened installations like a Minuteman complex might present a more
serious problem than previously thought. (Calculations based on
existing data indicate that the advantage over lower yield weapons
in this case is not likely to be more than 10-15%, but this is by no
means certain.) It must, indeed, be emphasized, that there are still
many uncertainties with regard to these and other examples of large
yield weapon effects, which can only be determined through further
intensive investigation and test.
- c.
- With reservations as to what further study of large-yield weapons
effects may indicate, the following implications of possible Soviet
employment of such weapons can be drawn from our war gaming and
other analyses to date. First, the military outcome in the mid-60’s
in terms of relative force survival under various circumstances of
war outbreak and targeting policies does not appear to be
appreciably affected. A major study of United States strategic force
requirements now scheduled for completion by 1 October 1962 will,
among other things, provide a reassessment of our tentative
conclusions on this issue. Second, while a definitive assessment of
the direct military advantages of using large yield weapons will
depend on factors not yet determinable, such weapons would certainly
lend themselves to a Soviet deterrent strategy with strong “terror”
overtones. Third, the magnitude of civil damage ensuing as a result
of use of large yield weapons would depend heavily on the targeting
strategy employed by the Soviets—military, urban-industrial, or
mixed. Variations in civil damage from use of high yield weapons are
more sensitive to the kind of targeting elected in military attack
cases than in urban-industrial or mixed attacks. For example,
assuming that 60% of the US population is afforded fall-out
protection consistent with our present civil defense goals for the
mid-60’s, tentative estimates for illustrative cases in this period
would be:
- (1)
- If the Soviets should strike first, employing a
discriminating military attack (assigning their high yield
weapons, ground burst, only against hardened targets, and
air-bursting all other weapons), collateral civil damage
would bring approximately 20 million United States
casualties. If the Soviets strike first, attacking military
targets less discriminately [Page 371] (i.e., ground bursting on all
targets), United States casualties could number about 85
million if large yield weapons were used, and 55 million if
only smaller yield weapons were used.
- (2)
- For urban-industrial and mixed targeting cases, with a
Soviet first strike, civil damage does not prove greatly
sensitive to large yield weapons, where fall-out protection
is assumed as above. Civil casualties for the United States
would be on the order of 135 million with only lower yield
weapons, while the additional employment of large yield
weapons would probably increase this casualty level by no
more than 10 million.
- (3)
- If the United States were to strike first, with the
Soviets receiving little warning, a Soviet retaliatory
attack directed against military targets and employing large
yield as well as lower yield weapons (all ground burst),
would bring about 35 million casualties. If the Soviet
retaliatory attack were directed against urban-industrial
targets, United States casualties would number around 100
million. For smaller yield weapons only, the casualties for
the respective cases would be 20 and 90 million.
3. Hardening of Soviet ICBM Sites
- a.
- Our latest intelligence [three illegible words] Soviet ICBM hardening, based on evidence
which has only recently become available, indicate that a probable
hardening program has got underway slightly earlier than hitherto
estimated. Some 10-25 hardened operational sites are now expected to
be available in 1963, whereas initial hardening was not previously
considered as a possibility until a year later.
- b.
- It is not presently clear what type of hardening the Soviets are
electing as a protective measure. Our estimates have tended toward
the probability that the initial Soviet measures would provide only
semi-hardening (approximately 25 PSI), but the most recent evidence available to us
tentatively suggests that the Soviet program from the outset may
involve somewhat greater hardening.
- c.
- If semi-hardening still proves to be the case, it would not
appreciably alter the effectiveness of our target destruction
capabilities in 1963 and thereafter. We had previously estimated
that hard-category Soviet sites (100 to 300 PSI or more) would begin to appear in 1965. By this
time, improvements in our Minuteman force will give us reasonable
expectation of adequate destruction capabilities against such
targets. [1-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified] Further improvements are anticipated by 1967.
These Minuteman accuracies are better than the planning factors used
last fall in calculating our force requirements in the 1965-67
period. The spread of assumed numbers of hard (300-PSI) Soviet sites used in [Page 372] last fall’s calculations
also involved larger numbers of such sites than estimated either in
present or previous NIE’s (See Table
1).15
- d.
- However, some possible difficulty might occur should the Soviets
introduce these hard-category sites in greater numbers than have
been hitherto estimated for later 1963 and 1964, that is—before the
improved Minuteman becomes available. Such a development could
degrade our target destruction capabilities somewhat in this
intervening period. We could reassign some Atlas E and F and Titan I
and II missiles against additional hard-category sites, but this
would be at the cost of target coverage flexibility. The extent of
this potential problem is clearly sensitive to: (a) our ability to
meet our own operational missile schedules; (b) our criteria for
second-strike destruction assurance against hard-category sites; and
(c) the actual number of such sites which will have to be dealt with
and their degree of hardening. The latter factor highlights the
importance of getting a good intelligence fix on the Soviet
hardening program.
- e.
- In general, evidence that previous Soviet reliance on soft sites
is giving way to a hardening concept does not surprise us. It does,
however, reaffirm the importance of our R&D programs for
improving the accuracies of our missiles. Carried through, these
programs should to a considerable degree offset the effects of the
Soviet hardening program after 1965.
4. Missile Readiness and Re-fire
Capability
- a.
- Our latest intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are
working to improve the readiness and reaction times of their medium
and long-range missile units, and that they are investing in
measures to provide a re-fire capability. Present Soviet procedures
for firing initial and subsequent salvoes are relatively slow and
complicated, and design limitations of their current missile systems
appear to preclude attainment of readiness conditions approaching
those of US systems. Nevertheless, some improvement can be expected.
These trends, together with the beginning of an ICBM hardening program previously
discussed, reflect a Soviet effort to increase the survivability of
their missile force. This would have the effect of making it easier
for the Soviets to defer decision in any ambiguous situation. It
would also place their forces in a somewhat better posture than at
present for attempting to carry out preemptive and retaliatory
operations.
- b.
- With regard to Soviet refire doctrine and capabilities, several
points are worth noting in connection with our own planning. In
Soviet eyes, the size of their missile force may be regarded not in
terms of numbers of launchers, but launchers plus re-fire. (While
the evidence is not [Page 373] firm
on this point, we believe an average of two missiles is provided per
launcher.) This could lead the Soviets to place somewhat greater
weight on the potential of their missile force than circumstances
may warrant. Our estimates indicate that Soviet time to re-fire is
measured in hours (perhaps 10 hours minimum for ICBM’s, and about 4 to 6 hours for
MRBM’s), which means that in
fact, under any likely circumstances of war outbreak and with our
planned targeting, the bulk of Soviet launchers would not survive
for a second round of fire. Soviet re-load capabilities to date are
associated with soft sites. It is not clear whether their hardened
sites will be adaptable to re-fire. Should the latter prove to be
the case, we would, of course, want to insure that hardened sites
were not left to deliver further fire. Even if complete destruction
of a hardened site should not be attempted, a weapon detonated in
the vicinity could render such a site unfit for re-fire for an
indefinite period.
- c.
- For our own part, the pros and cons of developing a re-fire
capability from our hardened sites have already been weighed, and it
has been considered that such a program is not worth undertaking.
This conclusion still appears valid.
5. Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile
Capability
- a.
- Our examination of this problem area in light of relevant
technological factors and the latest intelligence on Soviet
anti-missile developments suggests that the military implications of
Soviet anti-ballistic missile capabilities in the mid-60’s should
not be underestimated, even though the military impact is likely to
be less immediate than the psychological impact, which could be
considerable.
- b.
- In a military context, the advantages enjoyed by offensive
delivery systems over defensive systems do not seem likely to be
significantly narrowed by ABM
developments within the next few years. However, this situation
cannot be taken for granted without substantial efforts to keep it
that way. Our programs for development of multiple warheads and
other penetration aids, which have been greatly expanded in the last
couple of years, attest to the seriousness which has come to be
attached to the problem of assuring that our strategic missile
delivery systems will not be seriously degraded by future Soviet
ABM capabilities.
- c.
- Our penetration aids programs should probably keep pace with
Soviet ABM capabilities foreseeable
in the mid-60’s. Our first decoy capability (Atlas F) will become
available in about a year. Initial decoy capabilities for the A-2
Polaris and Minuteman are scheduled for early 1963 and late 1964
respectively. Our advanced ballistic missile re-entry system
research program will provide basic technology from which to design
new re-entry systems for any of our projected ballistic missile
programs over the longer term. If our present intelligence estimates
are borne out, the Soviets are not likely to achieve more than
limited deployment of a defensive system against ICBM’s in the 1963-66 period.
Nevertheless, [Page 374] we face many
complex technical problems and, partly owing to our pay-load
capacities, some difficult compromises between warhead and
penetration packages. Should the Soviets rely on phased array, low
frequency radars for their ABM
system rather than high frequency radars, and this now seems likely,
a considerable amount of our penetration aids work may have to be
revised.
- d.
- One factor which should tend to operate to our advantage during
the period of the mid-60’s, at least, is the probable Soviet
intention to give priority to major urban areas in deploying their
initial anti-ICBM defenses. While
it will be important for us to retain the ability to penetrate
ABM-defended urban centers, it
would appear that the main task of penetrating to military targets
removed from such centers will not be greatly affected. Over a
period of time the Soviets are likely to extend the deployment of
their ABM defenses, as they did with
their SAM defenses, but the huge
expense and time required for comparable Soviet ABM deployment would seem to allow us
room to work out ways of dealing with the situation.
- e.
- Notwithstanding the likely inadequacies of such Soviet ABM systems as can be foreseen for the
mid-60’s, it should be recognized that Soviet claims and possible
demonstrations of a capability in this field could have significant
psychological repercussions. Unless forehanded United States
counter-programs are carried out, Soviet exploitation of ABM claims could help to establish a
public image of Soviet military advantage and erode the confidence
of our Allies in United States military superiority.16
- f.
- Soviet advances with anti-ballistic missile systems require the
U.S. to counter Soviet political and propaganda exploitation of
their unfolding anti-missile capability. Preparation for this
contingency should include active informational programs on our own
progress, and on military limitations on Soviet progress.
- g.
- Soviet advances in development and initiation of deployment of
anti-ballistic missile systems also call for continuing review of
decisions on our own anti-missile program with due weight given to
the political considerations. The US should continue vigorous
prosecution of current programs to overcome the technical obstacles
to development of militarily useful anti-missile defenses.17
6. Soviet MRBM/IRBM
Forces
- a.
- Our latest intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are
building a larger MRBM/IRBM force than previously
estimated—roughly, to a level of 550-650 launchers in the mid-60’s
rather than [Page 375] 350-450. The
present size of their force on good evidence, is approximately 500
operational launchers, of which about 90% are deployed against the
European area. Some of these launchers may be alternates, not
assigned to a first salvo. The increase anticipated for the period
of the mid-60’s, which amounts in effect to about 50 additional
aiming points (200 more launchers, at 4 launchers per aiming point),
does not present a major new problem in terms of our own previously
recommended force levels.
- b.
- It is estimated, however, that beginning about 1965-67 the Soviets
may introduce hardened or mobile MRBM/IRBM systems to
provide greater survivability for a portion of their force. Should
this occur, some change in our own programs for dealing with the
MRBM/IRBM threat may be necessary, and we would be well
advised to examine factors bearing on this potential problem.
Studies now underway in the Department of Defense are taking this
problem into account.
- c.
- With respect to the Soviet MRBM/IRBM force as it
is presently configured, the larger number of launchers available
does not seem to offer any significant advantages to the Soviets
under some circumstances of war outbreak. If we strike first, little
more of this highly vulnerable force will survive than if it were
somewhat smaller. If the Soviets strike first, they already have
such weight of attack against Europe that the additional MRBM/IRBM forces seem to make little difference. However,
under some intermediate circumstances, the Soviets might consider it
important to have the additional assurance of a larger missile force
posed against Europe. The pattern of deployment of this force also
shows that the Soviets count on it, particularly on its IRBM elements, to insure
neutralization of United States overseas bases and installations
outside the immediate area of Western Europe. This is another factor
which may seem to them to justify some redundancy with respect to
this force.
- d.
- European reaction to the estimate of a larger Soviet MRBM threat is a factor to be
considered. Our frank handling of earlier estimates of this threat
and reaffirmation of our commitments through such means as our
actions on Berlin seem to have prevented acute anxiety on the part
of the Europeans. The new larger estimate could give rise to
concern, however, and therefore suggests the desirability of
continuing our program of frankness, more detailed discussion of
nuclear matters, and meaningful reassurances—through our actions—on
the extent and firmness of our commitment.
7. Soviet Anti-Satellite
Capability
- a.
- The high premium which the Soviets probably attach to being able
to take physical countermeasures against certain of our satellite
programs provides a strong incentive for early development of an
anti-satellite capability. The USSR
is conceded to be technically capable of [Page 376] developing a limited anti-satellite capability
as soon as, or perhaps before, achieving an anti-missile capability.
Studies we have undertaken in this area indicate that by use of
decoys and other techniques, originally developed in some cases for
other purposes, we can probably negate to a significant extent any
Soviet resort to physical attack against our satellites. The
important thing at this point is to push forward with programs
utilizing existing hardware and techniques that will give us a
near-term capability to insure survival of our satellites at the
time we are studying longer-term measures to preserve our future
capabilities against more sophisticated threats.
- b.
- On the other side of the coin, development of our own capabilities
to take physical countermeasures against Soviet satellites should
not be allowed to lag. Such capabilities-in-being could become
particularly significant in the event the Soviets should suddenly
confront us with a weapons-in-space situation, a subject discussed
separately below. We now have underway a preliminary exploration of
the problems of developing an anti-satellite capability. In this
connection, a Nike-Zeus lash-up for firing from Kwajalein against a
satellite has been authorized and should give us an initial
capability by the Spring of 1963. This program is being conducted
without publicity, since we stand more to gain than the Soviets by
the unimpeded use of satellites and do not wish to precipitate an
open competition in anti-satellite weapons.
8. Possibility of Soviet Weapons in
Space
- a.
- Our present intelligence projections do not ascribe to the Soviets
an effort within the foreseeable future to place weapons in space
for delivery against targets on earth. The military shortcomings of
space platform systems of bombardment, compared with available
terrestrial means for weapons’ delivery, constitute a strong
argument against the likelihood of an early Soviet weapons-in-space
effort, even though the Soviets probably are now technically capable
of it.
- b.
- However, if the Soviets, as appears likely, are pursuing a
strategy of building a deterrent force with a potent “terror”
component, then the incentive for early placement of some weapons in
space may exist, with considerations of military utility being
secondary. Should the Soviets decide that weapons in space—or even
the claim of weapons in space, which we would find it difficult to
disprove—would serve as a useful threat in some future crisis
situation, the United States and its Allies would be confronted with
a novel and awkward situation. Although this possibility may at the
present moment strike us as somewhat remote, it would appear useful
to give further thought to what our response in such a situation
would be, particularly if a Soviet claim of weapons-in-space were
coupled with a series of menacing actions at some trouble-spot on
earth, like Berlin. At the very least, it might be well to undertake
a [Page 377] program to deflate in
advance the psychological impact of such a development.
9. Problem of Making Clear to Soviets
Advantages of Non-Civil Targeting
- a.
- One important element in the development of our own strategy has
been to include in our plans the option of using restraint to the
extent that circumstances warrant in civil targeting. Corollary to
this has been the attempt to design our forces and provide options
for their use so as to exert pressures on the Soviets to minimize
civil targeting in the event of nuclear conflict. As to be expected,
there has been conspicuous Soviet refusal (exemplified by Khrushchev’s recent utterances on
this subject) to take a public line responsive to a civil
damage-limiting concept. What we know of private Soviet discourse on
the subject, as reflected in NIE
11-8-62, does not indicate that the Soviets have given much thought
to minimizing civil damage in a strategic exchange. Clearly, we
cannot count on the Soviet Union using restraint in its targeting
policies, even in self-interest. Nevertheless, the stakes involved
would seem to warrant continued effort to influence the Soviets in
this direction. In this connection, planning on our side to ensure a
protected reserve force which could be used in a controlled and
deliberate way to threaten Soviet cities or remaining military
forces after any initial counter-force strikes would appear to be
among the more persuasive “educational” tools at our disposal. Our
presently recommended forces and the targeting options they permit
can fulfill this function.
- b.
- It is also worth noting that two developments in the Soviet
military posture—missile hardening and nuclear subs—give the Soviets
the possibility of having a protected force of their own. With a
protected force they would be in a better position to go along with
a policy of restraint and damage-limiting targeting, providing they
can be brought to recognize its advantages.
10. Civil Defense Problem
a. Soviet capabilities—as now projected through the mid-60’s in submarine
launched missiles, in ICBM’s and in
large-yield weapons—confirm the urgency of the civil defense problem,
but do not change the basic objectives of our program. As currently
developed, this program calls for protection of the population from the
fallout threat. It offers no guarantee against the blast effects of a
potential attack. In the mid-range period, this shelter program would be
very effective in saving lives in case of attacks primarily against
military targets. (See page 5, paragraphs 2c (1) and (3).) If attacks
were launched against large urban-industrial areas, there would be very
large numbers of fatalities in any event, although fallout shelters
would make a significant difference. The currently projected program
(about two-thirds complete in the mid-60’s) would reduce total US
casualties, under a Soviet first strike, approximately on the following
order in several illustrative cases: [Page 378]
| Targeting |
Without Shelter Program |
With Shelter Program |
|
(Million Casualties) |
| Lower Yield Weapons Only |
|
|
| Urban-Industrial |
165 |
135 |
| Military |
95 |
55 |
| Combination High & Lower Yield
Weapons |
|
|
| Urban-Industrial |
175 |
145 |
| Military |
135 |
85 |
b. The potential thermal threat of large yield weapons might change the
degree of protection currently established for the civil defense
program. However, more data are required as to the magnitude of the
thermal threat, fire spread, and the likelihood of the employment of
very large yield weapons in the high-altitude thermal mode. More
variables could affect the latter—weather conditions, density of
burnable materials in target areas, and loss of blast and fallout
effects of the weapon. Until such more definite information is
available, there will be no basis to change current civil defense
policy.
c. Attempts to encourage non-civil targeting options, discussed earlier,
have a close bearing on our civil defense effort as well as that of the
USSR. Increased emphasis on fallout
protection would appear to be a logical corollary to development of
non-civil targeting options, since fallout protection would be required
to minimize collateral population casualties resulting from attacks
against military forces. Otherwise, the potential advantages of
targeting restraint would be lowered on both sides.
d. As now laid out, the US fallout shelter program will be substantially
completed by 1967-68, provided the passage of the Shelter Incentives
Legislation does not slip beyond the next session of Congress. Projected
Soviet capabilities require that there be no slippage in the current
schedule, and may in fact call for acceleration towards the end of the
mid-range period. Further, if response from the public and all levels of
government does not develop the number of shelter spaces required,
consideration may be necessary for an increase in the federal share of
the program.
e. In light of recent Congressional action which threatens the planned
civil defense program, we would like to emphasize that our latest
estimates of Soviet developments re-emphasize the importance of our
planned civil defense program in saving lives in the event of war, and
that this program is an integral part of our over-all national defense
posture, which will be adversely affected if civil defense measures are
allowed to fall by the wayside.
