Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

96. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 11-8-62

Washington, July 6, 1962.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet weapon systems suitable for long range attack, and in Soviet capabilities for such attack, projecting forward for about five years.¹

Conclusions

1. Major new developments are evident in Soviet programs for long range striking forces. First, as forces for attack on Eurasia are reaching planned levels, greater emphasis is being placed on forces for intercontinental attack, especially ICBMs. Second, the Soviets are attempting to improve their capabilities for both preemptive and retaliatory action, by measures designed to shorten reaction times and increase survivability.

2. The tempo of the ICBM program has quickened. The present relatively modest force level of about 50 operational launchers will probably grow substantially, reaching some 125-175 launchers in mid-1963 and 200-300 in mid-1964.²-³ From 1963 onwards, an increasing proportion of the ICBM force will probably be deployed at launch sites having some degree of hardening.

3. The USSR is developing a submerged-launch ballistic missile submarine system, with medium or intermediate range missiles. This improved system will probably be incorporated into some portion of the 40 or so existing ballistic missile submarines, and into a new submarine class. Soviet submarines armed with cruise-type missiles are also capable of attacking land targets. Within the next few years, Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines will probably be conducting regular patrols within firing range of the US.

4. For employment against Eurasia, the Soviets have built formidable missile and bomber forces, which they will continue to maintain and improve. Their limited bomber capability against North America will be tailored increasingly to conduct missions supplementary to ballistic missile attack.

5. The weight of nuclear attack which the USSR could launch will increase with the growth of long range striking forces and a general upward trend in weapon yields. Within the next few years, limited numbers of very high yield weapons in the 25-100 megaton range will be available for delivery by bombers and probably ICBMs. Ground-launched missile units are believed to have more than one missile per launcher, to provide a refire capability.

6. In the mid-1960’s, the principal Soviet forces for attack on North America will be increasing numbers of ICBM launchers, supplemented by increasing numbers of nuclear-powered missile submarines and decreasing numbers of bombers. In a preemptive attack at that time, the USSR would be able to strike at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery capability. Moreover, it would have some prospect that a portion of its own long range striking forces could survive an initial US attack and go on to retaliate.

7. With the long range striking forces we estimate it will have in the mid-1960’s, however, the USSR could not expect to destroy the hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery capabilities of the US.

Discussion

Soviet Policy Toward Long Range Striking Forces

8. The Soviets regard forces for long range attack as essential for supporting an aggressive political posture, deterring the West from resort to military action, and fighting a war as effectively as possible should one occur. In our view, they are building forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives rather than attempting to achieve the very high degree of superiority required to launch a deliberate attack on the West. Efforts to gear their forces better for both preemptive and retaliatory operations, along with greater emphasis upon forces capable of attacking the US, are the major new developments in the Soviet programs for long range striking forces.

9. In building these forces, the Soviets put initial stress on creating a massive capability against Eurasia and its periphery. Intercontinental capabilities were not neglected, but deployment of medium range delivery systems occurred earlier and in much larger numbers. This pattern is probably changing. We believe that deployment of medium range systems is approaching the planned level, and that major emphasis is now being given to further development of forces for intercontinental attack, primarily ICBMs.

Major Weapon Programs, 1962-1964

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

10. The tempo of ICBM development and deployment has quickened noticeably in the past year or two. While present force levels are relatively modest, there is good evidence that the Soviets have been conducting high priority R&D on new ICBM systems, with concurrent construction of deployment complexes. Moreover, the Soviets are probably building new sites with some degree of hardening.

11. Development and Deployment. During the past 18 months, activity on the Soviet ICBM test range has intensified, with firings of three different types of ICBMs. The most urgent recent program at Tyuratam has been the development of the second generation SS-7 ICBM system, which is now being deployed. Testing of the SS-8 ICBM has proceeded at a slower pace; it could be available for operational use in 1963. Firings of the first generation SS-6 ICBM, which probably became operational in 1960, have been at a reduced pace. We believe that within the next year or so the Soviets will begin firing new ICBMs or space vehicles which are as yet unknown to US intelligence.

12. The urgency apparent in the development of the second generation ICBM almost certainly relates to a Soviet decision to deploy the first generation system in only limited numbers. The SS-6 ICBM is a very large vehicle of nearly half a million pounds gross takeoff weight, with nonstorable liquid propellants and radio-inertial guidance. Ground control and support facilities are correspondingly large and include rail service direct to launchers. The second generation SS-7 ICBM is simpler and considerably less bulky, and probably employs storable liquid propellants and all-inertial guidance. A typical SS-7 complex consists of a rail-served support area and eight or more launchers, which are deployed in pairs and are road-served.

13. Probable Hardening. All currently operational Soviet launchers are deployed at soft, fixed sites, but we believe the Soviets have probably initiated a program to construct launch sites having some degree of hardening. Considering past Soviet practices, we estimate that there will be two ICBM launchers at each site. The first of these new sites will probably be operational in early 1963. It is probable that such sites are to employ either the SS-7 ICBM with redesigned ground support equipment or the SS-8 ICBM. Our information on the SS-8 system is inadequate to determine whether the missile employed is even larger than the SS-6 or whether it is smaller than the SS-7.

14. Estimated Force Levels to 1964. The ICBM force will increase substantially above its present level in the next year or so. Our estimate of the growth of the force in this period is affected, on the one hand, by the increasing tempo of the Soviet program, and on the other hand, by the greater time and effort required to build hardened launch sites. Considering these factors, together with all the other evidence available to us, we estimate as follows the size and composition of the ICBM force to 1964:⁴-⁵

[Here follows a table that shows totals of 250-300 SS-7 launchers and 50-150 hardened launch sites by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]

OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHERS, 1962-1964

	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
Soft 1st Generation (SS-6)...	6-10	6-10	6-10
Soft 1st Generation (SS-7)....	40-45	110-140	150-200
Hardened...................................	10-25	50-100
Approximate Total..........................	50	125-175	200-300

Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

15. MRBM and IRBM sites, each with four pads, are soft, fixed, and road-served. More than 90 percent are deployed in a broad belt of Western USSR stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, within range of NATO targets in Norway, most of Western Europe, and Turkey. A lesser concentration of sites in the Soviet Far East is capable of bringing Japan, Korea, and Okinawa under fire. A few sites in south central USSR are within range of US and Allied military installations in Turkey and Pakistan. IRBMs could extend the target coverage from these various areas to include all of Spain, North Africa, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines.

16. We estimate that the USSR now has about 500 operational MRBM and IRBM launch pads. We do not have evidence that all of the launch pads are manned, and it is possible that some of them represent alternate firing positions. The site construction program has probably slowed but not ceased. The force will probably grow over the next year or two to a total of about 55-650 launch pads (including some 50-100 IRBMs), after which it will probably level off.

Operational Procedures of Missile Units

17. ICBM, IRBM, and MRBM units are believed to have refire capabilities. Although the evidence is not firm, we believe that an average of two missiles is provided for each launch pad. Preparation to fire initial and subsequent salvoes probably requires a number of hours. Sophisticated methods of attaining a high degree of simultaneity and flexibility in operations are not believed to be employed. The USSR is working to reduce the reaction and refire times of strategic missile units, but current system designs will preclude the constant maintenance of readiness conditions approaching those of US systems.

Submarine-Launched Missiles

18. The Soviets now have operational about 40 long range ballistic missile submarines, including 7 diesel-powered “Z” class, 25 diesel-powered “G” class, and 10 nuclear-powered “H” class submarines. This force carries a total of about 120 ballistic missiles with ranges up to 350 n.m. The effectiveness of these submarines is limited by the small number of missiles each carries, the short range of the missiles, and the requirement for submarines to surface for launching. There is reliable evidence, however, that the Soviets are now developing a capability to launch ballistic missiles from submerged submarines. The range of the missiles may be either 650 or 2,000 n.m. A program to retrofit some portion of the existing force of about 35 “G” and “H” class submarines will probably begin soon. All of these submarines could be so equipped within the next two or four years. A new nuclear-powered submarine class is probably also under development to employ this new missile system; we estimate that the first submarine could become operational in 1963-1964. The probable numbers of ballistic missile submarines in Soviet operational units through mid-1964 are estimated as follow:

SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 1962-1964

	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
Diesel-powered............	32	32-35	32-35
Nuclear-powered............	10	12-15	15-20

19. The Soviet Navy has also developed 350 n.m. submarine-launched cruise missile systems, designed primarily for low altitude, supersonic attack against Western surface ships, particularly carrier task forces. They are now carried by a few converted diesel-powered submarines and at least four nuclear-powered submarines. We believe that the Soviets are now extending their capability to attack land targets with missiles of this type.

Long Range Aviation

20. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited to Eurasian operations than to intercontinental attack. We estimate that as of mid-1962 Long Range Aviation comprises some 165 heavy bombers and 950 jet medium bombers.⁶ Virtually all of the medium bombers are Badgers, but a few supersonic Blinders have probably now been delivered to units. It is unlikely that a new heavy bomber will be developed for operational use.⁷ Recent trends indicate little change in total aircraft strength over the next two years.

[Here follows a table that shows totals of 115 Bison bombers, 75 Bear bombers, and 10 follow-on heavy tankers by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF LONG RANGE AVIATION 1962-1964

Bombers and Tankers	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
Heavy
Bison...............	110	110	100
Bear................	55	55	50
Total................	165	165	150
Medium
Badger...............	950	900	800
Blinder..............	a few	50	100
Total................	950	950	900

21. In attempting to overcome the range limitations of Long Range Aviation for intercontinental attack, the Soviets have given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling and Arctic training in Badger and Bison units. Most of the Bears have been modified to deliver 350 n.m. air-to-surface missiles. We believe that the Soviets might plan to commit as many as 400-500 aircraft to initial attacks on North America. Considering a variety of operational factors, but excluding combat attrition, we estimate that the Soviets could now put about 200 bombers over North America on two-way missions in initial attacks; of these nearly half could be heavy bombers. The patterns of Arctic training and base utilization indicate that aircraft would probably be staged through a few bases in successive waves over a number of hours.⁸

Nuclear Weapons

22. The present Soviet stockpile consists almost entirely of weapons developed from nuclear tests conducted prior to the 1961 test series. Most of the weapons allotted to Long Range Aviation are probably high-yield types ranging from about 100 KT to 8 MT. Ballistic missiles now in service could deliver warheads with maximum yields in the megaton range. MRBMs are probably also equipped with lower yield warheads. Naval cruise-type missiles and air-to-surface missiles are probably armed with warheads of low or medium yield for use against ships, but could deliver warheads in the low megaton range against land or coastal targets. The general trend in the yields of weapons allotted to long range attack will probably be upwards. A few very high yield bombs of 25 MT, or even 100 MT, could now be available. It is possible that a few ICBMs capable of delivering these very high yield weapons could be available within the next two years.⁹

Trends in Long Range Striking Forces, 1965-1967

23. In the middle 1960’s the USSR will continue to strengthen and modernize its long range striking forces, with emphasis on those systems capable of attacking the US. The effort devoted to long range attack forces will be affected by the competing demands of other essential military and nonmilitary programs. We cannot estimate with confidence the decisions the Soviet leaders will make or the success they are likely to achieve in various weapons programs. However, we believe that while a mixed striking capability will be retained, the ICBM will be the dominant weapon.

ICBM Forces

24. The Soviet ICBM program will be influenced by a variety of factors: Soviet strategic concepts, technical improvements, other Soviet weapons programs, the nature and size of Western forces, and the international situation. These factors place broad limits on the future Soviet ICBM force but do not lead us too particular program. For this reason we can only estimate the Soviet force level within a broad range. All things considered, we believe the Soviet force level in mid-1967 will be within the range of 300-600 operational launchers. The majority of launchers will probably have a degree of hardening, including some fully hardened. To achieve the high side of the range, the USSR would need to commit resources throughout this period at rates at least as high as those now evident in the ICBM program. Many of the launchers will probably have more than one missile available, to provide a refire capability. Our estimate, reflecting the considerable range of uncertainty in any figures for this period, is as follows:

OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHERS

1965-1967¹⁰-¹¹

[Here follows a table that shows totals of 250-300 soft ICBM launchers, 150-200 hard launchers, and about 300 fully hard launchers by mid 1967.] [Footnote in the source text.]

	Mid-1965	Mid-1966	Mid-1967
Soft............	150-250	150-250	150-250
Hardened........	100-175	120-250	125-250
Fully Hard......	0-a few	a few-25	25-100
Approx. Total...	250-425	275-525	300-600

25. The smaller force would give the Soviets high assurance in an initial attack of destroying US soft fixed nuclear bases, semihardened ICBM sites, communication and control facilities, and the principal US metropolitan areas. The larger force would provide an additional attack capability against some hardened targets, control centers, and other elements contributing to US striking and defensive strength, and would increase the Soviet retaliatory capability. We believe that the programmed buildup in US intercontinental attack forces makes it increasingly unlikely that the Soviets would judge that they could launch an on US nuclear forces and inflict sufficient damage to assure that resulting damage to the USSR was acceptable.

26. The accuracy, reliability, and reaction time of the ICBM force will improve. Better command, communications, and other equipment will increase its flexibility and capability for simultaneous attack. The bulk of the force will probably be equipped with warheads in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] range, but a number of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missiles an. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missiles will probably be available. To improve the survivability of the force, the Soviets will probably continue to deploy ICBMs at launchers which are dispersed and have some degree of hardening. They will also probably develop a fully hardened system which we believe could become operational in 1965 or 1966.

MRBM and IRBM Forces

27. Soviet strength in these systems will probably have been stabilized before 1965 at approximately 550-650 operational launch pads. To improve the survivability of the MRBM force, the Soviets may also develop road mobile or hardened systems.

Submarine-Launched Forces

28. Soviet planners will probably look upon submarine missile forces as an important supplement to their ICBM strength because of their relative invulnerability and their capability for varying the direction and nature of attacks on the US. We believe that the number of nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles will be on the order of 25-30 in mid-1967. The Soviets will probably also have about two dozen nuclear submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles. In addition, diesel-powered missile submarines will remain in operation. The ranges of submarine-launched missiles may be extended to as much as 2,000 n.m. for ballistic missiles, and to 650 n.m. for cruise missiles. By the mid-1960’s, some Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines will probably be conducting regular patrols within missile range of US coasts.

Bomber Forces

29. With the growth and improvement of missile capabilities, the Soviets would probably plan to employ bomber forces in follow-on attacks after initial missile strikes had been delivered or to supplement the retaliatory blow if the USSR were attacked first. Aircraft equipped with improved penetration aids and nuclear weapons would probably be used for increasingly specialized missions, such as armed reconnaissance and attacks on hard targets. By mid-1967, Long Range Aviation will probably include some 750 medium bombers, about one-third of them supersonic Blinders. Heavy bomber strength will probably have been reduced to about 100 aircraft. We estimate as follows the strength of Long Range Aviation in the mid-1960’s:

Bombers and Tankers	Mid-1965	Mid-1966	Mid-1967
Heavy12
Bison.................	90	80	70
Bear..................	45	40	35
Total................	135	120	105
Medium
Badger................	700	600	500
Blinder...............	150	200	250
Total.................	850	800	750

Space Systems

30. We have no evidence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space. We think it highly unlikely, however, that the USSR would omit this field in its vigorous search for qualitative improvements in its military posture and for achievements with which to support claims of superiority. We believe that the Soviets could launch reconnaissance, communications, meteorological, navigation, or geodetic satellites at any time. There is no evidence that the Soviets are working to develop offensive space weapon systems, but the course of the Soviet space program to date suggests that any effort in this field would be directed toward an orbital bombardment vehicle. It would be technically feasible for the Soviets to launch weapons of limited capability into orbit in the mid-1960’s, but we do not believe they could achieve an effective offensive capability by the end of the decade.¹³

Implications of Capabilities

31. The capabilities of Soviet long range striking forces will be only in part a function of the numbers of weapons available, their performance, and the adequacy of supporting elements. Equally critical will be the way in which the Soviets employ their striking forces, their ability to maximize the effects of these forces under the various circumstances in which war could begin, and their assessment of Western capabilities and plans.

32. The current Soviet targeting concept reflects the view that even a general nuclear war is likely to be protracted and that victory requires the reduction of all elements of the Western warmaking potential. These elements include: the bases of strategic delivery systems; nuclear weapons facilities; communication and governmental centers; military and war supporting industry. We have no evidence that avoidance of heavy civilian casualties is among the objectives underlying Soviet targeting.

33. Should the Soviets conclude that the West was irrevocably committed to an imminent nuclear attack on the USSR, they would launch their available ready forces in a pre-emptive attack designed to blunt the expected Western blow. The mixed force which they have available for such operations would permit flexibility of tactics and complicate Western defensive problems, but would pose severe difficulties of coordination. Initial missile and bomber attacks against the US would probably extend over a period of many hours, and those against Eurasia over at least a few hours. We believe that at present the Soviets would plan to employ few if any missile submarines in initial attacks against the US; initiation of routine submarine patrols within missile range of the US could change this situation.

34. By the mid-1960’s, the USSR will have acquired a substantial missile capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the US, in addition to its already formidable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions of this force will be relatively invulnerable to attack. The Soviets will be in a position to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospect that a portion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high yield nuclear weapons. With the long range striking forces we estimate that they will have in the mid-1960’s, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing numbers of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles.¹⁴

[Here follow a glossary and a set of tables.]

0. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/62. Top Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The note reads in part: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
1. The weapon systems considered are ground-launched missiles with ranges of 700 nautical miles (n.m.) or more, submarine-launched missiles, heavy and medium bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and advanced delivery and supporting systems such as orbital and suborbital vehicles. Emphasis is placed on those systems designed primarily to attack land targets in North America, and in Eurasia and its periphery. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the number of Soviet ICBM launchers is unlikely to exceed the low side of the ranges shown for mid-1963 and mid-1964. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates the number of operational launchers as follows: mid-1962, 75-100; mid-1963, 175-250; and mid-1964, 300-450. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the number of Soviet ICBM launchers is unlikely to exceed the low side of the ranges shown for mid-1963 and mid-1964. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates about 75-100 operational ICBM launchers in mid-1962. He would estimate the force levels through 1964 as follows:
6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the heavy bomber force will have the composition included in the following table:
7. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that a follow-on heavy bomber will be introduced in 1964. The continued research and development of large supersonic aircraft substantiates the Soviets’ interest in large supersonic vehicles and indicates their intent to increase their strategic attack capabilities by such means. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the Soviets would use a number of bases for staging and would not be restricted in their mode of attack. He further believes that the Soviets could commit about 750 aircraft to initial two-way attacks on North America. Considering operational factors and allowing for noncombat attrition, about 300 bombers could reach North American targets. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. For a detailed discussion of Soviet nuclear weapon characteristics, see NIE 11-2-62, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated 18 May 1962, Top Secret (Limited Distribution). [Footnote in the source text.]
10. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the force level is likely to be towards the low side of the estimate presented in the table above. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes the operational Soviet ICBM launchers for the period 1965-1967 will be as follows:
12. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the heavy bomber force will have the composition included in the following table (see footnotes 7 and 8):[Here follows a table that shows totals of 90 Bison bombers, 50 Bear bombers, and 60 follow-on heavy tankers by mid-1967.] [Footnote in the source text.]
13. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that a Soviet orbital bombardment capability could be achieved prior to the end of the decade. Based on technical considerations and using a (large) SS-8 booster and techniques known to exist today or to be within Soviet capability, he believes that such a system could be developed as early as 1965. This system could be composed of orbital vehicles of 30,000 pounds gross weight, which could deorbit a very high yield weapon to a CEP of 4 n.m. initially and later to 1.8 n.m. [Footnote in the source text.]
14. On July 7, Rusk “noted the possible need of an immediate increase in our Polaris program” on the basis of this estimate, and “felt” that a senior group should study the “implications of the new information which we now have on Soviet capabilities. He questioned whether there might not be additional need for disarmament or on the other hand, had we not reached a point where superiority alone had become irrelevant.” (Briefing of Secretary Rusk held July 7; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/62)