Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

137. Memorandum of the 497th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, February 27, 1962, 10 a.m.

The meeting of the National Security Council was convened on Tuesday, February 27, 1962, at 10 a.m., to discuss nuclear testing. Present at the meeting were those listed in the preliminary attendance list,¹ with the following exceptions: the Secretary of the Treasury and The Attorney General were absent, while Lt. Col. Burris, the Assistant to the Vice President, was present.

The meeting began with a brief report by the Director of Central Intelligence on recent reports of possible Soviet preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. McCone reported that there were indications of aircraft movements parallel to some which had preceded the Soviet test series of 1961. He reported that while we might expect additional indicators before testing occurred in the northern testing grounds, we could not anticipate such additional warning in the event of renewed Soviet testing in the missile range. He reported that Khrushchev found himself in a flexible position, since his statements in recent months had carefully avoided commitments that might limit his freedom to test.

At the request of the President, the Secretary of State then summarized his recommendations on atmospheric testing. He believed that in the light of the progress which the Soviet Union had made in recent months, and in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union can test again whenever it is ready, common prudence now requires the United States to test. He recognized that atmospheric tests had some political disadvantages, especially in the short run. But he noted that the Soviet Union today did not seem to be suffering greatly from the public indignation which had greeted its tests last fall. Memory was short in these matters. The Secretary believed that we would not want a time to come when we were—or were thought to be—behind. We must not fall behind, but must rather rise to the expectations of those who wish us to succeed. The Secretary noted the spontaneous enthusiasm which had broken out in other countries after the successful space flight of Colonel Glenn.

Turning to more specific questions, the Secretary indicated that in his belief, from a political point of view, the United States would be in a strong position if it could say that it was ready, still, to sign today the treaty which had been presented last April, for the prevention of nuclear tests.

The Secretary recognized that this position might be criticized from two sides. On the one hand, there were those who believed that it was important to try to be more liberal, in the face of the fact that the Soviets have rejected the existing proposal. Could we not do better? And could we not offer an arrangement more nearly compatible with Soviet views on inspection? Mr. Rusk believed that in April we had gone as far as we could—even to the edges of security—and to a point which might make Senatorial consent to ratification uncertain.

On the other hand, there were those who argued that the April treaty offered no safeguards against preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. Rusk was prepared to take the risk of this weakness, because if we could put inspection teams in, in accordance with the treaty of April, then we would create a great political weight against any Soviet decision to resume testing.

More broadly, the Secretary of State believed that Khrushchev might well be willing to accept some limitations upon his freedom to test in return for a limitation upon the costs and dangers of the expanding arms race. The Secretary then turned to the question of the timing of U.S. tests, in relation to the Geneva talks. He believed that it was important not to tie the tests tightly to “progress” of an indeterminate sort at Geneva. He believed that we should announce before the Geneva meeting that we do mean to conduct tests, though he also argued that we should not in fact begin the test series until after the meeting had begun in April. He recognized that others felt that we should in fact conduct a test or two before the Geneva meeting, but his own review of the tests proposed for this period convinced him that they did not amount to much and would not in fact do what their advocates desired.

Finally, the Secretary believed it extremely important that we should have strong and far-reaching proposals to put before the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The track ahead might be hard to see, and the future murky, but we must make a major effort.

The President asked how the Secretary of State would reconcile his statement that we must not link our tests to “progress” but that we should be prepared to sign an effective test ban treaty. The Secretary of State replied that we would undertake not to test only if there were a major change—as, for example, consent to an effective test ban treaty, or a major settlement in Berlin.

The President then asked the Secretary of Defense to comment. Mr. McNamara began by stating his agreement with the Secretary of State that we must neither fall behind nor appear to fall behind. From the military point of view there were 3 questions to which tests would contribute answers.

1. Should we modify our design for the penetration of enemy defenses by our strategic vehicles?

2. Should we modify our command and control system in order to increase its survivability against enemy attack?

3. Can we redesign the Nike-Zeus system for anti-missile defense to overcome its present weaknesses? The Secretary believed that the answer to the third question was probably negative, but he considered it highly important to obtain additional information on the point.

The President asked whether the Secretary of Defense would be willing to refrain from testing if we could obtain Soviet agreement to the April treaty. Mr. McNamara replied that he would indeed sign on to such a treaty. He believed that the United States would be more secure if there could be a complete and effective end to testing. The President put the same question to Mr. Harold Brown, and Mr. Brown also indicated that in his judgment, on both technical and political grounds, it would be to the advantage of the United States to accept such a treaty.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric indicated his agreement with the position of the Secretary of Defense, with the addition of his belief that the proposed tests would be most important in indicating, in addition, the degree to which our 1200 missile sites were appropriately protected against attack.

General Lemnitzer, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that the Chiefs strongly favor the resumption of tests. He particularly emphasized the importance of proof tests of complete weapons systems. He reported the agreement of the Chiefs that the tests listed are the most important at this time.

General Lemnitzer also reported that the Joint Chiefs could not approve a treaty such as the April proposal, from the military point of view.

In their judgment we do not now know the level of Soviet progress in full detail. The Soviets may have made a major breakthrough in the last series of their tests. The U.S. needs one series at least in order to feel confident that it has not been dangerously surpassed. Gen. Lemnitzer emphasized that these considerations were advanced from the strictly military point of view and indicated his recognition that there might be other reasons which might govern the decision. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs believed that there was too much at stake not to go ahead with the tests currently proposed. Without knowing all the provisions of the April treaty, General Lemnitzer nevertheless recorded his doubt that it would offer hard assurance that there would be no resumption of Soviet testing.

The President indicated his own doubt that these tests—the Soviet tests of 1961—sophisticated as they may have been—had given the Soviets a clear breakthrough. Then after some discussion with General Lemnitzer on the point, the President indicated that in his judgment this question did not have to be decided at the moment.

Mr. William Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, indicated his general agreement with the Secretary of State. In particular, he reported that in his judgment the treaty of April was a good document. It would allow us to break through the barrier of secrecy surrounding the Soviet Union, and would have great value from this point of view alone. Mr. Foster’s one disagreement with the Secretary of State was that he hoped there might be an early test, promptly after an early announcement. He was in favor of the posture which Ambassador Dean had described as “test and talk.” He believed that the tests available before the opening of the Geneva meeting did have some significance, and he thought that if we had not tested before March 14, we would come under considerable pressure from neutrals and others not to test at all.

Secretary Rusk indicated his own support for the notion of “test and talk,” while he could not accept the argument for an early test. In supporting the “test and talk” idea, the Secretary reminded the meeting that the United States and the Soviet Union had worked out the statement of agreed principles in the fall of 1961 while the Soviets were conducting their great series of atmospheric tests.

Chairman Seaborg reported that the Atomic Energy Commission recommended that they return to atmospheric testing. He found some trouble with the question of the starting date, but he agreed that the proposed early tests would not have great significance, since their yield was limited pretty much to what can be done underground. Still there would be some significant elements in any such tests.

The President, at this point, remarked that it would be a mistake in his view to have a first atmospheric test in the United States. Such a test would result in widespread press attention, including pictures of the mushroom cloud in the U.S. newspapers. The domestic reaction would more than offset the gains from being in a position to say that our first test was in the U.S., not abroad. The other arguments in favor of a U.S. test were not important.

The President then asked Ambassador Stevenson to comment. Mr. Stevenson remarked that while he did not like to disturb the wholesome unanimity of the meeting, he had misgivings. These were not because he doubted the gains made by the Soviet Union—which he was not competent to judge. He wondered whether the United States had weighed the political and moral elements of the problem. He saw the world scene as a contest for the non-aligned, non-Communist, non-nuclear nations, and he believed that if we could avoid testing, we might make major gains with these nations. He expressed his doubt about the concept of “nuclear superiority” which appeared frequently in the briefing papers. He believed that for the hope of eventual arms control, nuclear equality was a better concept. He hoped that the moral and political balance had been carefully weighed, and he believed that if after such consideration there was a decision to test, there were a number of things which could be done. He proposed a package of proposals for a “Peace Offensive,” as follows: The President should present to Geneva a number of proposals including a modified test ban treaty, with emphasis on inspection for preparations and reduced emphasis on inspection of clandestine testing. The proposal should also include an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an agreement on the cut-off of nuclear production, an agreement on the sequestration of materials, an agreement to set aside certain numbers of delivery vehicles, an agreement which might limit the dangers of accident, miscalculation, and surprise, an agreement to prohibit the orbit of weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps other proposals.

Asking how it was possible to get an agreement to a test ban treaty, Ambassador Stevenson asked if we could not hold our hand on testing and simply threaten to resume if nothing serious were accomplished—but in the next sentence he indicated his belief that such a threat would not have any effect on the Soviet Union.

The President asked Ambassador Stevenson in what way he would adjust the treaty of April, and Ambassador Stevenson said in reply that he believed there should be less emphasis on the detection of underground testing and more on the detection of preparations. He interjected the thought that we are on the eve of a historic event—the opening of the Soviet society—and that we should conduct our affairs accordingly. He also remarked, however, that he did not assume for a moment that the Soviets would now accept an adequate test ban treaty.

The President asked Ambassador Stevenson directly whether he was against the resumption of testing. Ambassador Stevenson avoided a direct answer and asked again whether we have adequately weighed the moral and political elements of the problem. He thought there was no question but that we should prepare for tests, and certainly we should test if the Soviet Union tested again. And it was perfectly clear, also, that the Soviet Union had made significant gains. And if it were the judgment that these gains required a resumption of testing, Ambassador Stevenson would not disagree with the judgment. The Ambassador returned to the question whether nuclear superiority was really desirable, and Secretary McNamara in reply indicated that his reasons for favoring a resumption of tests were more complex. It was not so much a belief in the necessity of American superiority as a determination to prevent Soviet superiority which seemed to him governing in this matter.

Returning to the prospects for disarmament, the Secretary of State emphasized his own belief that a chance does exist and that this chance must be worked for. Dr. Wiesner agreed, pointing out that each passing year makes disarmament more difficult.

The President then indicated his own judgment that we must be prepared to test and indeed to test, unless we can make significant progress. Turning to Mr. Foster he asked which elements of Ambassador Stevenson’s peace offensive were a part of the current thinking of Mr. Foster’s agency. Mr. Foster replied that many of these proposals were in the President’s own speech of September 25, 1961, while most of the others were in the current plans of the Disarmament Agency.

The President then asked Ambassador Dean for his opinion. Mr. Dean replied that he would like to get something in the April treaty that would provide for an inspection of preparations. He believed that the Soviet government had never seriously negotiated after the April treaty was tabled, probably because of its own prior decision to turn toward the resumption of testing.

He believed that we would be met at Geneva by propaganda tactics, and at a very violent level, and he believed, in consequence, that we must follow our own line with calm determination. There followed a brief discussion of the tactics of debate in the United Nations between Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Dean, in which it was generally agreed that we might look forward to the possibility of a full propaganda exercise by the Soviet Union in June.

The President indicated that he saw some advantages in updating the April treaty, both in order to make it more responsive to the actual situation and in order to avoid any appearance of stale rigidity.

The Vice President was then asked by the President for his opinion: The Vice President’s judgment was that we should proceed with tests with a minimum of delay. On the basis of the papers available to him, he concluded that there was an urgent necessity, and he shared the Secretary of State’s conclusion that testing was necessary. He was in favor of an early decision and early tests. He believed we should test in Nevada and as quickly as possible. We might have superiority or we might not. But there had been a time when there had been no question on this point, and in the Vice President’s judgment it was no longer right to hesitate. He would rather have nuclear superiority than a test ban treaty. He believed that American people look to America for leadership. He favored the resumption of tests as soon as possible. It was time to stand.

In response to a final question from the President, Director McCone indicated his belief that the importance of Soviet efforts in the anti-missile field had been too little recognized in the discussion thus far. He believed that these efforts were very great, and he noted that there was much opinion in the intelligence community to the effect that both Soviet capabilities and Soviet deployment were far advanced. There followed a complex discussion of the anti-missile problem among Chairman Seaborg, Dr. Wiesner, and Dr. Brown, the result of which was general agreement that the problem is a very difficult one, both to attack and to estimate.

Director Murrow, responding to a question from the President, indicated his belief that if a decision to test should be made, there should be very little delay in actual testing. He believed that delay would look like indecision, and while he believed that our resumption of tests had been considerably discounted by public opinion throughout the world, he would like as short an interval as possible for such opinion to exert itself between a decision to test and the tests themselves. On the other hand, he could see the importance of an announcement of the American position before the Geneva meeting, and he recognized the physical facts which made significant testing in the immediate future difficult.

The President noted that this was the dilemma with which the meeting was faced, and after brief and inconclusive further discussion, he adjourned the meeting by expressing his thanks for all their participation.²

McG.B.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. A complete list of the 22 attendees is ibid., President’s Appointment Book. Other accounts of the meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 225-227, and in a memorandum for the files by McCone in Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/61.
1. Not found.
2. NSC Action No. 2448 states in part that, at this meeting, the Council: “Noted that the President would shortly reach a decision with respect to the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1962)