Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

136. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, February 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The National Security Council Meeting on Testing

So far there has been no publicity about this meeting, but you will undoubtedly want to repeat your warning against any discussion of the meeting itself or its subject. Equally, you will want to reserve any final decision in the meeting itself.

There are two main items of business:

A. To test or not to test

B. The timing and tactics of an announcement and of the test series.

A. To test or not to test

The documentation which has been circulated on this point has been unusually comprehensive. It includes a memorandum from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,¹ and a summary of the basic briefing on the positions of the U.S./U.S.S.R. which was presented to you on February 2² (this is the one which you have been using with Gaitskell and Stevenson.)³

This documentation reaches the unanimous judgment that we should test. Since it has been available to all present for several days, you will not want to ask for repetitive speeches. My suggestion is that you may want to ask for questions and comment in the following order:

1. Intelligence on the Soviet position after the tests of 1961 (John McCone will respond if there is questioning).

2. The technological meaning of our test series (Glenn Seaborg will respond).

3. The Defense recommendations (McNamara and Lemnitzer).

4. Foreign policy recommendation (Dean Rusk will respond).

At this point I suggest that you may wish to ask the Vice President to comment (or, alternatively, you may want to hold him until the end). I have asked him to be ready, and indicated to him that we are eager to have as solid an expression of opinion as possible. The men who still may have reservations in this group are Stevenson and Wiesner, though Wiesner will limit his comment, if asked, to a statement that the technological balance of judgment is very even and that political considerations should govern.

Stevenson has asked to have a memorandum written for him by Harlan Cleveland,⁴ but I do not yet know what is in it.

I doubt if you want to go all the way around the room, but Wiesner will not speak until spoken to, so perhaps the decisive question is how you wish to handle Adlai. Douglas Dillon will not be present, but I have a short memorandum from him expressing his firm advice that you should go ahead.

When you have heard as much as you want on the basic question, I assume that you will reserve the final judgment and turn to the question of timing and tactics in the event of a decision to go ahead.

B. The timing and tactics of an announcement and of the test series

Here there are three serious problems:

1. Should your position be stated in a speech this week?

2. Should there be any atmospheric tests before the Disarmament Committee meetings on March 14?

3. Should we hold to the date of April 1st for the main series, or should it be moved back to April 15—or conceivably further?

1. Should your position be stated in a speech this week?

The argument here is more evenly balanced than I have thought. Harold Macmillan has an ally in John McCone and, to some extent, in Douglas Dillon. The argument is that no decision should be stated until the very last moment before testing, in order to avoid very heavy propaganda pressures from good people in the English-speaking world and self-righteous neutrals everywhere.

It is also contended that an announcement this week will be just as bad for the Geneva conference as an announcement in early April.

On the other side, there is very strong feeling that we must not go to Geneva with this issue still apparently open. To complete our preparations for testing with no public explanation, and to test on one or two days’ notice would, on this argument, be deeply resented and would appear to be a torpedo attack on the Geneva meeting. In this argument, it is much better to state our position straightforwardly this week and to stick to it calmly through whatever criticism we may get in the intervening period. The men who hold this view most strongly are Bill Foster, Jack McCloy, Ed Murrow, and your own staff.

2. Should there be any atmospheric tests before the Disarmament Committee Meetings on March 14?

I think you have already pretty well decided against atmospheric tests before March 14, and I have alerted the principal Departments to this probability. If we could make a lot of tests quickly, the question might be more difficult, but the fact is that the only truly atmospheric test which is possible is a low-yield balloon shot of marginal importance which could not be set off now before March 8. This timing is so obviously unfortunate that no one is much in favor of it at present.

There is a minor technological question about an underground crater shot which will give off some radioactive gas (though less than the venting shot of last December).

I think this should be approved for next week, as a respectable underground noise with no significant atmospheric effect.

3. Should we hold to the date of April 1st for the main series, or should it be moved back to April 15—or conceivably further?

The test program is now scheduled for an April 1st opening, but I am informed by Defense and AEC that there is no technological loss in a 2-week postponement, assuming that tests can continue 2 weeks longer at the other end. Indeed, Harold Brown believes that there would be a technological improvement if this additional time is allowed. Major General Starbird, the Task Force commander, has no objection.

The disadvantage of the postponement is simply that we have to wait that much longer for the other shoe to drop if you make an announcement this week. Macmillan much prefers April 15, and while the 6 weeks of open time is troublesome to USIA and some others, it is generally agreed that the United States Government can stand it, as long as the decision itself is firm and you yourself are willing to take it calmly.

My own summary judgment on these tactical points is that, once we have made a decision to test, our tactics should be as open, calm, reasonable and forthcoming as possible. I take this to mean a full explanation this week, an avoidance of tests before the Disarmament Committee meetings, and the delay of the test series itself to the middle of April. The decision to test will itself satisfy all the tough guys, and the rest of our tactics should be aimed at those who have hoped for a different decision.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret.
1. The memoranda from the Secretaries of State and Defense are Documents 131 and 128, respectively. The memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Seaborg’s memorandum, both February 16, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting. The JCS memorandum (JCSM-127-62) is in the Supplement.
2. Apparent reference to Keeny’s summary mentioned in Document 126.
3. Kennedy had lunch with Stevenson on February 22. There is no record of the conversation, but Legere reported Bundy as saying “in a rather horrified manner” at the White House daily staff meeting on February 23 that “Stevenson had proposed to the President the institution of a two year moratorium on testing.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)
4. Not further identified.