Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

138. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan⁰

Washington, February 27, 1962.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Since I last talked with David Ormsby Gore,¹ I have had a most careful review of the testing problem with my senior advisers, and I should now inform you that they have unanimously recommended to me that the United States should resume tests in the atmosphere, starting about April 15. I myself believe that their advice is correct, and that once this decision is definitely taken, it should be promptly announced to the American people, and not allowed to dribble out in gossip and rumor. Our present plan is that I should announce such a decision in a television address to the American people on Thursday evening, the first of March. But before this decision becomes final, I wish to take this further opportunity of consultation with you, and I am sending you this letter in the hope that we may talk it over tomorrow, if you wish.

The military reasons which are leading me to this decision are, I think, familiar to you and to your advisers. The essence of it is that I do not believe we can accept a further moratorium on atmospheric testing while the Soviet Union remains free to move onward from what it learned last fall and test again and again. My central concern is not with the size of any particular weapon—the Western stockpile is large enough, in all conscience, from that point of view. The problem is rather one of assuring the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent against possible surprises in missile or anti-missile technology in future years. Until we can get a reasonably safeguarded agreement, of the sort which you and we have worked for in recent years, I feel that I have no alternative.

There remain a number of tactical questions on which I hope we may not be too far apart. You will see that I have somewhat changed my thinking since I talked to David Ormsby Gore a week ago. It now seems plain to me that I should not allow the Disarmament Committee to begin its work under the illusion that the United States is not yet settled in its own mind about the need for testing. I believe that a sudden announcement of a quick decision to resume, sometime in early April, would be seen as more of a blow to the work of the Disarmament Committee than a careful and moderate explanation of our position ahead of time. The honest way is to put the matter plainly now.

I would, however, intend to make it clear in any speech that the United States is still ready to sign and put into effect a properly safeguarded treaty which would protect the world from nuclear testing. I would like to be able to say that Great Britain joined in this position. I would also plan to say that if any such agreement could be signed in the next six weeks, there would be no American atmospheric testing.

The test series which we now propose is essentially the same as that which has been discussed at length between your experts and ours. I am giving David Ormsby Gore a short memorandum which contains a precise description of the current proposals.² The one notable addition is a pair of what are called “systems tests.” These are designed to show whether all of the components of our basic Polaris and Atlas missiles work together as well as the individual parts have done in separate testing. If we had not reached a decision to test on other grounds, these two, in my judgment, could be omitted. But once the general decision is made, I believe it would be wise to accept the strong and unanimous military advice that such tests would be necessary to give our commanders proper confidence in our basic strategic deterrent systems.

I shall be at my desk all day tomorrow, Wednesday, and would hope to be able to talk with you about this whole subject at any time that you wish.³

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk, stating that the original had been delivered to Ormsby Gore.
1. This meeting or conversation has not been identified. Kennedy was in Florida from the evening of February 22 until the morning of February 26. On February 24, Ormsby Gore gave Rusk and Bundy text of a message from Macmillan suggesting that Kennedy resolve the question of a meeting of Heads of Government by inviting Khrushchev to come to Washington at the end of April. If no progress were made, then “our tests could still be carried out with no real disadvantage, by announcing the dates immediately after the meeting. This plan would really trump his card. It would be difficult for him to resist.” (Ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) See the Supplement. No documentation on U.S. reaction to this proposal has been found.
2. Not found.
3. In his February 28 reply, Macmillan thanked Kennedy for his “message about nuclear testing. It is of course very short notice and as you frankly say represents a change in plan.” Macmillan indicated that the systems tests were not along previously discussed lines, “but I agree with you on this, that in for a penny in for a pound.” Macmillan asked, in order to aid in explaining the decision, that Kennedy delay his speech by a day or two, that the date of testing be postponed until May 3, and that Kennedy insert in his speech language stating that the United States and the United Kingdom would present proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty to the Geneva Conference. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) See the Supplement.
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.