Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

254. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 1, 1963, 1 p.m.

2129. Ref: CAS Washington [document number not declassified].²

1. Following comments keyed to units named in ref:

2. President Guard: Concur. Guard has estimated strength of 18 M-24 tanks, four M-114 and four M-113 armored personnel carriers. Guard lacks combat experience of such units as Airborne and Marines.

3. Airborne brigade: Commanders of 3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th Btns all reportedly close to Major Ho Tieu, Airborne DCO and COs, whom we believe most likely prospect to organize airborne support for coup. However, CO of 3rd is weak and not likely to participate. The 1st Btn is reported as part of coup force organized by Tran Kim Tuyen. The 1st and 7th Btn CO’s have been critical of regime to their advisors. Contrary to report of Tuyen’s coup group, we consider 6th Btn CO most loyal to the regime. CAS has report he may be relieved shortly for incompetence. In Airborne, as in Marine Brigade, Btns constantly being shifted for tactical reasons. On 31st October 1st Btn in new Hau Nghia Province; 3rd Btn on alert at Tan Son Nhut; 5th and 7th Btns in Binh Duong Province; 8th Btn in Kien Hoa Province; and 6th Btn going into training at Vung Tau.

4. Marine Brigade: 2nd and 3rd Btns in Saigon area; First and Fourth Btns on operation in Binh Duong Province. Brigade CO Le Nguyen Khang reportedly disaffected since beginning Buddhist crisis and CAS information indicates Khang waiting on coup but willing to sit it out. Capt Ma Viet Bang, CO 3rd Btn, reported disaffected and coup-minded, along with Tran Van Nhut, CO 1st Btn.

5. Armor: In addition to Presidential Guard Armor, other Armor units in Saigon include the 2nd Plt, 1st Co, 2nd Squadron (five M-24 tanks) at Tan Son Nhut; 3rd Plt, 1st Co, 2nd Sqrd (five M-24 tanks) at JGS; two M-113’s, two M-24’s; and six M-8’s at 1st Sqdr HQS, Go yap; the 5th Mech Rifle Co, 1st Sqdr, in Saigon area; two pits of 1st Tank Co, 1st Sqdr (about 10 tanks) in Saigon area; one pit, 1st Tank Co, 1st Sqdr (about five tanks) at Bien Hoar and 4th Co, 4th Sqdr (15 M-113) at Go yap. CAS reports indicate that Fifth Co, 1st Armor Sqdr, most likely to join a coup having promised support to Tuyen coup group, working with Major Nguyen Van Tu, CO, 8th Rgt, Binh Duong Prov. First Tank Co, 1st Sqdr, has figured in coup reporting without indicating if company CO involved. An armor company from 2nd Armor Sqdr has been reported as involved in coup. This unit was reportedly brought to Saigon area at the arrangement of Gen Tran Thien Khiem, ostensibly for counter-coup activity. Two CAS sources report that Armor School Commander promises between 40 and 50 vehicles including tanks and armored personnel carriers. The school is located at Long Hai and has total of 35 armored vehicles of which four are currently dead-lined and eight are in poor condition. If additional truck transport available to the school were included, the number of vehicles could fall into the reported range. One senior Armor staff officers has stated he will lead elements of 1st Sqdr Armor and a portion of the Presidential Guard Armor in a coup.

6. Special Forces: Some Special Forces officers have indicated feeling of dissidence with the regime, but we concur that they must be carried as a loyal element in terms of organized force. Four companies of Special Forces are not in the Saigon area at present.

7. We concur that the uniformed police constitute a negligible factor. The Combat Police, while trained in riot control have not been called upon to stand up under fire. The coup forces claim they can split the Combat Police.

8. Fifth Division: The regimental commanders have long been claimed dissident by coup organizers including Tuyen, and the division CO, Col Nguyen Van Thieu, has recently been reported by CAS sources as joining the coup. He has been frequently reported as friendly with some of the participant Generals. The Seventh Regiment is the least committed in fighting at present. The CO 8th Regiment (Maj Tu) has been named by a number of CAS sources as participant in coup plotting, and he is supported by his btn commanders. Although the current situation is unknown, 8th Rgt was to provide one to two btns to come to the relief of the regime in the event of a coup, but these btns planned to switch sides upon arrival at Saigon. Lack of transport may make it difficult for more than one btn of any rat to be moved at a time.

9. Seventh Division: Col Dam is reported dissident but we regard him as weak and not likely to commit himself. His deputy, Lt Col Nguyen Van Tu, appears to be the stronger personality and has been reported as a part of coup plotting by several sources. Tuyen claimed Tu was to lead counter-coup forces from the division to Saigon following the eruption of his coup, and join the coup. Seventh has only three mobile battalions.

10. Air Force: Dissidence is very widespread and in spite of Col Hien’s loyalty, we believe the coup group can gain control by eliminating Hien and having Lt Col Nguyen Cao Ky, backed by Lt Col Do Khac Mai, assume control. We are reluctant to relegate the Air Force as a strictly secondary force. They could prove a decisive factor if turned loose against Gia Long Palace, and would also be of assistance as an interdiction force against loyal elements moving on Saigon.

11. Miscellaneous units: We agree that these are generally insignificant with a few exceptions. The 3rd Bt, 46th Rgt, as [has?] the defense of Bien Hoa Air Base where the nearest fighter squadron is located and one report claims it is involved in the coup. In addition, counter-coup forces are reportedly to be brought in from Quang Trung and Thu Duc Training Centers. Tuyen claimed he had subverted these forces as well.

12. The units in the field can be expected to have sufficient ammunition for the coup. Although ARVN gasoline allotments recently decreased, reserves are adequate for any coup-related troop movements. Transportation also can be assumed available for field units.

13. It should be pointed out that we have not been given the coup plans nor a rundown on coup forces. General Don states he has nothing to do with the military preparations in the organization of a compartmented coup program. What information Don gave Conein was in response to specific attempts at elicitation by Conein and Don’s replies were vague, Don claiming he was passing on only some of the details he had overheard. Thus, we are unable to adequately assess the viability of the coup group. The basic questions are whether the Generals have the courage and competence to mount a coup successfully. They are basically cautious and it appears unlikely they would move without expecting success.

14. MACV comment:

a. The unit strengths and dispositions contained in this message have been furnished by the MACV staff. It is to be noted that all but three battalions of each of the 5th and 7th Divisions are committed to operational missions, which cannot be foregone without creating a serious security problem for the population.

b. MACV has inadequate information on which to base an evaluation of the motivations attributed by CAS to the military personnel cited in this message.

c. MACV has no info from advisory personnel which could be interpreted as clear evidence of an impending coup.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET. Top Secret; Immediate. Sent eyes only for Rusk, Harriman, Ball, Hilsman, and Hughes. Received at the Department of State at 3:18 a.m. Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense eyes only for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak, and William Bundy; to the White House eyes only for Bundy; and repeated to CIA eyes only for McCone, Carter, and Helms and to Honolulu and Hong Kong eyes only for Felt.
2. Document 237.