II. Period of Interlude, September 7-October 22, 1963: Assessment of the Progress of the War, U.S. Efforts To Reform the Diem Government, The McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and Report, U.S. Policy on Coup Plotting in Vietnam
79. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
The Country Team
81. Memorandum From the Counselor for Public Affairs of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)
82. Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak)
December 20, 1963, 3:45 p.m.
84. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) and Senator Frank Church
On the military front, however, there is some cause for optimism. Since there is now virtually no political interference in military operations, regional commanders have, in some areas, shown more aggressiveness and drive than they had in the past. More effective contact has been made with the enemy by the ARVN, and our military people in Saigon feel optimistic for the future.
88. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 9, 1963.
92. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Secretary of State
95. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are completely in accord with the view expressed in your memorandum of December 2, 19632 that South Vietnam is our most critical military area at the moment. In recognition of this priority, they have undertaken to see to it that General Harkins receives the best officers available in each of the areas of military activity represented in his command.
96. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak)
A. Establish a zone extending up to 50 kilometers into Laos from the border in which operations could be run without individual clearance.
Paragraph 6. AID has assured the GVN that, subject to Congressional appropriations, the United States will maintain the level of aid provided in FY'63 to the Diem government. Through the newly established Joint Committee on Economic Policy negotiations with the GVN have begun on desirable changes in GVN economic policies, and is using the leverage of commercial import financing to bring about these changes. [sic] Specifically, AID has proposed to the GVN a program of tax reform and enforcement, the draw-down of GVN exchange reserves up to $25 million a year, elimination of luxury imports, and measures to increase exports.