Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 1, 1963, 3 p.m.

842. Department pass ACSI and DIA. As reported through separate charnels,² coup d’etat commenced at about 1345.³ Salient developments as of 1500 are as follows:

1. General Don has confirmed in two separate messages to us that coup underway.

2. Telecommunications center of Ministry of Interior taken by coup forces, believed to be Marines.

3. Little firing in streets.

4. Col. Tung Commander Vietnamese Special Forces reported captured and persuaded issue cease fire order to Special Forces.

5. Presidential Guard fully deployed around Palace but no firing this area.

6. Minister Thuan, Minister of Economy Thanh, Minister of Finance Luong are all at Italian Ambassador’s apartment.

7. 103 truckloads of troops reported entering Saigon over bridge from Bien Hoa.

8. Col Tung, Police Commissioner, Chief Air Force, Air Force Commander, Civil Guard Comdr, all captives at Joint General Staff Headquarters. Navy Commander reported killed in premature action by Navy this morning.

9. Coup Generals have attempted get through to Palace to issue ultimatum to Diem guaranteeing safe conduct out of country for Diem and Nhu if they capitulate within one hour. Unable get through. General Don says he will issue proclamation concerning coup by radio within the hour.

10. Condition Gray declared and Americans alerted over radio AFRS to stay indoors.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIEI Confidential; Flash. Repeated Flash to CINCPAC. Received at 2:15 a.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency at 3:20 a.m.
2. CIA Critic 1, November 1, received at the Department of State at 2:15 a.m. (Ibid.)
3. According to interviews with Lucien Conein and others October 11 and April 14, 1984, respectively, Nhu attempted a last ditch ploy to save his brother’s government. As the American of ficals remember it, Nhu was generally aware of coup plotting at the end of October, “that the elephants were crashing about in the jungle and some were getting pretty close to him.” Nhu concluded that the only way to turn the situation around was to show the United States that he and his brother were the “only saviors of Vietnam.” Nhu arranged with General Dinh, military commander of the Saigon military district, to stage a fake Viet Cong uprising in Saigon. Included in the plan was the assassination of key U.S. officials. Nhu then planned to send “loyal” troops from Dinh’s contingent to put down the revolt, restore order, and save Vietnam. But Dinh had been won over to the coup plotters’ side and he told his rebel colleagues of Nhu’s plans. As Conein described it, the Generals’ “double bumped” Nhu. When the actual coup began, Nhu was under the impression that it was the staged uprising he had planned with Dinh. (Ibid., Office of the Historian, Vietnam Interviews)