89. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN CURRENT VIET-NAM SITUATION

I. Background

U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam since the 1954 partition of the country by the Geneva Agreements has been directed toward the securing and maintenance of a strong, viable and free South Viet-Nam capable of resisting Communist aggression with U.S. assistance and support.

II. Broad U.S. Objective in Current Situation

The U.S. policy objective should continue to be the maintenance of a viable, strong and free area in South Viet-Nam capable of maintaining its independence, successfully resisting Communist aggression, and susceptible to U.S. influence.

Prerequisite: To achieve this objective South Viet-Nam must have a regime and government capable of drawing sufficient popular support in the broad mass of the population and that degree of support in the Vietnamese elites required for the effective and dynamic communication of leadership to the masses of the population. Vietnamese leadership must be basically responsive to the burden of aspirations of the people as a whole.

III. Specific U.S. Objectives in Current Situation

A. Personnel Changes in GVN Leadership Under Diem .

1.
Exile of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Mme Nhu .
(a)
Ngo Dinh Nhu should be removed from all government positions and should leave Viet-Nam for permanent or quasi-permanent exile. He should be accompanied in exile by Mme Nhu.
(b)
This in itself would be principal signal expected by Vietnamese leadership and population as a whole that the U.S. has been able to force the situation, and that the character and nature of the GVN has changed in the direction they desire.
2.
Appointment of Vice President Tho or Minister Thuan as Acting Prime Minister until new Elections are Held.
(a)
Diem should agree to “reign more and do less” and to appoint preferably Vice President Tho, or alternatively Secretary of State Thuan as Acting Prime Minister.
(b)
This would further convey to the Vietnamese that a real change is taking place in the character of the regime.
3.
Introduction of New Personalities in the Vietnamese Cabinet.
(a)
General Duong Van Minh, Acting Chief of the General Staff, should be named as Chief of the Joint General Staff with cabinet rank.
(b)
General Nguyen Khanh should be named Secretary of State for National Defense.
(c)
General Le Van Kim should be named Secretary of State to the Presidency in place of Thuan, who could be designated Vice Prime Minister if Tho is named Acting Prime Minister.
4.

[(d)] Tran Quoc Buu, head of the Vietnamese Labor Confederation, should be named to a cabinet post.

Similarly, Dr. Pham Huy Quat, and Vu Quoc Thuc should be given ministerial positions.

5.
[4.] These are not impossible demands since none of the civilians mentioned are open opponents of the Diem regime and the generals have thus far at least ostensibly loyally supported the President.

These changes would further convey the changing character of the now thoroughly discredited Diem government.

B. Policy Changes Under Diem .

1.

There should be a clearly announced policy statement made to the National Assembly convoked in extraordinary session reversing current GVN repressive policies.

Specifically: (a) All those arrested as a result of recent events should be released without penalty, and thoroughly amnestied.

(b) Martial law should be revoked and press censorship removed.

(c) A joint statement of reconciliation should be negotiated by Tho as Acting Prime Minister between Diem and a reconstituted committee of the real bonzes. These do not need to include Tri Quang but should include at least Thich Thien Khiet, Mai Tho Truyen and Thich Thien Minh.

The joint statement should include provision for reconstitution for all damage and indemnification of all victims as can be agreed.

(d) Decree Law No. 10 should be repealed immediately by executive action subject to confirmation by vote of the National Assembly at its extraordinary session.

(e) Diem should make a unilateral statement of explanation for the policies of the GVN since May 8 to the extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

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(f) The same statement should schedule new elections to be held at a defined date and should give his guarantee that such elections will be held in full and complete freedom.

(g) The entire statement to the National Assembly, and proposals made therein should be subject to vote of confidence by the Assembly or covered by Assembly resolution expressing such confidence.

2.

Prosecution of the War.

Subject to the above we should tell Diem that we are ready to prosecute our program to annihilate the Viet Cong menace with renewed vigor and that we expect full cooperation from him in this endeavor.

We should undertake in agreement with him to assist in the quiet removal from Viet-Nam of certain persons, both official and private, presently in Viet-Nam and who may have become anathema to him or to ourselves.

3.

U.S. Influence in Conduct of the War.

We should reach at least oral agreement with Diem that the role of U.S. civilian and military advisors will remain unimpaired as heretofore and that we will be able to continue to station personnel for advisory purposes at the provincial and district level and in combat units to the extent required. In exchange we should be ready to inform Diem that we would place General Lansdale at his disposal, if requested, to assist in providing him political advice during the difficult period after the departure of his brother.

C. Specific U.S. Objectives in Case Diem Refuses to Accede Substantially to A. and B.

1.
Minimum Objective Under Ngo Dinh Diem .
(a)

Removal of Ngo Dinh Nhu .

At a very minimum our objective should be the removal of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Madame Nhu from all government positions.

(b)

Introduction of New Personalities in GVN .

At a very minimum our objective should be the introduction of new personalities without the appointment of Tho or Thuan as Prime Minister.

(c)

Change of Policies.

The objectives stated above form a minimum in terms of policy changes for the GVN to restore its image and public support under present leadership.

2.

Removal of Ngo Dinh Diem .

If Diem refuses to agree substantially to courses of action calculated to produce the above objectives we should be prepared outright to tell him that we believe his usefulness as chief of state in Viet-Nam has come to a close and that we will no longer support or assist him or his government.

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We should suggest that Diem abandon rule without struggle or violence and give way to Vice President Tho in the capacity of Acting President until new presidential elections can be held in Viet-Nam.

3.

Accession of New Leadership Under Vice President Tho .

Whether or not Diem agrees to A. we should be prepared to support alternative leadership under Vice President Tho (see separate paper).2

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries, Vietnam, Undated. There is no drafting information on the source text, but this is apparently the first paper Bundy asked Hilsman to prepare; see Document 85.
  2. Not found.