80. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1

IN 16397. 1. Herewith brief personal comments on recent developments [2 lines not declassified].

[Page 147]

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

2. Buddhist crisis. Believe GVN obviously had no conception of results which would flow from GVN restrictions prior 8 May. After 8 May, GVN underestimated seriousness of situation and moved grudgingly and too slowly. It now seems clear that Thich Tri Quang and a few leaders around him had far-reaching political objectives from outset, probably preceding 8 May. [1 sentence (2 lines) not declassified] At some intermediate period developments since 8 May, Tri Quang’s domination of Intersect Committee in support of governmental overthrow became clear to GVN and foreign observers. GVN concluded that its policy of conciliation was failing and was being taken advantage of by Buddhist leadership to stimulate disorder, organize greater anti-GVN effort, and to arouse hostile domestic and international opinion, especially American public opinion. We must assume that GVN concluded its own survival was coming into serious question. It would almost necessarily identify GVN survival with victory in war against VC and with survival of nation. Against this background, violation of GVN assurances to U.S. representatives with respect to its conciliation policy toward Buddhists was probably almost predictable. Diem, of course, [garble] GVN engaged in necessary “surgical operation” which, in his view, did not equate with longer range departure from conciliation policy. Assume he will make effort to restore GVN international and domestic image with respect to Buddhists.

3. [less than 1 line not declassified] senior Vietnamese military leadership had in fact become seriously disturbed and had taken initiative of urging martial law on Diem to include removing bonzes from Xa Loi and other central pagodas back to home pagodas. From General Don’s own comment that Diem asked this be done without hurting bonzes, we can assume that most parties to this affair, including military, realized that certain GVN effectives would have to enter pagodas to accomplish action of removing bonzes. Major Tran Cuu Thien, Chief of Staff, SFHCVN, informed Colonel Morton on 9 Sept that SFHCVN briefed General Don on Vietnamese Special Forces planning for operation against pagodas prior to operation (our estimate Tran Thien is anti-Tung). General Do Cao Tr, i had been pursuing hard line course in I Corps area well prior to 21 August. General Nguyen Khanh and other officers had expressed disturbance at potential effect of Buddhist affair on military morale. We have little hard data on direct interaction between Nhu and general officers on specifics of action taken against pagodas. Conclusion is that general officers were themselves also involved in responsibility for 21 August.

4. Developments resulting from Mission effort to implement Deptel received here 25 Aug2 exploded often-held assumption that [Page 148] certain general officers and other dissidents would move quickly if given green light and adequate assurances by appropriate U.S. officials. Looking back, [less than 1 line not declassified] general officers had done some thinking about assuming governmental power but were not unified, determined, or emotionally geared up to coup d’etat action. Do not believe general officers felt that strongly against Diem or that enough of them had deeply rooted animus against Nhu. They were simply not ready for action and would not embark on operation of this kind without major prospects of success. Assume also that they did not want to engage in all out fight in streets of capital city. At no time did they seem able to shift balance of forces sufficiently in their favor, even if one were to assume that they, in fact, made determined effort to do so. Yesterday, or day before, General Dinh is reported to have left for Dalat on short several-day vacation leaving his command with Chief of Staff Colonel Co who is responsive to General Khiem and Presidency. Despite absence of Dinh, general officers’ most formidable antagonist in terms of forces he commands and his loyalty to Diem and Nhu, we would not expect general officers to act on this apparently favorable opportunity. Am inclined to feel general officers will seek evolutionary accommodation with Diem (if he permits them to do so) unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there is breakdown of civil order or governmental machinery, or unless war effort begins to go backward seriously. This is not to say that other elements in military establishment might not attempt coup at some time in future.

5. Events since 21 Aug have caused concern and dissatisfaction within government and urban classes, and has increased dissidence among elements of military establishment. These effects may prove lasting among certain classes of population but it is extremely difficult to gauge intensity or pervasiveness of such effects. [1 sentence (2 lines) not declassified] Our impression is that there are few points of no return in Asia and that there seems be large amount of stretch in Asian societies. Despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 Aug, and despite difficulties and handicaps under which USG and GVN operating here, am inclined to believe we should be able resume successful prosecution of law [war?] in military and civil sectors. Although these liabilities and handicaps have probably increased and may increase further, these factors need not necessarily cancel out tentative conclusion suggested.

6. Aside from speculating on future, we should find next four to six months, perhaps even earlier, pointing way in practice as to what the prospects are. If situation goes forward reasonably well, so much the better. If it clearly deteriorate to [sic] both Vietnamese and we may find ourselves in better position to take corrective action.

[Numbered paragraph 7 (10-1/2 lines) not declassified]

  1. Source: Department of State, Har-Van Files, South Vietnam Policy File, August 31 through September 15, 1963. Secret. There is no time of transmission on the source text.
  2. Telegram 243 to Saigon, vol. III, p. 628.