Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

83. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 12, 1958, 2–2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Resupply of Quemoy: Military and Diplomatic Aspects of Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Mr. Robertson—FE
• Mr. Reinhardt—C
• Mr. Smith—S/P
• Mr. Cumming—INR
• Mr. Green—FE
• Secretary McElroy
• General Twining
• Mr. Sprague
• Admiral Dennison
• Commander Massey

Admiral Dennison described the difficulties and frustrations of the latest convoy to Quemoy. Only one of the three LSM’s actually beached, and during its 41 minutes on the beach only 25 tons were unloaded.

General Twining referred to a message the JCS had just received from CINCPAC¹ in which the latter proposed that, if the GRC is incapable of supplying Quemoy, the following alternative courses of action would represent the next step:

1. Authorize the Chinese Air Force to attack Chicom artillery positions.

2. Provide U.S. escort into territorial waters for protection while GRC ships are unloading.

General Twining added that the JCS had replied to CINCPAC that, before any such action is considered, the GRC should demonstrate improved skill and determination in getting supplies ashore.² According to General Twining, the GRC defenders of Quemoy have only 30 days’ supplies left, and even fewer days supplies of ammo if the GRC engages in effective counterbattery. Mr. Cumming added that the GRC defenders have only 9–10 days of ammo if it is heavily expended.

Secretary Dulles asked how helpful GRC counterbattery would be in assisting resupply.

General Twining said it would help in keeping the Chicoms “heads down,” but it wouldn’t be too effective. General Twining suggested that the GRC seems to be trying to get the U.S. involved. That seems to be their main motive.

Mr. McElroy remarked that if the Chiefs are correct about this GRC motive, we must find ways to get the GRC to act; certainly this is not the time to have the U.S. directly involved in beach delivery. We would be bound to suffer casualties and that would have serious repercussions here.

Secretary Dulles questioned whether the GRC was engaging in what he thought would be a “pretty complicated plot” to get the U.S. involved. He considered it more likely that the GRC needed experience and training in resupply operations under fire to beaches where tidal and other considerations were unknown and difficult.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that Warsaw talks would probably start Monday. He did not know what the Chicoms’ tactics would be at Warsaw but it was a fair guess that they would insist on our recognition of the 12 mile limit (including the Offshores) and that we pull all our forces out of Taiwan. We would reject these demands. The talks might then break off or we might then get down to realities, although past experience inspires little hope that we will get beyond the old Communist jargon and stonewalling.

The issue is likely to come up in the UN, Secretary Dulles continued, and there may be calls there for cease-fire. The Chinese Reds will probably challenge UN capability to handle this issue in order to dramatize why they should be admitted to the UN. Secretary Dulles thought the Chicoms might prolong the interdiction of Quemoy, avoiding direct assault, with a view to gaining political advantages in the UN. The question arises as to how long we can tolerate this situation dragging out. If the GRC can handle resupply effectively, then there is more time for manoeuvre. Otherwise it will be only two or three weeks before we face a real crisis.

Mr. Robertson asked Admiral Dennison if we had received any estimate of GRC performance from our own men on the scene.

Admiral Dennison said that he had read Admiral Smoot’s reports but he was not sure to what extent it was based on U.S. observation at close hand.

Mr. McElroy read aloud the report of the last convoy operation which showed that after the first attempt to land failed, two of the LCM’s didn’t wait for further attempts but turned about and went back to Makung.

Secretary Dulles remarked that Mr. Cumming had shown him maps showing the range of Chicom shore batteries. The latter could not reach out to more then 2 or 3 miles offshore from central Quemoy. He therefore could not understand why the LCM’s didn’t lie just outside this range and suddenly run in at the most propitious time.

Admiral Dennison agreed. He said such action could be covered by darkness or smokescreen.

Mr. Sprague cautioned that the Chicoms seemed to have the convoy operation penetrated and/or closely observed.

Commander Massey, at Secretary Dulles’ request, then provided a summary briefing using detail maps and charts of the artillery situation and of the beach delivery problem. He pointed out that there are some 227 Chicom batteries with about four gun barrels apiece, about half of them manned. Thus 500 guns of what appear to be 76 mm, 120 mm, 155 mm calibres can be fired simultaneously on the Quemoy complex. He pointed out that the batteries on Ta Teng Tao (an island connected by a causeway to the mainland) posed a particular threat since they alone controlled certain landing beaches of central Quemoy. Commander Massey also described resupply difficulties occasioned by extreme tidal action, rough water, surf, currents, etc.

Mr. McElroy wondered if it would be possible to get Ambassador Drumright to assist in stimulating the GRC to do the resupply job.

Mr. Sprague thought that there should be some way of getting across that the U.S. is not going to do the resupply job.

Mr. Robertson said that, if Admiral Smoot confirms that it is in fact true that the GRC is dragging its feet, then the Ambassador and Admiral Smoot should go directly to the Generalissimo with this problem.

Secretary Dulles agreed that we must be on sure grounds before so approaching the Gimo. We must not act just on surmise. For it would appear that first hand information from U.S. sources is lacking on GRC resupply performance. We must also bear in mind that such factors as tidal action and resupply under heavy gunfire are difficult to overcome. GRC inadequacy seems more due to blundering than to any willfulness. According to Secretary Dulles, it was inconceivable that the people on Quemoy would be party to a deliberate plan for sabotaging unloading operations.

General Twining interjected that it was the man in the boat, not on shore, who controlled unloading operations. The LCM which beached during the last convoy could have unloaded one-half its cargo during the 40 minutes ashore.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that since these amphibious craft apparently do not run up on the beach, they remain all during the unloading exposed to tides and surf. He could imagine from his experience with ships what problems this could cause.

Secretary Dulles continued that we must get the GRC to conduct this resupply operation at maximum capacity. Under current conditions the Chicoms will in all probability continue to harass and prolong their interdiction of Quemoy; they probably will not assault the islands or take new military initiatives while the Warsaw talks and UN session are going on. For the same reason we do not want to take new military initiatives during this period. The vital objective is to sustain at least the status quo. While it is disadvantageous for either side politically to change the present military pattern, it is more serious for us to do so because the Chicoms are already in defiance of the UN.

There was brief discussion of aerial resupply. General Twining pointed out that it offered only limited possibilities and risked enemy aerial counteraction.

Mr. McElroy proposed putting U.S. observers on the LCM’s in order to check on GRC performance, to find out precisely what was wrong, and to recommend improvements. He agreed with Secretary Dulles’ suggestion that U.S. observation teams on the beach were also desirable.

Admiral Dennison outlined a number of measures that could be taken to improve quick off-loading (amphibious craft on LCM’s, small packaging, floating packages ashore or hauling them up on the beach with tractors).

It was concluded that the JCS would immediately instruct COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US) in conformity with the above two paragraphs and in terms of the general sense of the meeting.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258. Top Secret. Drafted by Green. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.
1. CINCPAC telegram 111245Z to JCS, September 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39)
2. JCS telegram 947931 to CINCPAC, September 12. (Ibid.)