Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

82. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 12, 1958, 11:01 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir HAROLD CACCIA, Ambassador, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs

The Secretary stated that he was working on a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan’s message of September 5, which would also be in the nature of a reply to Foreign Minister Lloyd’s message of the 10th. He wished to consult the President regarding it, but hoped to be able to get it to Sir Harold later in the day.

The Secretary said that the situation caused by the continuing Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy was certainly a disturbing one, but he did not think that the Communists intended to press the attack to the point of full-scale war. The worst feature of the situation at the present time was their success in preventing Nationalist resupply of the islands. In reply to a query from Sir Harold he said that, of course, there was a danger of Nationalist supplies running out if the Communists’ interdiction operation were not overcome. The Nationalist garrison had supplies sufficient to last at least a month, but it must be expected that morale would tend to decline if the supplies continued to dwindle and there were no prospect of relief.

The Secretary commented that the Communists were being rather leisurely about resuming the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. According to a Peiping broadcast of the 10th, the Chinese Communist representative was returning to Warsaw after five days’ consultation but we did not know whether he had actually reached Warsaw yet. It seemed that the Communists were not in any great hurry; probably this was a war of nerves tactic. The Secretary continued that, as he would be saying in his message to Macmillan, we were not very hopeful that anything constructive would come out of the talks. The Communists would probably lead off by presenting some strong and obviously unacceptable demands, such as calls for us to cease interfering in their attempt to take over the islands and to recognize their proclaimed twelve-mile territorial waters. However, there were some things that might be done. As the President had said the night before, steps might be taken so that the islands would not be a “thorn in the side of peace.” The Secretary stated that he had directed an investigation to be made to determine the nature and extent of activities conducted by the GRC from the islands against the mainland. The preliminary report that he had received indicated that the Nationalists had not maintained an effective blockade of Amoy and Foochow nor interfered with Chinese Communist fishing vessels in the area; that small-scale commando-type raids and infiltration of agents on to the mainland had been carried out, but with limited effectiveness; and that there had been loud-speaker propaganda Beamed from the islands at the adjacent mainland, although he was inclined to think that this was as much for the purpose of drowning out Communist propaganda as anything. None of these activities were very serious, but they could be regarded as needlessly provocative.

The Secretary continued that if anything approximating a cease-fire were to develop in the area it might be possible to make a new attempt to bring about the withdrawal of GRC forces from the islands. We had, of course, tried and tried in the past to persuade President Chiang to take such a step but he was virtually fanatic in opposing such a step. Chiang’s inflexibility and stubborness were, he commented, actually useful in some instances. He mentioned Chiang’s rejection in 1938 of Japanese overtures promising to support him as head of a Chinese Government if he would abandon the struggle against Japan. He had, of course, spurned this and similar later inducements from the Japanese and remained firmly on the allied side throughout the war. More recently we had attempted to persuade him not to take an uncompromising position on two occasions, the question of Outer Mongolian admission to the United Nations and the controversy with Japan last spring over the issue of whether or not a prospective Chinese Communist trade mission in Japan should be allowed to fly the Peiping flag. In both instances he had refused to budge and had proved successful in his stand.

Sir Harold referred to the statement in the President’s speech to the effect that the United States would not be a party in the ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists to any arrangement which would prejudice the rights of the GRC. He asked if in making this statement we were thinking in legal terms or rather in general moral ones. The Secretary pointed out that this language was identical to that used by us in 1955 and also to the White House statement of Sept. 6. It had no very precise meaning, merely being intended to make it clear that we would not in the absence of GRC representation at the talks barter away their rights. He noted that with the arrival of the new Chinese Ambassador,¹ a man with long and detailed knowledge of international problems, our diplomatic contacts and consultation with the GRC on the whole matter should be greatly facilitated.

In the Secretary’s view the situation might well develop to a stage where some third party intervention, in the United Nations or otherwise, would be useful. He emphasized that the Chinese Communists were evidently in a very cocky mood and would almost surely present very tough demands. It was important to bear in mind, he thought, that the free world defense line in the Far East was an extremely thin and brittle one. He mentioned the lack of cooperation between various of the free countries of the area such as Japan and Korea and the Philippines and Japan. In the face of massive Communist expansionist pressures it was a hard and delicate task to keep the defense line firm. If there were any breach in it, the whole line might fall apart. He realized that the situation we found ourselves in over the offshore islands was a difficult one to support; the question was how to extricate ourselves from it without pulling the whole house down. Looking at the problem in a broader perspective, the Soviets were assiduously seeking to create the impression that they were militarily dominant and that their threats to intervene militarily had caused the Western powers to back down at Suez, in the Turkish–Syrian episode last year, and most recently in the Lebanon–Iraq crisis. If by our actions we were to give the world the impression that we were afraid of the Communists and were falling back in the face of their threats, the whole free world defense structure in the Far East could collapse. In this connection/the Secretary told Sir Harold, we had received private messages from top officials in various Far East countries urging that we not give in to the Communist show of force. Indeed, he emphasized, we could not do so without suffering a rather disastrous loss of face in the area and the world at large. However, if a formula could be worked out by the United Nations or otherwise which would provide a reasonable quid pro quo, we would probably be able to accept it.

Sir Harold commented that Foreign Minister Lloyd had sought in his letter to determine what we would regard as a reasonable quid pro quo. The Secretary responded that Chinese Communists might, for example, assume the same attitude toward the islands as the Indians did with respect to Goa—namely, that they regarded the islands as Chinese Communist territory but that they would not use force to take them. If they were willing to adopt such an attitude, it would probably be possible to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement. It would lay the basis for some form of demilitarization and a cessation of provocative activities on both sides. We could not, of course, guarantee that we would be able to put such a solution across without causing a near disaster on Taiwan. In the latter respect we had been informed that the GRC reaction to his press conference of September 9 had been one of panic and despair.

The Secretary confirmed Sir Harold’s understanding that we had never been happy about the extent to which the GRC had committed itself to retention of the islands. The President, he observed, had always Felt that it was absurd to place an important portion of the GRC forces in a militarily indefensible position as virtual hostages. Our own recommendation conveyed to President Chiang by several high level missions had been that the islands should be held only lightly. We would recognize that in the event of a Communist attack they would not be successfully defended, but the onus would be on the Communists as the aggressor. The Secretary commented that in the light of the military action of the past few weeks the Nationalists probably now realized exactly how vulnerable their position on the islands actually was.

Sir Harold said that there were a number of things he would like to say that he would prefer not to have made a matter of official record. The remainder of the meeting was between the Secretary and Sir Harold alone.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. George K.C. Yeh.
2. According to Dulles’ appointment book, Lutkins left at 11:30 a.m. Caccia left with Dulles an assessment of the Taiwan Strait situation by the British Chargé in Peking; Dulles sent an extract to the President with a September 12 covering note. It stressed the dangers of the situation and observed, “I do not think that the Chinese Government can by now back down altogether from their present position; they must have at least a diplomatic victory to show their people.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258; see Supplement)