84. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Macmillan0
Dear Harold: Your letter of September 51 was very helpful, with its analysis of the problem. It does not differ greatly from our own. There is general desire for non-involvement coupled with general condemnation of the Communist use of force. The President wrote you, last Saturday,2 a brief comment on one aspect of the matter; and as he indicated, I shall supplement that.
The President has made his talk of last night, the text of which you have surely seen, that, I think, makes our position clear, although it does of itself not assure a peaceful solution. That depends on others.
[Page 176]The essence of the matter is that we have not seen how to accomplish any unilateral fallback in the area without consequences which would be extremely serious from the standpoint of the entire Western Pacific position. This is thin and brittle. It has not much capacity to absorb any “breakthrough” at any point.
It is easy for those who merely look at a map to come to conclusions about Quemoy and Matsu. But the Far East line is held, not by geography, but by human wills; and the problem is primarily one of the psychology of the area and the impact of what would look like a retreat before the new, tough and arrogant probing of the Communists. If the United States seems afraid, and loses “face” in any way, the consequences will be far-reaching, extending from Vietnam in the south, to Japan and Korea in the north.
This does not mean that we enjoy or are satisfied with the position we are in. As in the case of Lebanon and Jordan, it seems to be the lesser of two evils. The problem you raise is how to extricate ourselves from the position under conditions which will neither involve a war nor involve a retreat or surrender which would jeopardize much more than the offshore islands.
We believe, indeed have long believed, that the military position would be stronger if the Nationalists would re-form their positions, and not gamble so much on the offshore islands. But our efforts in this direction have never succeeded because of the moral significance Chiang attaches to holding some part of China other than Taiwan.
The President used one phrase in his speech last night to which we attach considerable significance, namely, that “there are measures that can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace”. Under such a formula a good deal, I suppose, could be done in practical ways to assure that these islands will not be used in any provocative way by the Chinese Nationalists and to alter the character of their presence there. We have been going over the situation in that respect. There has not been much provocation, but there has been some. Also it could be said that the presence there of such large numbers of Nationalist forces is itself a kind of “provocation”.
Of course, any steps along these lines will be bitterly resisted by the Nationalists. But I believe that there are measures that could be taken in connection with a cease-fire which, while not palatable to the Nationalists, could be made acceptable.
The Chinese Communists seem to be quite leisurely about resuming the Ambassadorial talks. Wang, I believe, has been in Peiping. Perhaps the delay is part of the war of nerves.
If and when these talks get started, I hope we can quickly get to talking in practical terms rather than in broad generalities as has been the case heretofore. I am, however, skeptical that any positive results will [Page 177] come out of the Ambassadorial talks. I imagine that the Chinese Communist initial demands will be exaggerated and probably will include demands that we withdraw from the Taiwan area and accept their twelve-mile territorial water limit.
I would think that if the bilateral talks collapse, at that point there would be room for intervention by the United Nations. The President indicated this in his talk of last night.
With regard to the last paragraph of your letter, we have given further thought to the suggestion made by Lord Hood to Mr. Herter3 that your Ambassador at Moscow approach the Soviets in a manner calculated to have them urge restraint on the Chinese Communists, making it clear that this was a British initiative. The time is propitious, I believe, for such a move, if it can be made without implying weakness on our part. I leave it to your good judgment as to how and when this should be done and would ask that you let us know if you are going to move.
In the reply the President is sending to Khrushchev’s letter to him of September 7, he is suggesting that the Soviets urge on the Chinese Communist leaders that they discontinue their military operations and turn to a policy of peaceful settlement.
The President and I appreciate your and Selwyn’s helpful attitude, and the press guidance that you gave today following the President’s speech.
I look forward to seeing Selwyn in New York on Tuesday.
Faithfully yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles and cleared with FE. Dulles gave the letter to Caccia at 5:35 p.m.↩
- Document 70.↩
- September 6; see Document 72.↩
- On August 30; see Document 54.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩