6. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- Secretary Dulles
- Ambassador Drumright
- Walter Robertson
- Frederick Reinhardt
- Admiral Felix Stump
- Pres. Chiang Kai-shek
- Madame Chiang
- V. Pres. Chen Cheng
- Prime Minister O.K. Yui
- Foreign Minister George Yeh
- General (Tiger) Wang Shu-ming
- Secy. Gen. to Pres. Chang Chun
- Secy. to Pres. James Shen
SUBJECT
- Exchange of Views
General Situation
The Generalissimo asked what was the U.S. attitude toward Communist China; then changed his question to an inquiry regarding what [Page 9] might be the next move of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Secretary replied that for the present the Communists appeared to be effectively deterred from initiating any military aggression. They were now concentrating their efforts in the economic and subversive fields, towards neutralist countries, particularly those of the Middle East. They were also alert to exploit any trouble between countries of the free world. The threat appeared greatest in the Middle East and Asia and in North Africa if the French did not change their policy.
Indonesia
The Generalissimo said he wished to invite the Secretary’s attention to the Asian question. Developments in Indonesia posed a very serious problem. The dissidents should have all the moral support possible. If Sukarno won it would greatly enhance the position of the Communists in Indonesia and might lead to their control of the country. This would be disastrous given the key geographic position of Indonesia in South East Asia. The Secretary assured the Generalissimo that the U.S. shared his estimate of the situation and would gladly assist in any scheme which would not involve the U.S. but would be a contributing element to a satisfactory outcome. He pointed out that the capacity to help from the outside was limited and that any overt foreign involvement risked evolving a nationalistic reaction which would tend to unify the country.
Korea
The Generalissimo thought that the Chinese Communist proposal to withdraw their troops from Korea merited more attention than it was getting. He believed that it was an element in a larger scheme, an intrigue. He had had intelligence reports that when in Moscow last November Mao had reached an agreement with the Soviet Government for an attack on Taiwan this summer. Although he had discounted these reports initially, Chiang said the Communist troop withdrawal in Korea lent them more credence. He was now inclined to think that there might be some Communist military action somewhere in South East Asia this year. The Secretary observed that an attack on Taiwan would probably cause the South Koreans to move against the North, therefore if the Chinese Communists had an attack in mind they would not be withdrawing troops from Korea. He did, however, agree with Chiang that the situation in North Korea needed watching.
Japan and Ryukyus
Chiang spoke of Communist infiltration in the Ryukyus, particularly Okinawa and the revival of Japanese influence throughout the Islands. The U.S. would have to take steps to ensure the security of its position there. In Japan itself the situation was developing badly and he feared Japan had charted a neutralist course. Chiang thought the situation [Page 10] throughout Asia was not encouraging if one looked closely. It was like a man covered with many sores, anyone of which might suddenly develop into a fatal ailment. He thought it was important to grasp this pivotal point. The United States, he said, had in the past put its emphasis on Japan. Chiang asked where was the emphasis now?
Mr. Robertson responded that U.S. policy in Asia found expression in our defensive arrangements with our friends: SEATO, the Japanese security agreement and the several bilateral defense agreements. These are all designed to deter Communist aggression and avert it wherever it might appear. Our actions in Korea and with respect to Dien Bien Phu were demonstrations of this. If this policy was not clear to our Asian friends, it was certainly clear to us. Chiang observed that this was a statement of policy and it was well understood, but had nothing to do with emphasis.
Communist China
Chiang then observed that Chinese influence came from the mainland and that, therefore, in order to deter any expansion of the Chinese Communist regime, it was important to find ways and means of exploiting instability on the mainland. At present we were on the defensive, building dams, and this was not adequate. We should sponsor those elements of opposition already in being and keep alive their hopes. There were many signs, he said, that the foundations of the Chinese Communist rule on the mainland were shaken. This was particularly noticeable in the anti-rightist movement and the return-to-the-farm movement. The Chinese Communists were encountering many economic and fiscal difficulties which were demonstrated in the failure of the first five-year plan and the launching of the second five-year plan. Now was the time to put pressure on the regime, but we thought any overt action we might take would bring about world war and the Communists would continue to expand. The crux of the problem in Asia was on the mainland and unless we dealt with it, we were not facing the issue squarely.
Chiang went on to say that the continued existence of his regime in Taiwan was a challenge to the Communists and it was necessary to exploit their rapidly deteriorating condition. If we could not strengthen the opposition forces on the mainland, then our political influence would fade away.
Formosa, he said, still served as a rallying point for anti-Communists the world over but the British and French did not recognize its importance to their existence.
Chiang then said that the U.S. and free China should discuss three points:
- 1.
- How to strengthen anti-Communist forces on the mainland;
- 2.
- How to use forces in Taiwan without involving the U.S. and launching a world war;
- 3.
- How to leave Taiwan free to make such use of special guerrilla units (not regular forces) for commando raids and to hold beachheads.
It was necessary, Chiang said, to widen the scope of psychological warfare in order to quicken the fall of the regime on the mainland. There were two types of approach which were wrong, namely, that the solution of the Chinese Communist problem could not be achieved without world war and that the defeat of the Chinese Communist was a function of global strategy. The free world, he observed, had been too timid in taking advantage of its opportunities which could be exploited without bringing about world conflict. The success of the Soviet Union had been its understanding of this free world fear. Chiang said he had received from Mr. Herter about two weeks ago a reply on the subject of the 3,000 Paratroopers. Their training and use was to be subject to the terms of an exchange of notes. The U.S. could of course insist on any conditions it wished but he thought these forces should be used to assist the growth of the anti-Communist movement. To restrict their usefulness would nullify the effect of the aid program. The Communists on the mainland regarded free China as the enemy and for the U.S. to tie their hands and feet created a pathetic situation. Communist propaganda insisted that those on Formosa were under U.S. control and that people on the mainland need not expect any action from them. Finally, Chiang said he hoped it would be possible to get together and discuss these things. His purpose was to preserve the existence of free China and maintain the respect of people on the mainland.
Referring to Chiang’s remarks on the subject of Japan, the Secretary pointed out that it was one of the four industrial areas of the world and that, therefore, great importance was attached to it. He recognized that there was neutral sentiment in Japan. The Government however was not dominated by it. Japan as an island kingdom had a great urge and need to trade. The experience and policies of Great Britain with respect to the blockade in World War I offered an explanation of what might otherwise seem inconsistent motivation in our point of view on this problem.
In reply to Chiang’s assertion that defensive measures were not enough, the Secretary said we did in fact conduct psychological offensives which might or might not account for the recent troubles in Eastern Europe. We also did so in Asia but here it was more difficult. The Secretary said we had not run away from any opportunity through fear, but there was often a difference of opinion regarding the existence of an opportunity. He thought it was in the realm of possibility that an opportunity might come but because of the potential importance of such an opportunity, he did not want to waste or fritter away our assets on questionable situations. The provisions of the agreement Chiang had referred to were not designed to keep free China in a permanent state of paralysis but they did mean that any action should be on the basis of a real opportunity [Page 12] and not an illusory one. The Secretary saw no reason from the political standpoint why there should not be some quiet military planning along the lines suggested, but he would defer to military advice as to the scope it might properly assume. Finally, he begged of the President not to think that his partners were paralyzed by fright. This was simply not so.
Chiang replied that he did not consider the Secretary subject to any fear for he knew he was a staunch anti-Communist and he agreed with what the Secretary had said. He was not suggesting an invasion but simply a coordinated effort in psychological warfare to exploit opposition elements in being but not yet recognized. The Generalissimo hoped something could be done without using regular troops and which would not involve the U.S. position but would hasten the downfall of Communist China.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt and Robertson. Secretary Dulles visited the Republic of China March 14–15 following his attendance at the SEATO Council Meeting in Manila, March 11–13.↩