7. Despatch From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
SUBJECT
- Transmitting Memoranda of Conversations held by President Chiang with Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary
Transmitted are copies of memoranda of 1) the conversation held among President Chiang, Secretary Dulles and certain other persons, on the evening of March 14, 1958;1 and 2) the conversation held among President Chiang, Assistant Secretary Robertson and certain others on March 17, 1958.2 The summary of the conversations with Secretary Dulles was prepared by President Chiang’s secretary. It is my understanding that this transcript was carefully checked by the President and the Foreign Minister before a copy was released to me. No doubt there has been some editing of the conversation, but it is my impression that [Page 13] the enclosed summary is a relatively full and accurate account of the conversation that took place.
One problem arose from the conversations which, in my opinion, requires consideration and a decision from Washington. I refer to President Chiang’s proposal that what we might call irregular or unconventional activities be undertaken on the mainland. It will be observed that, in his conversation with Mr. Robertson, President Chiang went so far as to suggest the formation of a small joint Sino-American committee, whose existence would be kept secret, to consider the general problem of guerrilla and/or other small-scale operations directed against the mainland. It was clear to me, from President Chiang’s remarks to Secretary Dulles and Mr. Robertson, that he is chafing under the strings which he considers the United States has attached to him in connection with the mutual defense treaty and related agreements. His feelings apparently came to a head following receipt of Undersecretary Herter’s letter of February 11, 1958, which suggested that the “special forces” group now under training and perhaps paratroopers and other unconventional units coming within the purview of our support and training would be subject to the inhibiting provisions of our mutual agreement to consult together before applying force to the mainland. It is obvious that the President is becoming more restive as his regular forces complete their training and equipping. He considers inactivity in the face of the enemy to be wrong in principle, and he is also fearful that a “do nothing” attitude will be damaging to his prestige among his own followers here, among the general populace of this island, among the mainland public, which he regards as looking to him for deliverance, and to the anti-Communist world in general. The President senses it to be his destiny, his responsibility, to liberate his shackled people and to rehabilitate his own prestige and reputation before he dies. He said to Secretary Dulles that he is not suggesting an all-out attack or anything of that sort. I believe that he is sincere in that statement. He knows that he could not mount a counterattack without our all-out support, and he knows we would not give that support in an aggressive endeavor to unseat the Chinese Communists. But he believes our present posture (and that includes him) is entirely negative. He believes, and apparently sincerely, that the Chinese people on the mainland are disaffected and ripe for revolt. He wants to exploit this situation, of course. I understand that he has some ideas on how this might be done. As the Department knows, MAAG is now engaged in training 3,000 “special forces”. In addition, the Chinese are using their airborne regiment to train about 10,000 selected Chinese in paratrooper operations. We are not supporting this latter activity. The President is known to want to train a total of 30,000 selected forces in dropping operations. He is known to have a plan for the use of these forces. Apparently, it would envisage the dropping of selected and varied-sized units either in support [Page 14] of uprisings that might take place in certain areas of China or small-sized units might be infiltrated either by sea or air into the mainland where it would be their function to establish contact with the people, seek their support, and proceed to build up bases of resistance. Whether this latter activity is feasible under existing conditions on the mainland is unknown. In any event, so far as is known to the Embassy and related agencies, no guerrilla bases now exist which are supported by the Chinese on Taiwan.
Moreover, it appears that efforts formerly made to penetrate and build up on the mainland were discontinued following the fall of the Ta Chen islands. I gather that the United States retired from practically all activity in this field, and that there is no existing directive authorizing U.S. agencies to encourage and support infiltration and build-up activities on the mainland. Indeed, our current directives (which I have not had an opportunity to examine) apparently are directed to stopping the Chinese from engaging in infiltration activities on the mainland. There also seems to be a tendency both in American and Chinese quarters here to draw the mutual defense provisions over the control of such activities, that is, to stop them almost completely.
I have discussed this problem in a general way with Admiral Doyle, General Bowen and Mr. Duggan. They all appear to concur that encouragement and support should be given to the Chinese to resume infiltration activities on the mainland. The consensus is that these activities should be well-prepared, carefully planned and conducted on a small scale in areas such as eastern Kwangtung. My colleagues also appear to believe that we should seriously consider the formation of a joint committee to help the Chinese in formulating their plans, et cetera. I share their views that we should encourage the Chinese to attempt small-scale infiltration activities which would have as their basic purpose the creation of bases of resistance on the mainland. I think that we should encourage and support such activities, in order to ascertain whether the Chinese have the capability to create resistance bases from small initial starts and also to ascertain whether the mainland population is prepared to support such endeavors. This would, of course, rescue President Chiang and his followers from their present aimless course, so to speak, and give them at least some spirit of purpose and something to concentrate on. If confined to small limits, as I think it would have to be to have any chance of ultimate success, such a program should not involve us in any hostilities of consequence against the mainland.
I would also favor the formation of a small joint committee to study the problem of mainland infiltration. I would like to see it limited, at first at least, to an exploratory or advisory function. Its terms of reference, in other words, could be limited to study and exploration of what President Chiang has in mind and to a study of prospects of infiltration of the mainland, [Page 15] and to an examination of ways and means of carrying out any infiltrations that might be deemed feasible or in prospect within the capabilities of the Chinese on Taiwan. If such a joint committee is formed, I would hope that we would place on it not only military experts skilled in unconventional warfare, but also experts trained specially in guerrilla techniques and an officer or two who are specially trained in psychological warfare. If we would agree to discussing this with President Chiang, I believe that we could diminish the spirit of frustration which seems gradually to be overtaking him. I personally believe we could enter into talks with him that might perhaps offer him some useful guidance and channel his activities in the infiltration field in directions that might be mutually useful. I believe, also, that we could do this in such a way as not to get committed to operations that would involve us in large-scale hostilities with the Chinese Communists, but which would gradually give them increasing difficulty and at the same time hold out growing hope of liberation to mainland Chinese.
I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to CINCPAC, in view of his interest in this subject.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–358. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright.↩
- See Document 6. The enclosure, a summary record of the conversation prepared by Chiang’s secretary James Shen, is not printed.↩
- The memorandum of conversation, drafted by Drumright and revised subsequently by Robertson, is not printed.↩