Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

345. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, August 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Background Information For Your Discussions with Congressman Bowles re Off shore Islands

I understand that Congressman Bowles, in response to your letter to him of July 20, 1960 (Tab A),¹ will call on you at your home Thursday evening² to discuss further the problem of the offshore islands, which was raised in his letter to you of July 1 (Tab B). For your background information, I am attaching (Tab C)³ a summary of the talks held on April 24–27, 1955, between Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford, on the one hand, and President Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Minister George Yeh on the other, concerning a U.S. proposal for the withdrawal of the GRC from Quemoy and Matsu. To the best of my knowledge, since the decisive rejection of this proposal by Chiang, there has never been another attempt to persuade him to evacuate these islands. His attitude in April 1955 and since, together with subsequent developments in the China area, have provided no realistic basis for renewing a proposal of this kind to Chiang.

Despite the fact that Robertson and Radford in April 1955 offered Chiang the quid pro quo for withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu of interdiction by United States as well as Chinese naval forces of sea lanes along the China coast from Swatow in the south to Wenchow in the north, Chiang adamantly refused to consider the proposal, even though he was told at the same time that President Eisenhower had decided not to sanction the use of U.S. forces to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Chiang stressed that Quemoy and Matsu were the last footholds of his Government on soil that has continuously been Chinese and that he could not voluntarily abandon these islands and maintain the support of his own people. Chiang declared that from his standpoint it was far better to fight and lose the islands than to abandon them, for in the eyes of his people the latter course would mean abandonment of his cause.

This was and remains the basic reason why Chiang, regardless of the United States attitude, will not voluntarily relinquish Quemoy and Matsu. Many times before, and many times after the Robertson–Radford talks with him, Chiang has publicly declared his unalterable intention to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Just last week in an interview with a Scripps–Howard correspondent, Henry N. Taylor, who asked him about his reaction to the alleged opinion of Senator Kennedy and Congressman Bowles that the United States should “disentangle” itself from defending the offshore islands, Chiang reiterated his determination to defend these islands under any circumstances. In the face of his oft repeated public commitment to defend the offshore islands Chiang apparently feels it would be impossible to voluntarily evacuate them and still retain the respect and support of the Chinese people. Moreover, such a course would be contrary to everything he has stood for and fought for since his defeat on the mainland in 1949. It would symbolize to him and his supporters capitulation to the “two Chinas” concept.

The trend of events since April 1955 has made it even less likely that an evacuation proposal would succeed now, if it were again presented to Chiang. Thus, the quid quo pro of Naval interdiction which in 1955, as Admiral Radford strongly argued, was a real military offset to the loss of the islands would be of little significance now, for in December 1956 a railway was completed into Amoy and in November 1958 a railway was completed into Foochow so that these key ports in the area of the proposed interdiction are no longer dependent for reinforcement and supply on coastal shipping. A second major development was the GRC’s successful defense of Quemoy in 1958 against one of the heaviest and most sustained artillery bombardments in history, together with a spectacular air victory over the Communists. These military achievements and the strong backing given the GRC by the United States provided a tremendous lift to the morale of the Free Chinese, making even more difficult any voluntary relinquishment of this last GRC foothold on China proper. A third new factor likely to strengthen Chiang’s conviction that there must be no retreat on Quemoy and Matsu is that Chinese Communist foreign policy, which in 1955 (the year of Bandung) was at the high tide of its peace offensive phase, has in the last two years been marked by increasing belligerence. Peiping’s relations with such key countries as Indonesia and especially India have deteriorated to a point undreamed of in 1955. Peiping’s rape of Tibet and its encroachment on India’s border lands, its open espousal of force and so-called “just wars” against imperialism, all make voluntary retreat and surrender of further GRC territory even less palatable now than in 1955 when Peiping was showing a smiling and comparatively reasonable face.

So far as I know, during the 1958 crisis there was no consideration given by either the President or Secretary Dulles to urging Chiang to evacuate Quemoy and Matsu. In fact the Joint Communiqué issued by President Chiang and Secretary Dulles on October 23, 1958 recognized that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu is closely related to the defense of Taiwan: Considerable thought was given, however, to attempting to bring about a reduction in the forces on the offshore islands, particularly Quemoy. Secretary Dulles discussed this during his meetings with Chiang in October 1958. It was Mr. Dulles’ view that such a reduction would not only be militarily desirable but would reassure our allies and friends that the GRC was not attempting to build up the offshore islands for offensive purposes. Subsequently, United States and Chinese military officials in Taipei worked out an agreement calling for the reduction of the GRC forces on Quemoy by one division or about 15,000 men. This reduction was carried out and GRC forces on Quemoy now total 69,632 (as of June 1) as compared with some 86,000 in the fall of 1958.

While the Chinese Communists retain the capability of renewing action against the offshore islands at any time and have the publicly declared objective of “liberating” these islands along with Taiwan and the Pescadores, there are certain inhibiting factors that should not be ignored. We cannot, of course, count on these factors preventing renewed Communist attacks and we must be prepared at all times for such attacks. Nevertheless, the Communists do not have, I feel, quite as much flexibility as Mr. Bowles’ letter seems to indicate. All the evidence available to us points to the fact that the Chinese Communists are as much opposed to “two Chinas” as the GRC. They repeatedly stress their intention to “liberate” Taiwan, the Pescadores and the offshore islands as a whole. When in September 1958 a group of Afro-Asian neutralist powers broached the proposal to Peiping that the offshore islands question be taken up in the United Nations in such a way as to separate the offshore islands from Taiwan even temporarily, the Chinese rejected it catagorically and lectured the Afro-Asians on the dangers of “two Chinas”. It is probable that Chinese Communist fear that some sort of “two Chinas” situation would grow out of a prolongation of the offshore island crisis of 1958 strongly influenced their decision not to prolong it.

Thus Peiping is faced with a dilemma. So long as Peiping confines itself to fighting for the offshore islands it strikes the GRC and ourselves in a militarily vulnerable and politically weak spot, but it also runs a high risk of bringing about the very “two Chinas” situation it abhors. If, on the other hand, Peiping attacks the offshore islands and Taiwan as a whole in order to avoid the emergence of “two Chinas” it runs into certain involvement with the United States and a militarily much stronger position; it also creates an issue on which the GRC and the U.S. would receive not only the political support of our allies but the sympathy of much of the uncommitted world.

The Present Situation: While the United States is not committed to use its forces in the defense of the offshore islands, we demonstrated in the 1958 crisis our willingness to do virtually anything short of this to support the GRC’s defense of them and did not foreclose the strong possibility that we would use U.S. forces if worse came to worst. Our aim has been and is to deter a Communist attack on the offshore islands or if such an attack occurs, as in 1958, to limit its scope. This policy has been successful. As long as President Chiang and his Government are determined to maintain GRC forces on Quemoy and Matsu and to defend these islands regardless of our attitude, this seems to be the best policy we can devise.

If the Chinese Communists should now launch another assault, we anticipate taking the issue to the United Nations. (See my memorandum to you of June 10, 1960 (Tab D).)⁴ A contingency paper dealing specifically with possible United Nations action in such an event is under preparation. In the meantime, it should be our policy to maintain our firm and consistent posture of support for the GRC on the offshore islands issue. The more the GRC and ourselves appear divided on this issue the greater will be the temptation for Peiping to embark on some new and dangerous probing operation in the area; conversely, the greater the appearance of GRC–US unity and strength, the less likely it is that Peiping will risk such a course.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/8–1060. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin. The source text bears Herter’s initials.
1. Tabs A, B, and D are not attached to the source text. Herter’s July 20 letter is printed as Document 342. Regarding Bowies’ letter, see footnote 1 thereto.
2. July 11. No record of the conversation has been found.
3. Not printed.
4. This memorandum stated that in the atmosphere following the collapse of the summit talks, the chances for the outbreak of a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait appeared greater than at any time since 1958. It recommended contingency planning for the possibility of a Communist assault on the offshore islands, with emphasis on the problem of taking the issue to the United Nations. An attached memorandum, unsigned and undated, entitled “U.S. Policy Toward the Offshore Islands in Light of Recent Developments,” recommended that in case of a Communist attack on the islands, the United States should take the issue to the United Nations while providing logistic support and convoy protection to the Nationalists. (Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/6–1060; see Supplement)