346. Editorial Note
At the 456th meeting of the National Security Council, August 18, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Director of the Planning Board Secretariat Robert H. Johnson, August 25, reads as follows:
“Mr. Dulles began his briefing by saying that information and intelligence in the past weeks have indicated that friction between Communist China and the Soviet Union is more serious than estimated previously although there will be no break or other abrupt action. At the Bucharest meeting there had been an attempt to find a formula for agreement but it had not succeeded. There had been an exchange of insults and a dispute over defense arrangements at that meeting. A commission of Bloc and non-Bloc Communists had been created to deal with the dispute and its report would be taken up at a further meeting in November.
“Since Bucharest, Mr. Dulles noted, Moscow has taken the initiative in the Bloc and within the international Communist movement. Pravda [Page 710] and Izvestia have reaffirmed the Soviet view that peaceful coexistence is possible. On the 13th of August Moscow had announced that Khrushchev would visit North Korea in October, but with no stop-over in Peiping. TASS had refused to handle the business of the Chinese Communist News Agency in Delhi when the latter was thrown out. Moscow had offered helicopters to India which it knew would be used on the Chinese frontier. There were reports that large numbers of Soviet personnel were leaving Communist China. The decision to remove them had reportedly been taken three weeks ago. The British Embassy in Peiping and members of various other embassies have noted that families of Soviet experts are leaving. There had been changes in the pattern of Moscow broadcasts on Communist China. For more than five weeks there had been no comment on Communist China for the Russian home audience whereas previously broadcasts had regularly reported on Chinese economic progress and Soviet aid. The volume of comment on Communist China for foreign audiences had been considerably reduced. [4 lines of source text not declassified] On the 13th of August the People’s Daily in Communist China had attacked the Soviet position in an editorial. The Chinese had boycotted the International Congress of Orientalists now going on in Moscow. A number of high-level Party meetings had taken place in Communist China at which the Chinese were apparently reassessing their relations with the Bloc and with their Asian neighbors. All of this, Mr. Dulles indicated, constitutes most important cumulative evidence. Mr. Dulles again emphasized that he was not predicting a break but only frictions with an effort, probably in November, to see if the differences could be resolved. Mr. Dulles said that we would gain nothing if we ourselves advertised this break. Such action would only tend to bring the two countries together.
“Mr. Dulles then elaborated on the withdrawal of Soviet experts. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] One view (held by the Yugoslavs) was that ideological differences had reached such a pitch that the Soviet Union was withdrawing these technicians as a sign of its displeasure. The other theory was that, in their technological innovations, the Chinese had so abused Soviet machinery and ignored Soviet experts that the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its technicians. [1 line of source text not declassified]
“Secretary Anderson inquired whether in view of the efforts the Soviet Union had made to get rid of Trotsky, CIA considered that in the present situation the Soviet Union would attempt to exterminate Mao because he was attempting to sell a different brand of Communism. Mr. Dulles noted that the situation was different; that Trotsky was in exile and easier to dispose of. Secretary Anderson suggested, however, that the Russians could eliminate Mao if they wanted to. Mr. Dulles, however, [Page 711] suggested that this would not help the Soviet Union because the ideological positions of other Chinese leaders were the same as that of Mao.
“Secretary Gates asked whether it was possible that Communist China would move aggressively, for example in Formosa or Korea. The President indicated that he did not believe that they would move against Formosa because they simply did not have the ‘stuff. The President considered, however, that it was possible that they might move on the Indian border, against Nepal or in Southeast Asia. However, the President did not think that if the Chinese break with the Russians, they would be likely to take us on. In the course of this discussion, the President indicated that he thought it would be desirable for the NSC members to see a Chinese Communist propaganda film which he had seen and which reflected Chinese economic advances.
“Mr. Dulles said he wished he could predict the outcome of the dispute between the USSR and the Communist Chinese. It was possible that the Chinese Communists might give in. If the Chinese did anything aggressive, they would be on their own. He doubted whether they would take aggressive action without Russian help. In this connection he noted that the Chinese were attempting to settle their border problems. The President noted, however, that there had been a report of another Chinese raid into India.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)