344. National Intelligence Estimate0

NIE 100–3–60

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

[Here follows a table of contents.]

The Problem

To examine the Sino-Soviet relationship, and to estimate probable developments therein over the next five years.

[Page 704]

Conclusions

1.
The growth of Communist China’s power and self-confidence has brought to the Sino-Soviet relationship an increased Chinese assertiveness and a consequent sharp increase in discord, particularly concerning outlook and attitude toward the non-Communist world. There is still one Communist faith, but there are now two voices of Communist authority. As a consequence, the Sino-Soviet relationship is in process of difficult change. (Paras. 7–9)
2.
The Sino-Soviet relationship is not a Communist monolith. Instead, it contains elements of both cohesion and division, and varying degrees of unity are displayed in the relations of the two powers in ideological, foreign policy, economic, and military affairs. Although joined in the pursuit of broad Communist objectives, the Soviet and Chinese partnership is subject to many of the separatist forces that have traditionally confronted alliances and coalitions. (Paras. 58–63)
3.
We believe that cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet relationships will remain stronger than divisive forces at least through the period of this estimate. The strongest of the cohesive forces will be a mutual awareness of the heavy damage to their national interests and to the Communist cause which a substantial impairment of the alliance would inflict. The two partners will almost certainly continue to share a common hostility to the West and a belief that through their common effort in advancing international communism they can someday participate in dominating the world. Their relationship will also continue to find cohesion in the political, economic, and military advantages each receives. This will have particular force for the Chinese who, in view of their continuing military and economic dependence on the USSR, will probably feel that they have no genuinely acceptable alternative to maintaining their alliance with the Soviets. (Paras. 13–14, 64–65)
4.
Divisive forces continue to be present, however, and may increase. Differing national interests and characteristics, and the wide disparity in the development of the USSR and Communist China as Communist societies, will continue to exert basic stresses on the Sino-Soviet relationship. Communist China’s relative weight in the Bloc is likely to grow over the next five years. This growth will diminish the leverage Moscow can bring to bear through Peiping’s military and economic dependence. The Chinese Communists will be more inclined to pursue their own interests and to question Soviet leadership than they have during the first decade of the alliance. (Paras. 15–17, 66)
5.
We do not rule out the possibility that the two powers may during the period of this estimate either come to an open break or reach a more fundamental integration of interests than now exists. We believe it much more likely, however, that there will be no fundamental reconciliation of differences, that discord will ebb and flow, and that the growing [Page 705] duality of power in the Bloc will become increasingly incompatible with the present Bloc structure which has been based on a single source of authority. However, differences will be unlikely to force the USSR and Communist China so far apart that they cease to look to each other for support in their common drive against the West. (Paras. 67–69)
6.
The threat which the Sino-Soviet allies pose to US security and US interests is of great dimensions and is more likely to increase than to diminish during the period of this estimate. Nevertheless, since the alliance is a changing and evolving relationship, it offers possibilities for favorable as well as unfavorable developments from the US point of view. Stresses and strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship will tend to weaken the hostile combination, and may provide situations and opportunities which can be exploited by the West. At the same time, Chinese Communist pressure may on occasion influence the Soviets to pursue a more militant course toward the West than the Soviets would otherwise choose on tactical grounds. (Paras. 70–71)

[Here follows the “Discussion” portion of the estimate, consisting of paragraphs 7 through 71, and annexes entitled “The Impact of Soviet Trade and Technical Assistance on Communist China’s Economy,” “Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Relations,” and “Communist China’s Military Dependence on the USSR.” See Supplement.]

  1. Source: Department of State, INRNIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

    “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence

    “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and AEC.

    “Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 9 August 1960.”