331. Editorial Note
At the 442d meeting of the National Security Council on April 28, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations and the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, April 28, reads as follows:
[Page 663]“Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR and Communist China were conducting a kind of debate through public pronouncements in their journals on communist ideology. Both sides were quoting freely from Lenin. Three principal ideological points appeared to be at issue. The first point concerned the inevitability of war. The Chinese Communists say war is inevitable as long as imperialism exists and maintain that the ‘socialist camp’ will win such wars as occur. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that the strength of the Bloc is now so great that the theory of inevitable war may be cast aside in favor of ‘peaceful competition’. A second point at issue concerns the peaceable intentions of the West. The Chinese Communists maintain that the West is increasing its military preparations. They say that since general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc would be fatal for the imperialist powers, the U.S. is planning to use its military forces to fight limited war. The Soviets, on the other hand, say that the U.S. is seeking peace. A third point concerns the possibility of peaceful co-existence. The Chinese Communists maintain that the capitalist powers are now tottering on the brink of destruction to such an extent that an aggressive policy by the communist world would complete the disintegration of the West. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that an aggressive policy by the communist powers would rally the West to make a final desperate effort. Mr. Dulles believed this doctrinal dispute indicated that the Chinese Communists feel a détente would be to their disadvantage. They fear that an agreement for the maintenance of the status quo in the West might lead to an agreement for maintenance of the status quo in Asia, thus blocking their aggressive desires.
“Mr. Dulles believed it was necessary to watch carefully the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Sixty additional fighter planes, probably MIG–17s, had been moved from other parts of China to airfields near the Taiwan Strait recently. The Watch Committee, although noting that the Chinese Nationalists are concerned about the situation, believes that the Chinese Communists do not intend immediate military activity against Taiwan. Of course the Chinese Communists have the capability of initiating an attack in the Taiwan Strait with little or no warning. Mr. Dulles thought it was possible that the Chinese Communists might decide to engage in some military activity in the region of the Taiwan Strait in order to put diplomatic pressure on the USSR in connection with the Summit Meeting.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
At President Eisenhower’s news conference on May 11, a questioner asked about U.S. policy toward Quemoy and Matsu and referred to controversy in the Presidential election campaign on the subject. The text of the President’s reply is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, page 659; for the transcript of the news conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pages 403–414.