Office of the Historian

332. National Intelligence Estimate0

NIE 100–2–60
Washington, May 17, 1960.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

The Problem

To assess Sino-Indian relations and their international implications.

Conclusions

1.
Sino-Indian border clashes have shattered the appearance of cordiality between the two states. Early agreement on the boundary dispute is unlikely. However, both sides are probably willing to live with the present stalemate for some time, although further border clashes may occur. In the event of a prolonged failure to resolve the dispute, the climate could alter significantly, particularly if Nehru leaves the scene before a settlement. Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that an eventual settlement could be achieved—probably involving Indian concessions in Ladakh in return for Chinese recognition of India’s claims in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). However, even if the border issue is settled, it is unlikely that the friendly relations which existed in the past can be fully restored, [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]
2.
Peiping’s moves have sharply increased anti-Chinese sentiment in India. They have also tended to create in India a more sympathetic view of US policies, though India remains dedicated to the principle of nonalignment, and will also be influenced by interest in continued large-scale Soviet aid and by some hope that the USSR will restrain Communist China. The position of the Indian Communist Party has been made more difficult, but it has not suffered a critical setback. [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]
3.
To date Communist China has outstripped India in economic growth. The present wide gap in growth rates is expected to narrow, but the absolute disparity between the economies will probably continue to widen. As a result China will be able to maintain—and probably increase—its military superiority over India. However, as long as India is making significant economic progress, most Asian countries will probably continue to derive encouragement from India’s example, [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]
4.
Communist China’s growing strength and its aggressiveness have caused a more somber assessment of Chinese Communist motivations among Asian leaders. Even if the Sino-Indian border dispute is resolved through negotiations, the more apprehensive Asian view of Communist China that has recently developed probably will not be erased. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist China’s strength and dynamism and its ambitions for political hegemony will figure more prominently in Asia than will India’s influence, [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

[Here follow 7 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

  1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows: “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

    “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

    “Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 17 May 1960.”

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