Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

330. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense⁰

Washington, April 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

REFERENCE

• CIA memorandum dated 14 April 1960, same subject¹

1. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has sent us further information relating to his progress concerning subject. Following is a summary of that information:

a. As the result of a long series of confidential talks [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lieutenant General Chiang Ching-kuo, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has agreed to the following:

(1) The GRC will not take precipitate action to launch 200-man teams against the China Mainland this spring, although training of Special Forces in accord with the large team concept will continue.

(2) He will keep [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] informed on GRC plans and training readiness of Special Forces being developed as the 200-man team reservoir regardless of whether they are MAP-sup-ported.

(3) He will advise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in advance when and if the GRC feels it must implement the large team concept unilaterally.

(4) The GRC will propose small team operations in West China but recognizes that approval will be on a case-by-case evaluation of operational feasibility.

b. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has briefed Ambassador Everett F. Drumright on the above.

2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] notes that in view of the above he considers the initial phase of the educational process mentioned in reference to be concluded.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
[name not declassified]²

[Attachment]

³

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, April 14, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

REFERENCE

• CIA memorandum dated 7 March 1960, same subject

1. Since the forwarding of referenced memorandum to you [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has sent us further information relating to his progress concerning subject. This information is forwarded to you as an enclosure to this memorandum.

2. It should be noted that the schedule mentioned in the reference has been successfully met and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believes that the GRC is now willing to postpone implementation of their large team concept, at least for a year, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is now trying to persuade the GRC that any smaller teams to be sent into China should be in accord with purely operational considerations.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
[name not declassified]⁴

[Enclosure]

⁵

1. At the Baguio conference [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had several talks with Admiral Felt during which he briefed the Admiral on [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He also told the Admiral that the GRC was urging large scale airdrops and that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was attempting to dissuade the GRC from this concept or at least to postpone implementation.

2. Our representative also had a long discussion with Assistant Secretary Parsons at Baguio and brought him up to date on the details of the GRC large scale airdrop concept and of the tactical problems involved in negotiations with the GRC regarding this concept. With the full support of Ambassador Everett Drumright our representative made these recommendations: that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek be persuaded tactfully that his initial plan is presently impossible to execute clandestinely and that, informally and unofficially, he be made to understand that his plan, which amounts to semi-overt military assault, is clearly inadvisable in the context of the present international situation.

3. Assistant Secretary Parsons agreed that these negotiating tactics are sound, and did not press for Department of State involvement as long as Ambassador Drumright and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] continue their present close coordination in the field.

4. To implement the recommendations described in paragraph 3, above, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will continue the tactic of attempting to educate the GRC [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while committing the United States to nothing, avoiding a direct affront to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and keeping open [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to GRC thinking on this subject. In this connection we have advised him that in the absence of already organised Mainland resistance forces requiring training and direction and because even the pretense of clandestinity is impossible, we cannot agree to his involvement in the 20-man team concept which was proposed by the GRC as a more immediate addition to their larger scale operational concept.

5. The educational tactic will include [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the GRC within the framework of presently approved operational programs, of supporting feasible operational proposals, and of fobbing-off both the 200-man and 20-man team concepts by making success in other operations and the need for clandestinity strict prerequisites [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] expresses the belief that this approach will permit Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to save face and will allow [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to continue to monitor the planning done by the GRC in this field.

6. We believe, therefore, that there is no current need for the Department of State to take action in this regard.

[Attachment]

⁶

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, March 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

REFERENCE

• CIA memorandum dated 13 February 1960, same subject

1. Since the referenced memorandum was sent to you the Central Intelligence Agency has received [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] elaborating information indicating the possibility of some watering down of the original GRC proposal for the dropping of 200-man teams into the mainland around May or June 1960. The new GRC proposal envisages the use of six intelligence teams of up to 20 men each to be dropped into six new target areas. These smaller teams are proposed as additional rather than as alternative to the large teams originally proposed. However, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is optimistic that in due time he can persuade the GRC to substitute the concept of 20-man teams for that of much larger teams. He believes that he can persuade the GRC to change its plans in this respect over a period of six weeks to two months, primarily through his frequent discussions with Chiang Ching-kuo. He believes that, in addition, there is even a possibility that the target date for these drops might be postponed by the GRC from 1960 to mid-1961.

2. Although [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has had some success in modifying the original GRC plans, CIA does not believe the concept of 20-man teams to be, for both political and technical reasons, any more acceptable than the concept of larger teams. However, we have taken note of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] suggestion that he be allowed additional time to attempt to dissuade the GRC of the advisability of aggressive action before the decision is made to make representations through diplomatic channels. We have suggested to the Department of State that for the time being it confine itself to discussing the general problem with Ambassador Drumright and informing him that, should it prove impossible to reach a meeting of the minds with the GRC acting through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] diplomatic representations will then be necessary. It was additionally suggested that the draft telegram proposed by the Department of State be withheld at this time.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
Desmond FitzGerald⁷

[Attachment]

⁸

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, February 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

1. The Central Intelligence Agency has received [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a report concerning plans of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) to engage in large scale paramilitary operations against Communist China. As you know, previous information on this subject was disseminated through intelligence reporting channels.

2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has discussed with the GRC the overall problem of conducting operations on the mainland to exploit the resistance potential which the GRC believes exists there on a large scale. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has attempted to keep such planning on a modest and clandestine level, and has monitored GRC planning to ensure that it is in accord with treaty obligations and in the spirit of the joint Dulles–Chiang communiqué.

3. The report from Taipei states that the GRC planning, which is largely inspired by President Chiang Kai-shek, covers the following points:

a. The airdrop of 200- to 300-man teams as paramilitary assault units into each of nine target areas selected in the Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Sikang region.

b. These paramilitary units are to establish themselves as the leaders of local guerrilla resistance forces which the GRC insists will join or at least enthusiastically support the paramilitary units. Such units will then disperse to specified points within each target area, with an average of five points within each target area. Their objective will be to recruit or overpower the local commune militia and thereby build up their manpower and arsenal.

c. These sub-units at the separate points would have internal lateral communications with the unit designated as the Position Control Unit and this unit would have communications with GRC Taipei Headquarters.

d. The GRC wishes to drop these units within a very short span of time and believes there is no need to send in small clandestine teams in advance to assess the area situation. The GRC agrees that doing so would compromise the selected target areas which President Chiang Kai-shek has designated as ideal for airborne operations designed to spark wide-spread rebellion in Southwest China and would hopefully serve as the prelude to nationwide rebellion.

e. Most target areas are on provincial borders and appear to meet the standard criteria for selection of areas for clandestine action.

f. Although they prefer to use personnel from the MAP-supported Second and Third Special Forces, the GRC recognizes the U.S. hold on these troops and therefore plans to draw their paramilitary teams from the personnel of the non-MAP-supported First Special Force Group or from their old guerrilla forces which were withdrawn from the off-shore islands.

g. The GRC planning and training for the organization and employment of Special Forces against the selected targets has been going on for the past two years. The surfacing of these plans to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is due to the feeling of the GRC that opportunities for this type of operation on the mainland are greatest during the next year or two and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] might be able to get U.S. approval for such a large clandestine effort whereas regular military employment of these forces is precluded by policy considerations.

h. Lieutenant General Chiang Ching-kuo has told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that this is the key GRC strategic plan and the GRC must execute it at the optimum time, unilaterally if necessary.

i. The GRC, however, would prefer U.S. approval of the above concept and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support in the form of airlift, parachutes, communications equipment and ammunition as well as training and target area [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support.

j. While timing is being argued apart from the planning concept, it is abundantly clear that President Chiang has passed down orders to be ready for large team airdrops by May or June 1960.

k. An outline of the complete plan for mainland guerrilla warfare, studies of selected target areas and personnel and training status reports on the first, Second and Third Special Forces Groups have been obtained [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The complete plan calls for a military assault force on such a scale that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] consider it suicidally unrealistic.

4. Although [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have attempted to moderate the more ambitious plans of the GRC, it is obvious that their counterparts are subjected to positive pressures from the highest level of the GRC. Such planning [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] considers to be of importance on the national level. The Department of State has been informed of this situation and it has been requested that it be considered at appropriate levels and that a decision be made as to what action will be taken.

5. Because of the political sensitivity of this matter, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has requested that this situation be handled outside of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channels. He has briefed Ambassador Drumright, Admiral Smoot and General Dean.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
[name not declassified]⁹

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Files: Job 83–00036R, Box 2, HS/CSG–304. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
1. Printed below.
2. Printed from a copy that indicates [name not declassified] signed the original above FitzGerald’s typed signature.
3. Secret. Drafted in the Far East Division in the Directorate of Operations on April 6.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates [name not declassified] signed the original above FitzGerald’s typed signature.
5. Secret. The unsigned, untitled, and undated source text bears no drafting information.
6. Secret. Drafted in the Far East Division in the Directorate of Operations on March 7.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. Secret. Drafted in the Far East Division in the Directorate of Operations on February 12.
9. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.