322. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • GRC Para-Military Operations on the China Mainland

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary, FE
  • Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
  • Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director, CA

During the course of a call by Ambassador Yeh on Mr. Parsons at the latter’s request, Mr. Parsons said that on his recent visit to Taipei Under Secretary Dillon had promised President Chiang1 he would look into several points which President Chiang had raised related to GRC para-military operations on the mainland upon his return to Washington. Mr. Parsons said that this had now been done, and that Mr. Dillon had asked him to give our views to Ambassador Yeh for transmission to President Chiang.

Ambassador Yeh said that President Chiang had plans for dropping paratroops on the mainland which he had discussed several years ago with Mr. Herter. Mr. Parsons indicated that he was familiar with this plan for training of 30,000 paratroopers. It did not appear to us to be a realistic war plan. However, what he wished to discuss today was our attitude toward GRC para-military activities. First of all he would like to stress that we sympathize with the GRC’s desire to restore freedom to the mainland and will continue to support as best we can GRC measures to obtain this objective by political means, including propaganda and psychological warfare. We believe that a high priority should be given to determining what resistance assets are available for development on the mainland. United States agencies are prepared to give assistance in making such a determination. We feel that it is important to have an inventory of such assets as a prerequisite to successful para-military activities.

Mr. Parsons indicated that one of the points raised by President Chiang was that the United States had failed to deliver parachutes for the 3,000 special forces which were being trained by the United States MAAG for para-military activities. Mr. Parsons said he understood that training of these forces would be completed in the spring of 1960. As to the parachutes, we anticipated that 1,500 would be delivered early in [Page 642] 1960. These had been programmed in Fiscal Year 1959. The balance of the 3,000 parachutes for the special forces would be programmed in Fiscal Years 1960 and 61. Mr. Parsons suggested that any further questions regarding delivery of the parachutes be taken up on Taiwan with the MAAG.

Mr. Parsons said that it was the view of the United States Government that employment of the special forces by the GRC should be in accordance with the Exchange of Notes of December 10, 1954 between Dr. Yeh and late Secretary Dulles and also in accordance with the Joint Communiqué issued by President Chiang and Secretary Dulles October 23, 1958. Unilateral employment of GRC forces, whether regular or special, against the mainland would be contrary to these undertakings and would be damaging to the GRC’s international position.

Ambassador Yeh inquired whether the delivery of the balance of the 3,000 parachutes would be made before the end of Fiscal Year 1961. Mr. Parsons replied that so far as he knew, there was no definite schedule as yet for the delivery of these parachutes, but he hoped that delivery would be earlier than June 1961. Ambassador Yeh asked if this would be the latest date for the delivery. Mr. Parsons indicated that he could not be precise as to the delivery date.

Referring to the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Exchange of Notes to the use of special forces, Ambassador Yeh asked if we would consider their use as one form of the use of force, Mr. Parsons replied in the affirmative. Ambassador Yeh said that the question of the applicability of the Treaty and the Exchange of Notes to para-military forces had been raised before, and it had never been clear whether their use in para-military and psychological warfare activities would be subject to the Exchange of Notes. Ambassador Yeh said that he would therefore reserve his position in this matter.2

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/12–1659. Secret. Drafted by Martin.
  2. In a conversation on October 21; see Document 310.
  3. Yeh told Parsons on January 25, 1960, that his government fully understood and agreed with the U.S. position that use of the 3,000-man special forces unit undergoing training on Taiwan should be subject to joint consultation in accordance with the December 1954 exchange of notes. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2560; see Supplement)