321. Editorial Note
At the 428th meeting of the National Security Council on December 10, 1959, Acting Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Bissell discussed the Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, December 10, reads as follows:
[Page 640]“Mr. Bissell said that the President’s trip had produced additional evidence of a divergence of views between the USSR and Communist China. The Moscow press and radio were commending the President’s trip while the Chinese Communists were openly attacking the journey as an effort to ‘sell a false peace.’ In his last three speeches, Khrushchev showed concern over the Chinese Communist challenge to Soviet primacy in the Communist world. In Hungary, Khrushchev warned against Communist leaders who became conceited. In a lecture at a Moscow University, a speaker referred in so many words to differences between the USSR and Communist China and to the cold and incorrect reception given Khrushchev in Peiping. One reason for the Chinese Communist attitude was apparently the fact that the Chinese are at an early stage in their revolution, equivalent to the first Soviet Five Year Plan. They have been attempting an ambitious program of industrialization at the expense of the peasantry, and consequently have forced the standard of living of the country lower than at any time in recent memory. The hard line of the Chinese Communists was not surprising in the light of the present stage of Communism in China. Mr. Bissell cautioned, however, that while the strain between the USSR and Communist China was real, it would not lead to a rupture of the alliance since both parties had too much to gain from the alliance. Moreover, attempts to exploit these strains by propaganda would probably do more harm than good unless our propaganda was extremely subtle. The Vice President asked whether there was any dissenting opinion in the Intelligence Community on whether there was a real strain in the relations between the USSR and Communist China. Was there, for example, any opinion that Khrushchev might be seeking to build up the appearance of difference between the two countries? Mr. Bissell reported the Intelligence Community was unanimous in believing there was real strain in the USSR-Chinese Communist relations. There had been too many indications of strain recently to permit of an interpretation that the strain was fabricated. However, both parties probably realized that there was an advantage in pursuing different lines, the Russians pursuing the soft line and the Chinese Communists a hard line. The Vice President asked whether Mr. Bissell meant that Khrushchev felt the Chinese Communists should be tough, but now they have gone too far in toughness. He noted that the Russians had gone further than previously in urging local Communist parties around the world to preserve the appearance of independence from Moscow. Mr. Bissell confirmed the correctness of the Vice President’s impression. He added that in India the Russians were influencing the Communist Party toward legal methods, away from violence and toward an identification with nationalism rather than with international Communism.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)