Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

310. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Taipei, October 21, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Far East Situation—Chiang’s Views on Relations Between USSR and Communist China; The Situation on the Mainland; GRC Action Against the Mainland

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon
  • Ambassador Everett F. Drumright
  • Mr. David L. Osborn, Embassy
  • Mr. Graham Martin, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
  • Mr. James Wilson, Deputy Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination
• China
  • President Chiang Kai-shek
  • Vice President Ch’en Cheng
  • Secretary-General of the Presidential Office, Chang Chung
  • Minister of National Defense, Yu Ta-wei
  • Minister of Foreign Affairs, Huang Shao-ku
  • Minister of Finance, C.K. Yen
  • Mr. James Shen, Director of Information Department, Minister of Foreign Affairs, President’s interpreter

The President in greeting the Under Secretary referred to the very close cooperation which has existed between the United States and China in the past and hoped that as a result of this visit the relationship would be closer still. The Under Secretary said that the late Secretary Dulles, with whom he had been very close, had mentioned many times the great esteem in which he held President Chiang, which was an additional reason the Under Secretary had looked forward to this visit. The President remarked on the deep sense of personal loss which he felt on the passing of Secretary Dulles.¹ The Under Secretary said that the United States Government had been deeply touched by Madame Chiang’s coming all the way to Washington to participate in the last rites for the Secretary.

The President inquired whether Mr. Dillon had anything that he wished to bring up for discussion. The Under Secretary said that he had come to Taiwan to learn rather than to talk. He hoped that the President would give him his views on the general situation in the Far East. He would also be glad to answer any questions that the President might wish to ask regarding developments in Washington.

The President asked about Mr. Dillon’s view of the Far Eastern situation—whose core is the problem of the Communist regime on the mainland—following the visit of Khrushchev to Peiping. Mr. Dillon said that it was of course difficult to know what Khrushchev actually said to the Communist leaders. However, when Khrushchev was in Washington, the Department was certain that, for reasons of his own, he was really interested in a relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. However, the United States had no indication that this desire necessarily extended to Communist China, and in fact there was some feeling that the question of China was regarded by Khrushchev as a separate situation. That was one of the reasons why the Department has recently been trying to make it very clear that it is impossible to have a relaxation in one part of the world and none in the Far East. As President Chiang was aware, Khrushchev did make some speeches with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes and so on in Peiping. The Chinese Communist leaders did not reply in kind at that time; however, in the last few days the Chinese Communists have also made some speeches about peace. Naturally, speeches alone cannot accomplish very much. The Under Secretary said he would be interested in the President’s views on the subject.

The President complimented the United States Government on its very clever propaganda line since the Khrushchev visit to Peiping. The President was in agreement with the speech of Mr. Dillon in New York October 7 and had noted this as an instance of how the United States Government was reacting toward the Communist attempts to have a relaxation of tensions in the West, and an indication that the question had occurred to the United States whether the desire to relax tensions extended to the Far East as well. This question was a very pertinent one. The President thought it was excellent tactics to try to pin Khrushchev down, because in fact tensions in Europe and Asia are inseparable. He felt it was really a matter of great importance that Khrushchev should be told that it is impossible to have a relaxation in Europe without a relaxation in the Far East. This is an entirely correct policy to pursue prior to a Summit Conference. Unless Khrushchev is told he will be held responsible for what Communist China might do in this part of the world, there should be no Summit. Without such an assurance, the best that could be expected from a Summit would be that the Communists would refrain before and during the conference but would resume their aggression after the conference. The President said he was no prophet but had been dealing with the Communists for so long that he had some special knowledge in this field. He hoped that Mr. Dillon would convey his views to the Secretary and to President Eisenhower.

Mr. Dillon pointed out that the Department has adopted the line favored by the President in various statements that have been made, and has said that as long as the Soviet Union claims to be the leader of the Communist camp, a leadership which Peiping acknowledges, the Soviet Union obviously has a measure of responsibility for the actions of Peiping. That is a fact which is well understood by public opinion in the United States, and the press has been quick to pick up and use this same line.

The President asked whether Mr. Dillon would like to hear an exposition of his views on the relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China and between Khrushchev and Mao. The President felt quite possibly some of his American friends may not see things exactly the way he does, but he would be pleased to explain his own views with the hope that they would be used by the Secretary in the formulation of his policies. According to information available to the GRC, the three days of conferences between Khrushchev and Mao did not lead to any agreement or bring forth any conclusion. This is known for a definite fact. The President said that the friction or differences between Khrushchev and Mao started some three years ago. During the recent visit of Khrushchev, the friction came more to the surface. As far as the GRC is aware Khrushchev has never been in favor of the commune system, nor has Khrushchev been favorably disposed to the rise of Mao Tse-tung as a leader of the Communist movement in the Far East. The schism between the two, though dating back three years, has now become more obvious. This friction is primarily between Khrushchev and Mao; it is not between the Soviet Union and the Communist regime. The President asserted that Khrushchev’s way of controlling the Chinese Communist Party differs from the methods he has used in controlling other satellites. His method of controlling the Peiping regime is not one applied at the top through Mao Tse-tung. Mao has very little regard for Khrushchev nor would he consider taking orders from him. Mao is a contemporary of Stalin and considers himself ahead of Khrushchev. Mao has little respect for Khrushchev as a theorist, regarding himself as the leading theoretician in the Communist movement at the present time. The President commented that in fact Mao is correct; he has made a longer study of the Communist doctrine than has Khrushchev. As a result, over the last few years, Khrushchev has not been able to control Mao nor has Mao been willing to accept his control. Mao, the President said, probably feels much closer in spirit to Molotov than to Khrushchev. Khrushchev’s recent visit provided additional evidence of the growing schism between the two leaders. It follows, the President thought, that Khrushchev realizes Mao is less likely to follow the Soviet lead in seeking to bring about stability in the Far East. Knowing what he is up against, Khrushchev has resorted to a device of controlling the Communist Party through controlling the six other members of the Chinese Politburo. These six members of the Politburo are under the control of Khrushchev as individuals. If and when a showdown were to come in the Politburo (that is, if Khrushchev should lay down the line) he would be certain of six members of the Politburo opposed to Mao Tse-tung. The President noted the telegram recently sent from Communist China to Khrushchev endorsing the peace offensive and that Mao Tse-tung was one of the four signing that telegram. This shows that as long as the other members are under Khrushchev’s control, Mao has no choice but to go along with them. In other words, despite the friction between Mao and Khrushchev, Khrushchev still has a firm grip on the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore it would be a mistake to think that Mao and the Chinese Communist Party are synonymous.

Mr. Dillon said that the only question he had regarding the most interesting presentation by the President was with respect to the means of control exercised by Khrushchev over the other six members of the Politburo. He wondered why the other six members allowed themselves to be controlled by Khrushchev and how Khrushchev was able to exercise this control. The President explained that the first reason was the following. All six other members joined the International Communist Party before they joined the Chinese Communist Party. They became Communists while in the USSR or while in Europe and have all along been under the direct control of the international Communist movement. Mao is the only truly indigenous Chinese Communist leader. The second point was that all along the international Communist movement has kept a firm grip on its individual members through its intelligence network. This control is exercised not through the Chinese Communist Party as a whole but through its individual members. Liu Shao-chi studied in Moscow. Chu Teh joined the Communist movement in France and in Germany. Chou En-lai joined in France. Both Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping (the Secretary-General of the party) were Russian trainees. In reply to the Under Secretary’s question whether there was any connection between the recent change in Defense Ministers and other personnel shifts in Peiping and the subject which the President was discussing, the President declared there was not the slightest doubt that the changes were the result of a policy decision on the part of the Russians, and that this policy decision might have gone against the wishes of Mao Tse-tung. Up to the present time, however, the President said Mao Tse-tung still retains quite a bit of influence at the provincial level and among the rank and file of the armed forces. Accordingly, Khrushchev has not yet found it convenient to get rid of Mao. That was why at least for the time being the other six members of the Politburo would have to keep up the appearance of supporting Mao, until Khrushchev is ready for a final break with him. The Under Secretary expressed his appreciation for the President’s presentation and said that when he returned to Washington he would pass these views on to those concerned. Ambassador Drumright asked the President whether Khrushchev and the six other members of the Politburo would in fact have any difficulty in ousting Mao Tse-tung later on. The President said there was no question about this and it was only a matter of time until the blow fell. Time would be required because of the considerable influence Mao still retained at the present time.

Mr. Dillon asked whether in the President’s opinion the commune system was created in accordance with the theories of Mao, as opposed to the ideas of the international Communist movement. The President said the communes represented an attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists to apply Communist theories to the mainland. The aim was to form a new kind of society in which the armed forces, industry, and the agricultural sectors would be merged. The system was not closely related to the international Communist movement. Mao appears to work on the assumption that the Chinese people are more pliable than the Russians and can be more easily coerced into this new society. Mao claims the creation of this system as his own. The President said that perhaps too much time had been taken by this discussion of the Communist situation on the mainland and asked whether the Under Secretary had any other questions.

Mr. Dillon said that a year ago when he visited India there was a great deal of concern about developments in Red China because of the feeling that the Communists were making tremendous economic progress which, if it continued, would have an attraction for the Indian people. Now they have seen that the claims made were not true and that much of the so-called progress was false. Nevertheless the Indians still have some fears of Communist China’s rapid economic progress. The United States, the Under Secretary said, has great hope that by working closely together here in Taiwan the United States and China can show that faster and greater progress can be made under freedom than under the slave system on the mainland. Mr. Dillon asked whether in the President’s view the Chinese Communists will be able to continue to develop at a rapid pace.

The President said that given a continuation of past United States policy which allows the Chinese Communists to stabilize their control over the mainland, and in the absence of an external force which would be able to go to the aid of the people there, the mainland population have not much choice but to submit to Communist control. So long as that is the case, the Communists—and particularly Mao Tse-tung—will seek to retain the commune system. The present policy of the United States is not one of trying to get rid of the Chinese Communists but has had the effect of permitting them to retain their control. United States policy with respect to the GRC has been a sound one thus far, but now that a new situation has arisen following the Khrushchev visit to Peiping and the fresh developments on the mainland, it is time for that policy to be reconsidered. The President said he was not asking permission to use troops in open counter, offensive, but for United States agreement that the GRC should be free to take necessary measures to organize and stir up anti-Communist movements on the mainland. Unless that happened, he said, the commune system would continue, and although the Chinese Communists would not be able to score any spectacular successes they would be able to continue their control because the mainland population has no choice. The President asked Mr. Dillon to assure President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter that the GRC for its part will always tailor its policies to fit those of the United States. The Chinese Government has no plan to use its regular forces in an open attack against the mainland, but the time has come, the President thought, to let the GRC use non-military or quasi-military measures to stir up trouble on the mainland and deny the Communists the opportunity to consolidate their position. This is the only way of seeking the eventual destruction of the Communist regime.

The President referred to what he considered a lack of confidence on the part of the United States Government in the capability of the GRC to organize anti-Communist movements on the mainland. Three years ago, the President pointed out, it was decided that a certain amount of equipment would be made available to our Special Forces. Thus far, only a very small amount of the equipment has been delivered. That shows there is a conflict of policy in the United States Government. On the one hand the United States does not wish to use its own regular forces; on the other hand the United States is not willing to permit the Chinese to use non-military or quasi-military to create uprisings. Thus, the President thought, the time had come to let the GRC have more leeway in its activity toward the mainland. Mr. Dillon said that it would be helpful to him if the President could state in a little more detail what he had in mind in the way of effective and necessary measures and “non-military and quasi-military” actions. He also wished to know in more detail what effect these measures would produce on the mainland. The President asked to be excused for his unwillingness to come forward with any concrete proposals at this moment. Two years ago, he recalled, prior to the visit of then Under Secretary Herter,² he had asked for 30 thousand parachutes to be used for training of paratroops. He was supplied with 3 thousand. He has been told from year to year and month to month that this material is being delivered but nothing is received. Apparently there is some fear in Washington that if the Chinese Government were supplied with these parachutes, it might touch off a third world war. So, the President saw no use in outlining his plan in detail. Ambassador Drumright commented that the United States has a 3 thousand-man Special Forces program within the MAP, which was going forward. The Special Forces were being trained. However, these Special Forces are a part of the regular forces. When Mr. Herter was here the President asked him about the possibility of training 30 thousand paratroopers³ and Mr. Herter took the suggestion back to Washington for consideration. Mr. Herter later wrote back in reply that we were willing to have the GRC train additional paratroopers provided this was at no additional expense. However, so far this matter remains between our MAAG and the Chinese military and there has not been any agreement. As to the parachutes, the Ambassador said he had been told that they have had a low priority in our assistance program and that is the reason why they have not been put in the program so far. The Ambassador suggested that if the President feels the parachutes should have a higher priority, it would be appropriate to make this known to the military. The President said that he is sure the project he has in mind will receive the endorsement of the United States Government. In the first place it would not involve the United States in any action, and nobody would even blame the United States for being behind it. There would be no risk of touching off a global conflict.

Mr. Dillon inquired whether the situation on the mainland at the present time was ripe for the defection of the Chinese Communist armed forces. The President said this was definitely the case. The peasantry on the mainland had originally supported the Communists because of the anti-landlord campaign. The experience of the Communists had drastically changed things and now there was deep resentment and opposition to the regime on the part of the peasantry. Since the greater part of the armed forces came from the countryside, this disaffection could not help but be reflected in the armed forces. The coming year would be an ideal time, and there is growing unrest throughout a broad portion of the military forces.

Should there be any organized military force which could take hold on any part of the mainland there would be an uprising supported by a good portion of the Communist armed forces. In view of the friction between Khrushchev and Mao, which has been made more evident during the recent reshuffle of Communist commanders, the possibility exists that the Communist forces might be split in two, one going against the Russians, one siding with the pro-Russians. This possibility, the President thought, had always existed but it would be greater than ever before during the coming twelve months.

Closing the interview, the President remarked that he did not wish Mr. Dillon to go away with the impression that he was dissatisfied with the relations between the GRC and the United States missions here. What he had said this morning related to policy. Mr. Dillon for his part referred to the President’s mention of a possible lack of confidence in the capabilities of the GRC. He said that the United States has the fullest confidence in the President’s judgment, though there might be some difference of judgment regarding the over-all consequences of GRC action and where such action might lead. However, this was a question of policy and did not involve any lack of confidence in the President’s judgment.

Note: As I recall it, the President proposed through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a program to train 30,000 Army troops in parachute jump techniques. This proposal was made either late in 1956 or early in 1957. Nothing happened. When Mr. Herter visited Taiwan in September 1957, the President proposed a reduced, compromise version of the plan, calling for the jump-training of 10,000 troops. In response to this, the Department in effect said it was all right for the GRC to train additional troops in jump techniques—provided it was without additional cost, and provided use of these troops was subject to existing restraints.⁴ In the meantime, Washington approval was given for the training of special forces under the MAP. These are to operate not as guerillas, but as adjuncts of the regular forces. They, too are subject to existing restraints. Provision of equipment under MAP has lagged. (If this note proves inaccurate on further research, a revision will be sent to Tokyo.)

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1508. Secret. Drafted by Osborn. The conversation was held during a visit to Taiwan by Under Secretary Dillon October 21–23, during which he also met with Vice President Ch’en, Foreign Minister Huang, and Defense Minister Yu. Memoranda of those conversations are ibid.
1. Secretary Dulles died on May 24.
2. September 12–14, 1957. For a record of a conversation between Herter and Chiang on September 14, 1957, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 603–607.
3. See note at end of memo. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. See Document 3.