319. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter0
SUBJECT
- S/P Memorandum of November 17 entitled “The Tactic of ‘Partial Responsibility’”1
While we in FE were most interested in S/P’s commentary (Tab A)2 addressed to you on this subject, we differ somewhat from the conclusion which suggests that we should hold the Soviets partially responsible for Chinese Communist actions only where we attach little importance to the usefulness of the USSR in acting as a brake on the Chinese. The following comments are offered in continued support of the thesis that properly used we can gain great advantage from time to time in holding the USSR publicly responsible for Communist Chinese acts which differ from the current Soviet line.
It appears to FE that S/P has slightly misconceived the concept of the “use of the USSR as a brake on Chinese Communist actions”. To be sure, certain appeals must be made in private to have any chance of success, for instance for release of the five American prisoners in China. It was a pity that this appeal broke publicly. However, I have not conceived of using the USSR as a brake mainly by appeals to the sense of reasonableness, justice, and cooperation with the United States. Private actions to seek to get the USSR to moderate Chicoms’ actions at this stage of our relations would, I fear, appear merely as an indication of where we were hurting, as a confession of weakness perhaps. Perhaps it is inherent in a Communist regime invariably to take advantage of such appeals unless a favorable response is procured by the prospect of compensatory advantages to it in some clearly defined agreement.
What I have had in mind has been not use of the USSR by something which would involve direct appeal to or negotiation with it, but rather putting the USSR publicly in such a position that it would later in its own interests react by private efforts at restraint on the Chinese Communists. Perhaps the recent broadcast on the Russian Far East Service obliquely suggesting that Taiwan could be taken by peaceful means is a case in point, coming as it does some time after we publicly put the bee on the [Page 638] Russians on this subject. In other words, I have thought of a two stage process whereby from time to time: 1) we hold the USSR publicly responsible and 2) in its own good time and in its own way the Soviet Union reacts with the Chinese as it finds that it is in its interests to do so.
I, of course, agree with the thesis that “Khrushchev’s difficulties in restraining Chinese Communist actions are likely to be proportionate to the degree of public knowledge that he is attempting to do so”. For that reason when we successfully impute a damaging degree of responsibility to the Russians, we are unlikely to know just how or when they put pressure on the Chinese. Occasionally, later on if we are observant, we may be able to detect developments attributable to use of the tactic of partial responsibility. From the same line of reasoning I find myself in disagreement with the sentence to be found at the end of the same paragraph on page two which reads, “So while public references to Soviet responsibility for any particular Chinese Communist actions will not rule out successful Soviet influence, it probably will reduce its chances.” I would agree with this only if we imputed responsibility to the Soviets publicly and in the same pronouncement rather clearly asked them to do something about it.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/12–159. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons.↩
- Document 316.↩
- The tabs are not attached to the source text; Tab A is Document 316, Tab B is Document 308, and Tab C is Document 312.↩