312. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter0
SUBJECT
- Further Reflections on the “Doctrine of Partial Responsibility”
In a wide range of areas we will want to seek opportunities to test Mr. Khrushchev’s protestations of peace and suggest opportunities for him to apply in practice the doctrine of the denial of force as an instrument of international relations. As this applies to China in the realm of Russo-China affairs it gives Khrushchev the opportunity to apply the restraining hand on China. If he tries and fails, he must either imply criticism of a China that will not submit to his bidding or he must face having [Page 623] to accept responsibility for a partner whose conduct shows the hollowness of the Communist peace offensive. In either case we reap an advantage, be it from the restraining of China, from the frictions induced by Soviet restraining efforts, or from the demonstrated contradictions between bloc peaceful pretensions and practice in a critical area, the Far East.
The “doctrine of partial responsibility” as a policy approach is not new. We have long recognized Moscow’s pre-eminent position in the world Communist movement. So has the Communist world. However, the coincidence of Soviet efforts to achieve a détente in the West and the outbreak of Communist-inspired troubles in Asia gives this policy new emphasis and perhaps greater utility. This “doctrine” is in a sense a diplomatic and propaganda tactic. As a tactic it affords us a degree of flexibility in that the degree of responsibility being undefined, we can decide when and to what extent we are to attribute responsibility to the Soviet Union. It thus has the merit of conforming to reality in that it does not depend on either of the extreme interpretations of the Moscow–Peiping relationships (satellites or equals).
As the degree of responsibility which we assign to the USSR is our option, we can be guided by the particular tactical situation. Further, by assessing the Soviet Union with that degree of responsibility for Peiping’s actions which our estimate of the situation demands, we put the Soviets in the position of having to choose between exposure of the falsity of their announced desire for an East-West détente or of disavowing its position of leadership of the Communist bloc. Intra-bloc frictions could be fanned by either of these developments. If the Soviet Union chose the further and likely alternative of assuring the Chinese People’s Republic privately of its support while continuing publicly to espouse peaceful solutions, we at least force it to live with a false position which we can, as opportunity offers, profitably exploit.
We would, of course, have to be selective in the use of this tactic of “partial responsibility”. One of its by-products is that we should gain support from Asian neutrals who genuinely desire a détente and who will react to the exposure of bloc contradictions. This could pose a further complication for the Soviet Union, assuming Chinese intransigence.
As an alternative to the doctrine of “partial responsibility” we could try to create the impression that Khrushchev expressed concern to the President about Peiping’s behavior. One objection to this is that it invites as a refutation not only a public demonstration of Soviet-Communist Chinese solidarity but also actions designed to give concrete evidence of such solidarity. Another difficulty with this approach is that it might tend to exaggerate in the minds of some of our allies, as well as the American public, the extent of the differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Such a lead on our part would probably receive [Page 624] great press attention and we might find it difficult to maintain our position in the face of press demands for clarification. We would be hard put to adduce the facts which led us to imply Khrushchev was worried about the Chinese and we and the Russians had therefore come closer together than we could admit openly. If this alternative tactic should succeed, it might tend to deepen the Sino-Soviet rift. However, in our view as stated earlier, it would be more liable to lead to redoubled effort by the USSR to prove to the Chinese that there was nothing to the U.S. insinuations of secret US–USSR rapprochement.
It could also be said that the “partial responsibility” principle in a sense puts Peiping on the defensive by forcing it to justify itself to Moscow, modify its policies, or add to the strain in bloc relations. There is nothing in Peiping’s reactions to date, however, to support this thesis— in fact quite the contrary.
The alternative tactic of implying a greater US-USSR rapprochement than exists could put the Soviet Union on the defensive.1 If use of this tactic created doubts in Peiping or concern in Moscow, Khrushchev might find it necessary to explain and deny that he had reached any secret accommodation with us. Not only should this prove easy for him but there is a further disadvantage to this tactic from the U.S. viewpoint. At a time when it was allaying Peiping’s suspicions the Soviet Union would be less likely to criticize or to seek to restrain the Peiping regime lest the Chinese Communists interpret this criticism as indicating Khrushchev may in fact have expressed concern about Peiping actions to the President and reached some accommodation with him. It therefore seems to me of little value to imply in any way that which has no basis in fact and which would result in loud protestations by Mr. Khrushchev denying that he made any such commitment. In order to disprove it he might well bend over backwards to give the Chinese added support required to prove his point.
The alternative tactic also involves some risk that both partners being convinced of the falsity of our insinuations would have reason to lower their estimate of our capacities in this field and hold us in less respect than the facts actually warrant. We cannot ignore the possibility that some of our Asian friends in the process would come to the same conclusion. The effect of the alternate tactic then would be likely to drive Moscow and Peiping closer together, whereas the doctrine of “partial responsibility” not only has some possibility for creating division but also corresponds to the truth. It seems to me that in the judicious use of this doctrine we cannot lose in any way that it turns and we may gain.