Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

318. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)⁰

Washington, November 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Republic of China—Para-military Activities on the China Mainland

Problem

During your talk with President Chiang on October 21, 1959 in Taiwan,¹ he referred to what he considered a lack of confidence on the part of the United States Government in the capability of the GRC to organize anti-Communist movements on the Chinese mainland. With regard to equipment for Chinese Special Forces, he said (according to the official Chinese memorandum of the conversation handed to us later) that we had promised to supply 3,000 parachutes for Chinese Special Forces, but so far had not delivered even one. This he thought indicated a conflict of policy in the United States Government. On the one hand, the United States wishes the GRC to use methods other than military against the mainland; on the other hand, it is dilatory in the supply of parachutes which are needed to strengthen the mainland resistance movement by non-military and quasi-military methods. President Chiang said the GRC does not want the U.S. to use its troops to assist in a counterattack against the mainland, but that the U.S. “must agree” that the GRC is at liberty to support and aid resistance movements on the mainland.

On October 23, Foreign Minister Huang Shao-ku referred to President Chiang’s statements to you about U.S. support for the GRC’s anti-Communist campaign on the mainland and said he hoped you would convey President Chiang’s views to the Secretary and the President.² You said that you would look into the matter upon your return to Washington.

Discussion

A. This problem goes back a number of years. A summary of developments is attached as Tab A.³ There is no conflict in policy in the U.S. Government on this matter. Chiang apparently considers our training of 3,000 Special Forces under the MAAG as a first installment on his more grandiose plan for the training of 30,000 troops in air-drop techniques. We did not promise the GRC 3,000 parachutes as President Chiang states. We did agree to the training of 3,000 Special Forces and have scheduled 1,487 parachutes for the Special Forces for delivery under the FY 1959 MAP. According to an Army source in the Pentagon, our military does not have large stocks of such parachutes; they must be continually ordered from the manufacturer and, when delivered, are allocated on a world-wide priority basis. Our source said that the 1,487 parachutes will arrive in Taiwan in late January or early February 1960.

Additional parachutes are programmed for FY 1960 and FY 1961.

B. The United States does not object in principle to strictly non-military (i.e., political, psychological, intelligence, and underground resistance) activities by the GRC on the mainland; this is implicit in our support of the GRC as the government of all China and is one of the principles of the Joint Communiqué of October 23, 1958. However, there appears to be a difference between us and President Chiang in interpretation of “non-military.” Air-dropping large numbers of troops on the mainland is quite different from infiltrating agents or dropping them individually or in small numbers. We therefore feel that Chiang’s plan could not be considered non-military or quasi-military and should be considered “use of force” in the sense of the Exchange of Notes of December 10, 1954 and the Joint Communiqué.

C. We do not believe that GRC troops air-dropped either in small or large groups on the mainland would have much chance of success under present conditions. This opinion is shared by our Country Team in Taiwan (Tab B),⁴ and apparently by Generals Chiang Ching-kuo (President Chiang’s son), and Lai Ming-tang (Vice Chief of the Chinese General Staff). We therefore feel that Chiang’s paratroop plan is not sound military strategy under existing circumstances. Failure of an endeavor of this type could have grave consequences in terms of lowered morale among free Chinese and of a decline in the GRC’s international standing.

D. A combined exercise using GRC and US Special Forces was held in May this year in an effort to demonstrate to the Chinese both the capabilities and limitations of its unconventional warfare forces. The exercise gave the Chinese a clearer idea of the function of these Special Forces as contrasted to paratroopers in possible mainland activities.

E. The GRC thus far has been unable to develop an effective organization on the mainland that could enlist support for the GRC and capitalize on any disaffection in the Chinese Communist army or large-scale rebellion that might occur. We believe that this is the field where it should concentrate its energies at this time, since this would be an indispensable preliminary to exploiting possible large-scale revolts on the mainland.

F. We do not believe that any GRC actions can “stimulate” large-scale mainland revolt. Any such revolt would more probably result from intolerable internal conditions generated by the oppressive policies of the Chinese Communist regime. However, the existence of an effective GRC organization on the mainland might make possible GRC assistance to and exploitation of any resistance movement that might come into being as a result of Communist misrule.

G. We have now received the Country Team’s assessment and recommendations (Tab C).⁵ They closely parallel our own thinking here.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to call in Ambassador Yeh and discuss the matter raised by President Chiang along the following lines:

1) We, of course, sympathize with the GRC’s desire to restore the mainland to freedom and will continue to give what support we can to GRC measures to attain this objective by political means, including propaganda and psychological warfare.

2) We believe the highest priority should be given to determining mutually agreed GRC resistance assets to be developed on the mainland, and United States agencies are prepared to give all practicable assistance in making this determination, as well as subsequently in supporting this effort.

3) We understand that the MAAG training program for 3,000 Special Forces is under way and will be completed in the spring of 1960. According to information available to us, approximately 1,500 parachutes suitable for paratrooper use are scheduled for delivery under the FY 1959 Military Assistance Program early in 1960. Additional parachutes are included in the FY 1960 and FY 1961 Military Assistance Programs, according to the MAAG in Taiwan. If there is further question concerning delivery of parachutes, we suggest that it be taken up directly with U.S. military authorities in Taiwan.

4) Employment of these Special Forces would, of course, be governed by the Exchange of Notes of December 10, 1954, pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Communiqué of October 23, 1958. Unilateral employment of GRC forces, whether regular or special, against the mainland would be contrary both to these undertakings and to the international interests of the GRC.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/11–2459. Top Secret. Drafted by Kahmann and Bennett and cleared by the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security, John O. Bell, and in substance with ISA.
1. See Document 310.
2. See the source note, Document 310.
3. The tabs are not attached to the source text, but the document under reference, headed “Background on Chinese Government Interest in Training Paratroopers for Guerrilla Activities on the Mainland,” is in Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1959; see Supplement.
4. Despatch 195 from Taipei, October 12, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1259)
5. Despatch 245 from Taipei, November 5, not printed.(Ibid., 793.5–MSP/11-559)
6. Dillon initialed approval of the recommendation on December 3.